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historians/' said Sir J. Knox Laughton at 
the recent International Historical Congress, 
* * have considered, and therefore people in general have 
considered, that the navy is merely an engine for 
fighting battles." That is an attitude which it is 
becoming increasingly easy to avoid, because its fallacy 
is being ever increasingly exposed ; though, until our 
present standard naval history is superseded, there 
remains in being a monumental example of that prime 

It is that fallacy, or rather, that lack of true pro- 
portion, which it is particularly necessary to avoid 
in this study of the Navy of the Restoration. The 
Restoration period is one of vital interest and import- 
ance regarding the development of the Navy as a self- 
containing, independent service, and as a part of the 
nation. It is not too much to say that it is during this 
period that there is the first dawn of a service con- 
sciousness esprit de corps. That " very calme and 
good temper " with which the fleet as a whole took 
any and every political change that came along was 
not mere stolid indifference, nor a stupid dull obedience 
resulting from thick brains ; there was as much live 


interest in questions of the day in the Navy as in the 
Army, but it scarcely ever became so uncontrolled as 
to gain the upper hand of discipline ; though once, in 
February, 1660, it rose perilously near the danger 
point. The naval captain rarely forgot that he was 
not a mind himself, but a part of a unit, of a squadron 
or a fleet. The precision of the English ships when 
manoeuvring drew applause from friend and foe alike, 
and that at a time when tactical manoeuvres were 
in their infancy : no mere letter-of-the-law discipline 
could have enabled them on the third day of the great 
Four Days' Fight, when they were shattered and torn 
by a three days' losing fight against superior odds, to 
have retired in the perfect order in which they did, 
one line covering another like a bulwark, a splendid 
example of a well-ordered retreat. Nothing but 
loyalty, loyalty to fellow- captains, to the admiral, 
loyalty to the service, could have compassed such a 
feat. It is true the fleet was honeycombed with petty 
personal spites and quarrels but a contrast to those 
in the Dutch fleets they were not indulged in to the 
service's detriment. Even in the notorious case of the 
division of the fleet in June, '66, the crime was com- 
mitted-supposing the story is true-by one man, to 
curry favour : and the storm of complaints, of abuse, 
that arose from all ranks of the fleet, was too unanimous 
to be but the wailings of Englishmen weeping for their 


country ; it was the deep and bitter resentment of the 
professional seaman who sees his profession disgraced 
by a blunder criminal to him to the true professional 
it were better to die than blunder. 

The attitude of the Navy towards the Restoration is 
specially interesting, for then the new spirit was already 
born but not yet conscious, it could be used, not under- 

Thus, in trying to treat of things in their true 
proportion, I have given a comparatively small space 
to the actual fighting, and have endeavoured rather 
to give space to the things that matter now, to treat 
of things at that time, not as events between 1658 
and 1667, but as threads of a pattern that is still being 
weaved, spans of a bridge that is still being built. 
There lies one great danger in the way of such an 
attempt, one great difficulty ; the danger of looking 
at the past as the past, the difficulty of looking forward 
from the past to the present instead of merely the 
reverse. In all cases of naval operations it is as essen- 
tial to appreciate what the various commanders did 
not know, as it is to know everything : more so. And 
to carry the point further, to the question of ideas, 
there seems to be a great danger in the unconscious 
assumption of the existence and comprehensibility at 
that time of ideas which are commonplace axioms at 
the present day. The most striking case in point 


during this period is that of the Mediterranean ' policy ' 
which, though to the modern eye it was clearly practised 
then, was, with equal definiteness, to them a meaning- 
less, pointless incident or turn of chances. 

I have, where possible, gone to original sources for 
every point ; the exceptions to this rule have full 
references, the most extensive being to the important 
Sandwich papers brought out by Mr F. R. Harris in 
his Life of Mountagu; not having had access to the 
originals I have been compelled to take them second- 
hand ; I have given full reference in each case. I have 
also been unable to see the Dutch MSS. at the Rijks- 
museum. For the rest, my main authorities have been 
the Pepys MSS. at the Pepysian and Bodleian Libraries, 
and the Admiralty papers at the Admiralty Library 
and the Public Record Office. I have been compelled 
to limit the scope of the essay to naval operations in 
European waters, and consequently to omit the ex- 
peditions of Holmes and Harman in the West. I have 
also but barely touched on the particular questions 
of 'shipbuilding,' and 'the Flag and the right of 
Recognition and Salute.' Lest the size of the Biblio- 
graphy seem disproportionate with the essay itself, I 
should explain that I have considered the compilation 
of a comprehensive bibliography one of the most 
important parts of my work. 


My thanks are due to Dr J. R. Tanner, of St John's 
College, to Mr S. Gaselee, Librarian of the Pepysian 
Library, Magdalene College, who kindly gave me every 
facility for access to the Pepys MSS., and also to 
Professor C. H. Firth, and Mr R. G. Perrin, Librarian 
of the Admiralty Library, for doing me a like service 
at the Bodleian and Admiralty Libraries respectively. 
I am greatly indebted to Mr F. R. Salter, my History 
Tutor at Magdalene, who, during my absence in Fiji, 
undertook entire charge of the proofs ; also to Mr H. R. 
Tedder, Librarian of the Athenaeum, who has given 
me invaluable assistance in the correction of proofs 
of the Bibliography. 

A. W. T. 

January 1915 

P.S. The difficulties attending the correction of 
proofs under active service conditions, which have 
greatly delayed publication, will, I trust, at least par- 
tially excuse the more palpable faults and omissions 
which under happier circumstances I should have 
hoped to correct and repair. 

April 1916 







1. Civil. Navy Office . , .39 

2. Discipline. The Fleet . . .57 


1. Preliminaries . . . . 102 

2. 1665 . . . . , . 112 

3. 1666 . . . ... 144 

4. 1667 . . . . . . 179 

BIBLIOGRAPHY: sources of English Naval 

History, Sept. 1658 to July 1667 . 192 

INDEX .... 231 


To illustrate the Second Dutch War (1665-1667) At end 
Mouth of' the Thames . 



" THE credit of your navy is so greatly impaired 
that having occasion to buy some necessary provisions, 
as tallow and the like, your minister can obtain none 
but for ready money 1 ": so wrote the Admiralty 
Commissioners to the Council of State two months 
before the death of the Protector ; nor was it the first 
time that they had written in that strain. The reins of 
government were indeed already loosening in Oliver 
Cromwell's grasp, and the Navy early felt the change. 
The all too small assignments to the Navy had been 
diverted in part to the Army, and to pay the salaries 
of the Protector, the Judges and others. A naval 
administrator without money is like a sower without 
seed, and at a decent interval after the death of Oliver 
the Commissioners again wrote a bitter complaint to 
the Council giving a vivid picture of the financial 
condition of the Navy. They wrote, " we have several 
times laid before you the great straits and necessities 
of naval affairs and hoped something would have been 

done The late sad change has constrained us to 

silence, but the need becoming more pressing, and no 
whit provided for, we must remind you thereof, the 

i Cal. S. P. Dom. July 6th, 1658. 

T. 1 


rather that the receipts assigned to the Navy are again 
in part diverted and diminished, though falling very 
short of the charge. We have struggled to keep off 
clamours, but ships have to be kept abroad upon dead 
wages, contracts and debts are unpaid, the stores are 
unsupplied. and contracts for the ensuing year have to 
be disannulled. We beg that the Navy income may 
not be diverted, and that some course may be taken to 
carry on the service 1 ." 

On September 3rd, 1658, Oliver Cromwell died, and 
on the 4th his son Richard was proclaimed Protector 
of England : " the Vulture died, and out of his ashes 
rouse a Titmouse 2 ." The trouble anticipated with so 
much eagerness by the Royalists seemed to be very far 
off. The proclamation was peacefully accepted through- 
out the country : the fleet under Rear- Admiral Bourne 
" made bold to manifest the truth of its affection by the 
expense of some powder from the several, ships in the 
Downs 3 " a proceeding for which Bourne was severely 
reprimanded 4 : which did not, however, prevent him 
from * making bold ' once again, on this occasion " to 
expend some powder to solemnize the funeral of his 
late Highness 5 ," precisely 14 days before that ceremony 
took place. Apart, however, from such small contre- 
temps, the fleet adapted itself very readily to the change 
of government ; and, with one or two exceptions in 
the Mediterranean squadron, there were no objections 
raised by the commanders against subscribing to an 

1 Cal 8. P. Dom. October 14th, 1658. 

1 Heath's Chronicle, p. 409. 

Cal. 8. P. Dom. September 8th, 1658. 

4 Rec. Off. Adm. Sec. In Letts. September 10th, 1658. 

6 Cal. 8. P. Dom. November 9th. 


address, which Mountagu prepared, swearing fidelity 
to the " undoubted rightful Protector 1 " as against 
royalist and republican. Indeed the fleet showed at 
this juncture the same loyalty towards its admiral that 
made it so important a force a year and a half later. 
The change of government did not mean improved 
administration or finance so far as the Navy was con- 
cerned. A spasmodic attempt was made to remedy 
some of the abuses of absenteeism among the dockyard 
officials, but there was no alteration made at the root 
of the evil ; the shortness of supply continued and, 
inevitably, its consequences developed and worsened. 
The political split that was growing, between the sup- 
porters of Richard and Fleetwood and his republicans, 
had a twofold result, in increasing the neglect of the 
Navy and in still further weakening the credit of the 
government : a strong healthy debtor is a more reliable 
person than one who is constitutionally weak. When 
it became necessary to set out a fleet, in November and 
again in February, the cry of the Navy Commissioners 
was for ready money. " Unless there be a present 
supply of money to provide necessaries," they write 
on February 14th, " there will be a full stop to your 
affair, for our credit is gone .... The hemp merchants 
deliver n6t what they have, because not paid for the 
former ; timber, plank, cordage, and the like, not to 
be gotten because no compliance with bills .... Although 
we know that of late we have given good price for several 
provisions, yet now men's stocks and credit being 
drawn out who have usually dealt with us other men 

1 Brit. Mus. E. 999, 12, " A true Catalogue." 



will not deal upon any terms 1 ." Contractors, seamen 
and dockmen alike suffered from this intolerable 
neglect. Some ships had already gone 2| years unpaid 
at Richard's accession some actually being still unpaid 
in the spring of 1660, a period of 4 years without pay 2 . 
Some contractors were bankrupt, others had paid the 
State's debts with their own money, others borrowed to 
pay them. An estimate of the debts of the Navy to 
November 1st, 1658, gives the total as 541,465. 14s. Id., 
of which 160,000 is due on bills already signed, 266,257 
due for wages of seamen, 25,000 for wages in dock- 
yards 3 . Eight months later the total has risen to 
703,703. 16s. 3d., 210,000 due on bills, 317,600 in 
wages to seamen, 38,000 in wages in dockyards : the 
growing charge to December 1st is estimated at 549,490, 
making a total of 1,253,193. 16s. 3d., " towards which 
the provision already made exceeds not the summe of 
260,000...," the remainder "falls much short of 
answering the pressing occasions of the Navy unto 
which they are applyed." "Present action" needs 
20,000 a week and upward, while since May 31st 
" there has not been received 8,000 a week 4 ." 

The following pathetic little series of letters is 
typical of the ever increasing volume of entreaties and 
complaints with which the Navy Office was inundated : 
" DOVER, July 2nd, 1659. 

Our need at Dover is so exceeding great that we are 

Jtramed to cry out to you to help us to the money due 

1 Col. 8. P. Dom. February 14th, 1659. 

* 8. P. Dom. Int. coxxn. f. 28. 

Adm. Lib. MSS. 8, Orders and Warrants, 1658-60. 

4 Ibid. July 8th (" Report touching money for supply of Naval! 
occasions "). 


to this poor town. Our condition is so bad that we are 
weary of making known our wants... 3 quarters account 
due to us 

August tith. 

Is so much out of pocket, and so much engaged, that he 
cannot remain silent, but must still be begging a supply. 

August Wth. 

Hopes pity for their condition at Dover and an order 
for some money, as they are always in action, and as speedy 
with dispatch of business as any port in England 1 ." 

etc., etc. 

" Let me be an humble petition," writes Major Bourne, 
a commissioner, "in y e behalf e not only of many 
hundreds of poore seamen and their distressed wives 
and children who are ready to starve (having their 
just pay kept back) and in y e name of many poore 
widdowes and families who are in danger of utter ruine 
for want of due payment for their goods ; But also in 
behalf of divers other persons who tho' their estates are 
larger yet suffer extremely both in reputation and loss 
of Trade by a non compliance w th them in point of 
payment, who have given a vast creditt to the Nation 
for supply of Navy stores... 2 ." 

With shortness of money came also the inevitable 
shortage and badness of victuals, and the State Papers 
contain numerous complaints against both quantity 
and quality. " At Woolwich," writes Vice- Admiral 
Goodson, " I find the men are victualled with fiery salt, 
old and rusty meat, and this not only by report but 
have seen and tasted some of it myself. At this place, 

1 Cat. 8. P. Dom. 1658-9, 1659-60 passim. 

2 Bawl. MSS. A. 187, f. 1. 


when men have been at their labour all day, they cannot 
get their provisions till night 1 ." 

In the face of such facts as these in the administra- 
tion of the Navy, it is not a little surprising to find quite 
a considerable activity on the part of the State ships. 
It was probably the inertia of Cromwell's naval energy. 
He had initiated a naval policy which necessitated, and 
made use of, an effective permanent fleet : and even 
though the idea of a fleet as a purely diplomatic argu- 
ment was not yet appreciated, the principle that a fleet 
was a unit that was usable for other things besides a 
battle melee was already deeply set. The new govern- 
ment acted on, if it did not understand, the principle, 
and the year following the death of Oliver is one of 
a naval activity that is extraordinary, in the light of 
the financial difficulties, when it is remembered that 
England was not at war and had no specially warlike 
thoughts against any of her neighbours. 

Since 1657 there had been war in the Sound between 
Denmark and Sweden : in the summer of 1658 the 
Netherlands, after remaining neutral for some time, 
joined to support the Danes, and early in November 
they gained a hard-won victory. In the meantime the 
English government had decided to interfere with the 
object of ensuring a reasonable balance of power in 
those waters : neither a Dutch nor a Swedish supre- 
macy was likely to favour the English trade. Sir George 
Ayscue was to go out and endeavour to mediate between 
Denmark and Sweden. The original idea was that 
wo " fit vessels 2 " should accompany him. Early in 

1 Gal S. P. Dom. February 10th, 1659. 
8 Ibid. October 25th, 1658. 


November, however, a fleet 1 was ready to sail for the 
Sound under the command of Goodson : Ayscue was to 
go with it. On the 17th Goodson sailed from the 
Downs. Winter had already set in, and the English 
fleet, meeting some very rough weather, was forced to 
put in at Sole Bay. There Goodson was kept until the 
beginning of December. He made use of the time to 
supply the fleet with pilots or their substitutes : 
originally he had only one pilot. After " rummaging 
the fleet, according to the sea phrase," he found six 
mates and midshipmen somewhat " acquainted with 
the Sound," whom he distributed amongst the ships 2 . 
At length, early in December, he got clear of the coast 
and made for the Scaw, meeting with winter gales and 
heavy seas, and being " hurried to and again by the 
foul weather." Not until the 15th did the fleet arrive 
off the Scaw, and then " on account of the ice and 
violent cross winds 3 ," it being impossible to get into the 
Sound, it was decided at a council of war to return to 
England. The following day the fleet was scattered by 
a violent snowstorm and gale, and when the whole of 
it had reached the English coast by December 30th, it 
was found that no less than 12 ships had more or less 
serious defects, one being entirely dismasted. 

This unfortunate experience did not, however, deter 
the Parliament from preparing a still larger fleet to 
go to the Sound in the following spring. For a time 
the question was in doubt as to whether it should be 
sent : news of the Dutch preparations settled it. " It is a 

1 List in S. P. Dom. Int. cxcv. ff. 72-3. 

2 Cal. S. P. Dom. November 30th, 1658. 
8 Ibid. December 21st. 



shame," writes a news-letter, " that wee should sitt still 
at home with our hands in our pocketts, and to let the 
Dutch goe with so great a fleete into the Sound, and so 
probably have it delivered up by the Dane unto them, 
and we sit still at home, and not to come and interpose 
by way of mediation to keepe the balance equall 
betweene those two Princes, that the Dutch may not 
take it from them both, and give a law to us as to our 
navigation, the woodden walls of the nation 1 ." At the 
end of February, Parliament decided to send a fleet. 
On March 12th, Mountagu, having been appointed 
' General-at-Sea,' went on board his flagship, the 
Naseby, on the 22nd he set sail with a fleet of 51 sail 
including 18 of 50 guns and over, 13 between 40 and 50, 
and 8 between 40 and 26. On April the 6th the 
vessels anchored in Elsinore Roads. He had arrived 
before the expected Dutch reinforcement, and immedi- 
ately made precautions against their arrival, setting 
guards in the entrances to the Sound while he himself 
lay before the town and castle of Elsinore. He sent a 
letter to Opdam, the commander of the incoming 
Dutch fleet, explaining his mission ; he desired Opdam's 
" assistance in promoting the peace " and asked, 
" that you will not suffer the fleet or fleets under your 
command to act in hostility against, or give any further 
assistance to either side, or act in such a way as may 
occasion jealousy between England and the United 
Provinces, whilst these endeavours are on foot 2 ." In 
the meantime Goodson was given orders that if the 
Dutch attempted to relieve Copenhagen he was to 

1 Clarke Papers, ra. 183. 

Rawl. MSB. A. 64, f. 43, printed in Thurloe 8. P. vn. 645. 


engage them " and fight with, sink, take or destroy 
such of them as shall proceed to pass through as afore- 
said ; the which myself and the rest of the ships of the 
fleet. . .shall second and stand by you in 1 ." 

At the same time that he wrote to Opdam, Mountagu 
had written to the Kings of Denmark and Sweden also 
explaining his mission, " a common friend to you both, 
contributing what in me lyes to remove those diffi- 
culties, that may be in the way of the peace 2 ." The 
term ' common friend,' however, was not one that was 
true in any but a very superficial sense. The one 
constant factor in the negotiations was the utter dis- 
trust that the Dutch and English had of each other : 
Mountagu's feeling was best illustrated by his pre- 
cautions ; De Ruyter wrote home " that the English, as 
far as he was able to judge by their manner of Proceed- 
ing, seemed ill intentioned, notwithstanding all their 
fair Protestations, and that he believed they turned 
Affairs in that manner, with Design to favour Swede- 
land 3 ." Mountagu had corresponding suspicions con- 
cerning the Dutch and the Danes. Consequently it 
was almost inevitable that his good relations with 
Sweden should prosper rather at the expense of his 
4 common friendship.' Then came the news that the 
two Dutch divisions under Opdam and De Ruyter 
intended to unite which would have given them a 
united fleet of over 80 ships. In a council of war it 
was decided to berth the ships " in the most advan- 
tageous manner to hinder the conjunction 4 ." Before 

1 Sandurich MS. Journal, i. 67 in Harris, Life of Mountagu, I. 124. 

2 Thurloe 8. P. vn. 645. Life of Tromp, p. 215. 
4 Sandwich MS. Journal, i. 87-90, in Harris, op. cit. i. 128. 


even this plan could be put into execution there came 
the news which changed the whole face of matters so 
far as Mountagu and the English were concerned. 
Richard Cromwell had been deposed. His last instruc- 
tions to Mountagu show how much the whole policy of 
the English towards the Dutch was changed : " you 
shall carry yourself friendly towards them and use your 
endeavours that by consent they may not give their 
assistance to the Dane, until the issue of the treaty be 
known, but not engage with them unless it be in your 
own defence 1 ." The fleet accepted the new political 
change with the " very calme and good temper 2 " that 
characterises it through the recurring changes at this 
time ; at a council of war it was decided, in the light of 
the new instructions, to withdraw northward to the 
Scaw, and from that time the English fleet is of interest 
merely as the focus for the intrigues that finally won 
over Mountagu to Charles, and through him, the fleet. 
The other scene of active naval action was the 
Mediterranean. In July, 1658, it had been resolved in 
council, " on consideration of the Mediterranean trade, 
that a fleet be continued there of the same strength as 
formerly 3 " : consequently Capt. John Stoakes remain- 
ed out in those waters doing useful work in the way of 
pirate-catching 4 , of which the most noteworthy incident 

1 Thurloe 8. P. vn. 666. 

2 Public Intelligencer, May Slat-June 6th, 1659. 

3 Gal. S. P. Dom. July 27th (Council Proceedings, 5). 

4 Piracy was not by any means confined to the Mediterranean : 
the Irish Sea was a favourite haunt of pirates, a large number of whom 
were Spanish. " There are great complaints by merchants of pirates 

being on the coast and none of the state's ships to look after them 

There are no less than 5 pirates now upon the coast, some carrying 
22 guns apiece. . .if some course is not taken to secure the coasts all 


was the capture of Victorio Papachino, " the prince of 
Spanish pirates." " He was so confident as to give us 
chase, taking us for three Baccallas men," writes Capt. 
Bonn of the Phcenix. " We chased him for nearly 
seven hours before we could bring him by the lee, and 
would not have effected it then had not his sails been 
all shot to pieces. The force of his vessel is ten guns 
and some pedereros. She sails well, on which account 
Papachino always kept her full of men for the purpose 

of boarding The news of his being in our hands is 

very welcome in this place, and the French are no less 
joyful than ourselves 1 ." Successes such as this, a peace 
with Tunis, and the quietening down of the sea-rovers 
in the Mediterranean, gave an opportunity for Stoakes 
and his squadron, as being no longer necessary, to be 
recalled and " the public charge eased 2 ." At the 
end of July the English squadron left the Mediterranean 
once more at the mercy of the Corsairs. Not yet was 
it realised that for a Mediterranean policy to be effective, 
to be a policy, it must essentially be continuous and 
without gaps of time or force. 

trade will be spoilt." (Cal. S. P. Dom. July 29th, 1659.) Such is an 
official report from the Lancashire coast. Another official account 
from Ireland tells of worse things, 14 vessels lost in a week off London- 
derry, from Coleraine : " there are 17 vessels, great and small, 
ordered to ply this coast, so that it lies under a universal ruin," off 
Carrickfergus 28 vessels have been lost in eight days. (Cal. S. P. 
Dom. July 13th.) It is probable these stories are exaggerated ; 
however, in May, 1660, it was noted in council " that there are 
now at present ten Pyrats which ly upon that coast " (Barnstaple) 
Add. MSS. 22,546); in March, 1659, the only warships in the Irish 
Sea at all were the Ouift Prize, 16 guns, and the Fox, 14 guns. 
(Carte MSS. 73, f. 227.) 

1 S. P. Dom. Int. CLXXXIII. 96. 

8 Cal. S. P. Dom. February 18th, 1659. 




The following list will give a better idea of the real 
condition of the Navy before the Restoration than pages 
of description. There seems no reason to doubt its 
fundamental accuracy. 

" A List of the fleete of this Commonwealth both at Sea and in 
harbour, with accompt of their respective stations and present 
condition and the time they have been unpaid. March, 1659. 

Guns unpaid 

(James (V.-Ad. Lawson) 56 
Worcester 48 





In the Hope being 

Portland . . 



foule and out 




of victuall and 




unfitt for ser- 




vice till they be < 

Dragon . . 



repair having 
laide there 

Taunton .. 




since 20th Dec. 





Pearle . . 






^Convert . . 



( Kentish .. 



Winsby .. 















Bradford . . 



Forrester . . 



In the Doivnes and 

Norwich . . 




sent forth upon 




severall occa- j Grantham 



sions of con- ^ Cheriton . . 



voy, etc., many 
of them being 





Drake . . 



Martin . . 



Nonsuch (Ket.) 



Eaglett . . 






Roe (Ket.) 



Sivallow . . 






Cignett . . 






Total men 

*J 1 






Plyeing to the 
W. t. in the 

Saphyre . . 
Const Warwicke 

mouth of the 

Sonlings . . 

Chan, sound- 

Oxford . . 

ings, most of - 


them being 

Fagons . . 

foule and out 


of victualls and 


want repairs. 

Wolfe . . 

^Griffin . . 


. 40 10 


. 38 16 


. 30 13 

Fame . . 

. 22 18) 

Bryer . . 

. 22 13 / 


. 30 10 



4 Ketches plying nr. Thames Mouth. 

2 bt. Maze and Yarmouth. 

Gone convoy to Portugall. 
Helena Is. 

., Hope. 

Minding N. Sea fishery. 
Ply on N. coast. 




Guift Prize 

Foxe . . 






17 J 

Ply bt. Portland, 

Aldern. etc. 
G.c. to Jersey. 

Coast of Ireland. 

16 Guard of Medway. 


In Port cleaning and victualling. 
54 231 

54 14 



32 2\ Ports- 
26 17 J mouth 

2675 men. 
Total 7240. 

Ships lately come into Port and intended to be paid off. 




at Portsmt. 







having ben 


there almost 




3 months 



> 4 mon. and 

their whole 

Newly in. 



1 coy. borne 





' on them. 



23 j 
27 j 





As additional guard 
for the Channele 







Shipps now refitting and victualling. 

Richard 66 

London 64 (Sr. Ri. 

Speaker 54 









3210 men. 

Ships gone convoy to the Streights. 

Leopard .. .. 50 13 

Preston .. .. 40 16 

Jersey 40 15 

Elizabeth .. .. 40 14 

710 men. 

Ships at Jamaica. 
Diamond 36 

Hector . . 
Pearle .. 









495 men. 

Shipps in Harbour. 
































Gt. Charity 









































10 1 





Lyon 56 

1 gt. galley 

1 Carte MS. 73, 227. 



NEGLECTED as was the history of the Navy until the 
Power of latter end of the last century, ignorance had 
Naval"*' resulted in an almost absolute non-recog- 
an s d hs ne nition of the influence of the fleet upon the 
Restoration and the intrigues and negotia- 
tions accompanying it. The more modern refusal 
to recognise that influence is, however, less com- 
prehensible. It is possibly true that merely as an 
armed force the fleet " could only apply pressure by 
intercepting trade and cruising outside ports," by 
blockade " in circumstances which made effective 
blockade impossible 1 " ; but as a moral force the Navy 
was far from being negligible on either side of the 
Channel. There were simple reasons for this. In 
England after the death of Cromwell every party, every 
political force, had lost half its power through divisions 
and dissensions ; there was the Army against the 
Parliament, Lambert against Monk, the Rump against 
the ' Secluded Members,' minor sect against minor 
sect, petty faction against petty faction, until no man 
knew where to turn for authority and there was no 
' power ' in the land. The one exception to this rule 

1 Hannay's Royal Navy, I. 298; cf. also Camb. Mod. Hist. iv. 


of chaos and disunion was the Navy. There were of 
course differences of opinion, of belief, among officers 
and men ; there are plenty of signs that all shades of 
opinion, from royalist to republican, were represented 
in the fleet ; but the important fact is that opinions 
seem to have had no effect on discipline as regards the 
fleet as a whole. In that sense it is true that the Navy 
followed and ' did not lead 1 ' at this critical time ; it 
did follow its commander a unique discipline and 
obedience which at that time gave it a special prestige 
and power. The fleet had no politics beyond those 
of its commander. It was the royalist tendencies of 
Mountagu that brought it back in haste from the 
Baltic, the apparent parliamentarianism of Lawson 
that took it up to Greenwich to demand a free parlia- 
ment, and again the royalism of Mountagu that took it 
over to Scheveling to meet Charles. 

Across the Channel the prestige of the Navy had an 
added importance. The position to which Cromwell 
had raised the English Navy still claimed a healthy 
respect from the European powers and they were 
closely interested possibly more so than the English 
themselves to see which party was to have the control 
of the one reliable force the country owned. According 
as to whether he could show the Navy on his side or 
not, so would be the provision or the lack of that 
financial support and diplomatic toleration which were 
so essential to the practical working of Charles' schemes. 
" I am to tell you by his Majesty's command," writes 
Clarendon, " that if any impressions could be made upon 
the Navy, or a part of it, that five or six ships would 

J Hannay's Royal Navy, i. 298. 


betake themselves to his service, the consequence and 
reputation of it would be so great that all would be done 
from hence and from France that could be wished 1 ." 
20,000 pistoles were to be promised to the officers and 
men of these ships. " You may think," he continues, 
" that such a sum of money if it be in our power, might 
hire ships to do our work as well, and it may be it would 
do so, but the money can be in our power to no other 
purpose, nor upon any other terms, than upon getting 
off part of the English Navy, which would persuade 
those who would assist us that the rupture and divisions 
are in truth as great as we report it. Whereas, while 
they see the Navy entire and against us, they will not 
be persuaded that we can make a prosperous attempt." 
It would indeed have been a vivid proof of the greatness 
of the divisions if the fleet had caught the general 
contagion and become divided against itself though 
the fiasco of the royalist revolt in the fleet in 1648 
scarcely offered good prospects for the success of such 
a split. But with the conversion of Mountagu and 
Lawson to royalism the fleet became ipso facto a royalist 
weapon and when the long-wished-for fleet came to 
fetch Charles back, it was not merely ' five or six 
ships,' but over thirty of the pick of the English Navy. 
By the end of April public opinion tended almost 
universally towards Restoration, largely because it 
was the obvious and apparently inevitable outcome of 
events inevitable because it was widely believed that 
Monk and Mountagu aimed at restoring Charles and in 
their hands was a powerful and willing instrument in 

1 Clarendon S. P. m. January 12, 59-60, Hyde to Wright 

T. 2 


the form of the fleet. Because the influence of the 
fleet during the time between Mountagu's appointment 
to the command and his arrival at Scheveling is not 
calculable in any concrete way, is no reason for assuming 
that it was really negligible. The mere passive presence 
of that force, believed to be in royalist hands, in the 
Thames, probably acted as a very liberal royalist 
education to many waverers. 

The process of gaining control of the fleet was on 
conversion of the whole a less unedifying spectacle than 

ltagu - such an intrigue might be expected to be- 
possibly because a great part of it is hidden from our 
view. Mountagu was the most important person to 
catch and even before he left England for the Sound in 
1659, hopes were entertained of him, and it was thought 
that " there might be application made to him of no 
small hopes 1 ," and it was not long before Charles 
opened negotiations. " I am assured by so many who 
believe they know much of your mind and purposes," 
wrote Charles, " that you have much affection for me, 
and a resolution to do me all the service you can, that I 
think it necessary you should know from myself, that I 
am very willing to be served and obliged by you, . . . and 
you may be confident I shall never expose you upon 
any rash undertaking for the vindication of it, but 
concur with you in such councells as are most proper, 
and shall give you all evidence of my beinge heartily 
your most affectionate friend 2 ." But Mountagu was 

1 Clarendon MSS. 60, f. 465. 

2 Clarendon MSS. 60, f. 436, May 9th, 1659, a Draft in Hyde's 


" withall extreme cautelous 1 ," and he had besides a 
real regard for Richard Cromwell : it needed more than 
tactful or flattering letters from Charles or his followers 
to make him royalist. The republicans at home soon 
provided the necessary impetus. The deposition of 
Richard left the government in the hands of a repub- 
lican militarism particularly distasteful to Mountagu, 
and from him they received " no assurance, only 
compliment 2 " ; so, " as if resolved to declyne all the 
precepts and examples of Policy in the Christian 
world, by aggravating a malcontent in supreme com- 
mand so far out of reach 3 ," they deprived him of his 
lodgings at Whitehall, his regiment of cavalry and pay, 
sent out as Vice- Admiral, John Lawson, a man who had 
few reasons 4 for being well disposed towards him 5 , 
and, as a final proof of their petty inability either to 
trust or to dismiss, they sent out three new commis- 
sioners, Honeywood, Boone and Algernon Sidney, to 
act as joint plenipotentiaries with Mountagu in other 
words, to act as a check on his actions. 

The royalists were more clever, and Mountagu 
now became the centre of secret intrigues of which he 
was a more or less passive subject, Whetstone and 

1 Clarendon 8. P. in. 488, June 15th, Mr Herbert's report on M. 
to King. 

2 Cal 8. P. Dom. July 10th, 1659. 

3 Clarendon MSS. 61, f. 172, June 10th. 

4 In January, 1656, Mountagu, then young, inexperienced, 
absolutely ignorant of the sea, had been appointed joint commander 
of the fleet with Blake over the head of Lawson, an experienced 
seaman and fighter. Lawson resigned. 

5 " Lawson's fleet, appointed to guard the Narrow Seas, is rather 
to bring Montague to reason." Cal. 8. P. Dom. July 10th, 1659. 



Edward Mountagu 1 the go-betweens, and Charles and 
Clarendon the authors : everything that tact, persua- 
sion and bribery could do was done, down to the offering 
of an earldom, the Garter, any command or office he 
might desire 2 . But Mountagu's caution was only 
equalled by his secrecy, he was not to be enticed into 
any immature or rash attempts, and the King got 
scarcely anything more satisfactory or tangible than the 
* compliments ' that had annoyed Parliament. It is 
evident, however, that by August the Admiral was a 
virtual, if not a confessed convert, for in that month 
there came an opportunity for him to prove his good 
or ill will towards the King without at the same time 
unduly endangering his own skin. 

It was an opportunity after Mountagu's own heart 
and he made full use of it, both defensively and offen- 

As we have seen, the fleet had been originally sent 
Return of * ^ ne Sound to maintain the balance of 
Baltic fleet. p Ower j n fa^ q uartei . } to balance the Dutch 

support of Denmark by affording Sweden the moral 
support of a large fleet : it was, in other words, a 
natural continuation of the Cromwellian policy of 
hostility to the Netherlands. The change of govern- 
ment in England, however, brought a change of official 

1 Ed. Mountagu was the Admiral's cousin ; Whetstone, O. Crom- 
well's nephew. 

2 Clarendon MSS. 61, f. 291 (Whetstone's instructions), 303 (to 
Mountagu), 335 (to Morland) ; 62, f. 30 (to Hyde). In Clarendon S. 
P. in. 497 (Hyde to Ed. Mountagu) there is even -a suggestion that 
Gen. Mountagu should take any ships that would follow and appear 
off some good harbour in the King's name. 


policy ; republican ascendancy put republican sym- 
pathies in power, and republican Holland became, in 
the eyes of Fleetwood and his friends, the natural 
ally of a republican England. Consequently the new 
commissioners were given instructions favouring Den- 
mark rather than Holland, and between July 25th and 
August 4th an agreement was come to between Holland 
and England that their combined fleets should force 
a settlement and compromise upon the combatants 1 . 
The King of Sweden protested at this arrangement, 
" telling the English lords, ' I accept of you for my 
mediators, not for my arbitrators, for as much as you 
continue in the terms of good friends ; and for you ' 
(turning himself to the lords Netherland commissioners), 
' I refuse you for my mediators, since you are my 
enemies 2 ' " ; and in this protest he had the sym- 
pathies of Mountagu with whom he had been on the 
best of terms throughout the negotiations. A policy 
thus in itself distasteful to Mountagu was made but 
little less so to him by its chief upholder, Algernon 
Sidney, one of the new commissioners. It is unne- 
cessary here to trace the story of the antagonism and 
inevitable quarrel between these two men, the one 
capable, inquiring and republican, the other clever, 
secretive and royalist 3 ; it is only the final stage of it 
that has a direct bearing on the movements of the 
fleet. Up to the time of the change in English policy 

1 Manley, Late Warres, p. 82. 

2 Thurloe S. P. vn. 736. 

8 Harris in his Life of Mountagu, vol. I. pp. 142-157, gives a 
detailed account of it, quoting largely from the Sandwich MSS. 
Journal, I. 109-128. 


the English and Dutch Fleets had acted as armed 
sentinels on each other, manoeuvring to obtain strategic 
positions ; and late in July Goodson had written from 
the Sound : " the change of government hath putt a 
longe stoppe to affaires here, the Dutch not well 
knowing how to deale with their old antagonist our 
present Parliament. Their fleete and wee have bin 
long facing one another in this and the Belt 1 ." But 
now that they were to act in combination there was no 
need for the continuance in the Sound of such large 
fleets, while with the English the victualling question 
was becoming serious. A proposal was set on foot that 
proportional number of ships from each fleet should be 
withdrawn to return to their respective countries. 
Sidney trusted the Dutch to carry out their side of 
such an agreement, Mountagu rightly as it proved 
did not, and he came to a decision, on which he promptly 
acted, to return with the whole fleet. He described the 
whole proceeding to Richard Cromwell a few weeks 
later : " when y e victualls of y e Fleete was spent to a 
months proportion at whole allowance the consideration 
of sending y e whole or a part of it home became neces- 
sary e, and after much discussion amongst y e plenipo- 
tentiaries at last wee resolved to send it all home, 3 

of us beinge for it and only Coll. Sidney against it 

Two very powerful reasons were y e Dutch would send 
away none of theire Fleete whereby if wee had left 
fifteen shipps behind it would have beene useless and 
at theire mercye, and y e other y e absolute necessity 6 
for want of victualls, wee could not have been supplied 

1 Clarke Papers, TV. 29. 


in any way wee could devise 1 ." In other words 
Mountagu was quite determined to return home : he 
knew that a royalist rising in England was imminent 
and he fully appreciated the effect that the proximity 
of the fleet under his command would be likely to have. 
The delay caused by Sidney, however, proved fatal to 
any royalist hopes Mountagu may have had. The 
sporadic risings throughout the country had fizzled out 
before the fleet reached England, and Mountagu, 
helpless and yet suspected as he was, went into retire- 
ment and the command of the fleet passed to the yet 
unconverted Lawson. 

Thus it looked as though Mountagu and the fleet 
had failed, as though the time and trouble, tact and 
promises, expended on his ' conversion ' had been 
wasted. In reality, however, a big step towards 
ensuring final success had been taken ; Mountagu's was 
the bigger one of the two names the fleet would follow, 
and, the leader secured, it only remained to supply a 
safe and favourable opportunity for him. 

Mountagu's caution had led him to a right appre- 
ciation of the weakness as well as the strength of the 
fleet in this question of Restoration. No fleet could 
lead the nation in an unpopular direction, it could force 
obedience to no unwished-for government ; and in 
September, 1659, the nation as a whole (if that can be 
spoken of as a whole which is split and torn into 
innumerable squabbling sects and factions) did not yet 
want the Stuarts back. The nation knew not what it 
wanted a mystery that was finally solved partly by 

1 Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 312, cf. also Tanner MSS. 51, 
ff. 69-127. 


elimination, by experience, of things it did not want, 
partly by an admixture of tact and bluff on the part of 
three men using the fleet as their instrument 1 . 

It was not until the early part of December that the 
Navy r Navy took any concerted or decisive action 
Army> with regard to the civil disturbances and 
changes 2 . By that time England, and especially 
London, was heartily tired of the vagaries of military 
rule under the name of the "Committee of Safety"; 
notice was made of " strange discontents growing in the 
City and other places 3 ." and on December 13th, Lawson, 
in the name of the fleet in the Downs, wrote to the Mayor 
and Aldermen of London enclosing a declaration "in 
order to the removal of the interruption that is put 
upon the Parliament the Thirteenth of October last 4 ." 

1 A tabulated summary of the whole process is contained in a 
MS. list of the " Ten Changes of Government in England : from May 
1659 to May 1660, viz. : 1. In May 1659 Richard Protector. 
2. In the same month Wallingfordhouse. 3. In June following 
the Rump restored. 4. In October a Committee of Safety. 
5. In December the Rump againe. 6. In January Genii. Monk. 
7. In February y secluded Members. 8. In March a Councell 
of State upon y 6 dissolution of y 6 secluded members. 9. In Aprill 
a parliament convened. 10. In May y 6 King Lords and Commons." 
This is on the fly-leaf of " An Exact History of the several changes of 
Government in England" (1648-60). BriL Mus. E. 1917 (2). 

2 On November 4th, a party of naval officers, including Stayner 
and Wm. Goodson, had written a letter to Monk remonstrating with 
him for his opposition to the English army (printed in Whitelocke's 
Memorials, p. 687) : the ineffectiveness of which proceeding is 
a good example of the futility of any attempt of any part of the 
Navy to act as an independent power instead of merely as an instru- 
ment in the hands of a leader. 

3 Monthly Intelligencer, December, 1659. (Brit. Mus. 669, f. 22 

4 The Declaration is printed in the Mercurius Politicus for 
December 22-29, p. 975; and Lawson's letters in the Public 


This, however, had no effect and received no answer, so 
Lawson took a more practical method of showing the 
firmness of his intentions, and on the 17th he was 
sailing up the Thames, much to the alarm of the existing 
authorities. Sir Henry Vane and some military 
officers went down the river to meet him and endea- 
voured their utmost to persuade him not to come further 
up the river, but Lawson was quite firm and irre- 
sistible, and the same evening he came to anchor off 
Gravesend with his fleet of some 24 ships. Vane and his 
companions made feverish, futile attempts to win over 
Lawson, or even to obtain the removal of part of the 
fleet down the river : but Lawson had the whip- hand 
and kept it. On the 21st he sent a second letter to the 
Mayor and Aldermen enclosing the declaration and a 
copy of the previous letter : and as, on this occasion, 
the fleet was near enough to lend point to their resolve 
" if it cannot be done by Christian and friendly 
means ... to use our utmost endeavor for the removal 
of that Force " (put on Parliament by the army 
officers 1 ) the effect was immediate, and success rapid : 
the plans of the army officers fell to pieces at the 
touch : 

Intelligencer for December 19-26, p. 967 (Brit. Mus. E. 773), also 
in Granville Penn's Memorials (Penn wrongly dates the second 
letter the 29th), with a Narrative of the Proceedings of the Fleet, 
n. 186. The declaration is an interesting and noteworthy exception 
to the usual navy attitude of no interest and non-interference in 
civil matters ; it " disclaimed the interest of Charles Stuart," and 
advocated the maintenance of the " maimed or dismembered," and 
of widows and orphans of sailors, the abolition of tithes, excise, and 
of impressment " in any military employment either by land or sea, 
otherwise than in the defence of his country." 
1 See previous reference. 


" December 17th. The Council took care to issue 
forth immediately the writs for the election of a Parlia- 
ment, and it is thought they had proceeded vigorously 
therein, but for Vice- Admiral Lawson his declaring 
(this day) for the Old Parliament, which began to put 
the council of officers at a stand 1 ." So complete was 
the ' stand ' to which they were put, that by the 24th 
their rule was a thing of the past, and Parliament 
House again open and clear of guards : on the 26th 
the Rump of the Long Parliament sat once again. 
In spite of appearances there were not wanting people 
to say that the Navy action was all part of a royalist 
plot 2 , and it was probably that fact and also a certain 
undesirable restlessness in the City, which led Lawson 
to send a third letter to the Mayor and Aldermen on 
December 28th, speaking of " Charles Stuart's party " 
and suggesting the advisability of a " total, absolute, 
and publicke disowning and discountenancing of 
them 3 " : and on January 7th he was " still in the 
Thames, to awe the City which talks high 4 ." 

Affairs in England at this moment were in an extra- 
ordinary state of ferment : " truly," writes Hyde to 
Bennett 5 , " the People there (in England) are so 

1 Monthly Intelligencer, No. 1, December, 1659 (Brit. Mus. 
669, f. 22 (51)). 

2 Baker's Chronicle, p. 698. How little truth there was in 
this suspicion may be gathered from Clarendon 8. P. m. 628 
(Broderick to Hyde, December 16th). " Lawson with his two 
squadrons attempted the Tower, and negociate in all parts of the 
Nation, never considering themselves embarked in the same ship 
with us. . . .They say the King offers nothing." 

3 Brit. Mus., Thomason MSS. 669, f. 22 (43). 

4 Clarendon S. P. ni. 640, Lambourne to Hyde. 

5 Jbid. p. 647, January 17th ; 1660. 


fantastical and change their minds so often, that I 
believe they who live within twenty miles of London, 
and receive letters thence every day, know as little 
what will be done the next day as we do," and again, 
44 1 believe if you did at this instant receive twenty 
letters from London of the same date with our last, you 
would receive so many several opinions of the state of 
affair there, according to the constitutions of the 
persons who write 1 " : any attempt to detail the 
course of all these changes would fortunately, however, 
be out of place here ; they may be briefly summarised. 
Apart from Lawson, the one force, the one man in 
the country was George Monk, commander of the 
Army in Scotland, a man of action, to be frightened 
neither into tears like Fleetwood, nor into supercau- 
tious inactivity like Mountagu. Until he heard of 
Lawson's declaration and move up the Thames, Monk 
had contented himself with improving the fitness and 
discipline of his army and with keeping up more or less 
futile negotiations with Fleetwood and Lambert : on 
the receipt of the news from the Thames and from 
London he started on his march south to London. 
Lambert's army in the north of England melted before 
Monk who made a slow unopposed progress through 
England : it was not until the end of January that he 
came as near as St Albans. There Lawson and his 
captains " presented their Acknowledgments to Gen. 
Monck at St Albans, who gave them a very courteous 
reception 2 ." On February 3rd, with 5600 men Monk 
entered London, his forces " in very good plight and 

1 Clarendon 8. P. m. 641. 

2 Public Intelligencer, January 23rd-30th, 1660, p. 1052. 


stout officers 1 ." A week later he declared against the 
Rump and for a fully representative Parliament, a 
death- knell to the Rump which caused universal joy 
that night, says Pepys, " Bow bells and all the bells 
in all the churches as we went home were a-ringing. . . 
and at Strand Bridge I could at one view tell thirty-one 
fires 2 ." It was the beginning of the end : the whole 
attitude towards Charles had altered in a week or two : 
" Everybody now drinks the King's health without any 
fear, whereas before it was very private that a man 
might dare do it 3 ." 

And now it was that the Navy again became a vital 
Navy and factor not as an independent force, but as 
the stuarts. an a ll_i m p Or tant instrument in the hands of 
Monk, Mountagu and Lawson. The nation no longer 
hated the idea of the Restoration but was still in a 
doubtful, touchy mood : both tact and bluff were 
needed if the King was to be restored without a hitch. 
Monk had the necessary qualities and means for both. 
Though neither he nor Mountagu, who had been 
appointed joint General-at-sea with him, showed their 
hands, there is no doubt that by the beginning of 
March they were determined in their own minds as 
regards the Restoration. On March 6th Mountagu 
told Pepys that " he did believe the King would come," 
though he thought he " would not last long. . .unless 
he carry himself very soberly and well 4 " : and by 

1 Pepys' Diary, February 3rd, 1660. 

2 Ibid. February llth. There are a number of letters from 
Pepys to Mountagu describing events in London from October 
onwards in Carte MSS. 73, f. 320 and foil. 

3 Pepys' Diary, March 6th. 

4 Ibid. 


March 18th Monk was in definite negotiation with the 

With Mountagu and Monk converted there remained 
conversion one important person to be made sure of. 
ofLawson. j n S pite of the command he had held, 
Mountagu was no true seaman, and, though his tact 
might soothe some opposition, he was not the man whom 
the seamen would follow naturally : but Lawson was. 
Sailor born and bred, he was a sailors' leader, a man 
whom they would follow with less question than any. 
His conversion then was necessary if the fleet was to 
be a reliable instrument of Restoration. As early as 
December 16th, Broderick had written, "if the King 
would find some means to treat with Lawson it is not 
improbable but he may in some measure be wrought 
upon 1 " : Broderick's next notice of him on December 
30th speaks volumes of the intervening fortnight, 
" Lawson. . .a Sea-Fairfax, so sullen, so senseless, of so 
obstinate a courage and so wayward an animosity. . A" 
Lawson was evidently a hard nut to crack ; during 
December and January he took, as we have seen, 
every opportunity to disclaim the interests of Charles 
Stuart, but after Monk's arrival in London he seems to 
have adapted himself to changing circumstances. We 
hear of no protest from him against Monk's treatment of 
the Rump though he was still in the Thames with his 
fleet ; later on he sent his congratulations to Mountagu 
on his appointment to command of the fleet 3 , an 
appointment whose outcome he must have foreseen ; 

1 Clarendon 8. P. in. 629 (Broderick to Hyde). 

* Ibid. 

3 Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 355. 


and on March 23rd he welcomed Mountagu on board 
the Swiftsure and stepped down to second in command. 
" The Fleet is now secured to your Majesty's service, 
by Lawson's proffer to do what Mountagu shall direct 
him," writes Lord Mordaunt to the King on the 24th, 
" Mr Bremes has wrought him so to it 1 " : and that 
is all that appears of the process of Lawson's con- 

It remained to convert the fleet itself in order to 
Conversion ensure success. Pepys, who was with the 
of the fleet. fl ee {. as Mountagu's secretary (and inciden- 
tally remarks, " I pray God to keep me from being 
proud or too much lifted up thereby "), gives vivid 
glimpses in his Diary of the gradual preparation of the 
fleet for royalism. On March 29th he gives a hint of 
what a difficult task Mountagu and the royalists 
would have had with the Navy unaided by Lawson : 
on that day he writes : " this evening was a great 
whispering of some of the Vice- Admiral's captains that 
they were dissatisfied, and did intend to fight them- 
selves, to oppose the General. But it was soon hushed, 
and the Vice- Admiral did wholly deny any such thing, 
and protested to stand by the General 2 " : an incident 
which rather gives the impression that even Lawson 
had had some difficulty in controlling some of the 
officers. Mountagu, however, was determined to have 
his fleet as thoroughly reliable as possible. " After 
dinner " (April 1st), says Pepys, " My Lord did give me 
a private list of all the ships that were to be set out 
this summer, wherein I do discern he hath made it his 

1 Clarendon S. P. ra. 706. 
a Pepys' Diary, March 29th. 


care to put by as much of the Anabaptists as he can 1 ." 
Lists of commanders and officials were also drawn up 
by Pepys and Creed, and against any doubtful char- 
acters notes were made, such as " distracted," " use- 
lesse, and in matter of attendance," " querie his 
affection," " Anabaptist," etc. 2 ; further procedure was 
as follows : "At night he (Mountagu) bid me privately 
to get two commissions ready, one for Capt. Robert 
Blake to be Captain of the Worcester, in the room of 
Capt. Dekings, an anabaptist, and one that had 
witnessed a great deal of discontent with the present 
proceedings. The other for Capt. Coppin to come out 
of that into the Newbury in the room of Blake, whereby 
I perceive that General Monk do resolve to make a 
thorough change, to make way for the King 3 ." On 
April 8th, Mountagu and the fleet sailed from the 
Thames and anchored in the Downs on the following 
day : London needed overawing no longer ; and the 
Straits of Dover being the highway of the ever-increasing 
stream of intrigue and negotiation between Charles 
and his would-be subjects, the presence of the fleet in 
the Downs had a special strategic importance. Pepys 
with his exceptional advantages is again the best 
chronicler of events in the Navy at this time : " April 
17th. He " (Mountagu) " told me clearly his thoughts 

1 Pepys' Diary, April 1st. 

2 Carte MSS. 73, ff. 264, 402 ; 74, f. 490. 

3 Pepys' Diary, April 15th. M. wrote to Monk complaining of 
Dekings and Captain Newbury the former had " designed in the 
river very weake and undutifull thinges " but with characteristic 
caution asked that " if any thinge be done towards them, a motion 
by any member of the Councell may doe it, and take off any unkind - 
nesse from mee towards them." Carte MSS. 73, f. 399. 


that the King would carry it, and that he did think 
himself very happy that he was now at sea, as well for 
his own sake, as that he thought he might do his 
country some service in keeping things quiet 1 ." " 21st. 
This day dined Sir John Boys and some other gentlemen 
formerly great Cavaliers, and among the rest one 
Mr Norwood, for whom my Lord give a convoy to the 
Brill, but he is certainly going to the King. For my 
Lord " (cautious ever) " commanded me that I should 
not enter his name in my book. My Lord do show 
them and that sort of people great civility. All their 
discourse and others are of the King's coming, and we 
begin to speak of it very freely 2 ." Now too, after 
years of stern Puritanism the spirits of the fleet began 
to rise : on the 23rd " the first time that we had any 
sport among the seamen " ' my Lord ' himself " fell to 
singing of a song made upon the Rump, with which 
he played himself well 3 ." " Every man begins to be 
merry," and supper parties with music after them 
became the fashion : ". . .to supper, where. . .we had 
very good laughing, and after that some musique " 
not quite satisfactory to the critical Pepys " Mr 
Pickering beginning to play a bass part upon the vial 
did it so like a fool that I was ashamed of him 4 ." On 
May 1st, " the happiest May-day that hath been many 
a year in England," " they were very merry at Deal, 
setting up the King's flag upon one of their maypoles, 
and drinking his health upon their knees in the streets 

1 Pepys' Diary. M. was evidently not at one with present day 
opinion that the influence of the Navy was insignificant. 

2 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. March 26th. 


and firing the guns 1 ." Two days later Mountagu made 
public to the Fleet the King's Declaration 2 . " This 
morning my Lord showed me the King's declaration 
and his letter to the two Generals to be communicated 
to the fleet. . . .Upon receipt of it this morning by an 
express, my Lord summoned a council of war, and in 
the meantime did dictate to me how he would have 
the vote ordered which he would have pass this council, 
which done the Commanders all came on board, and 
the council sat in the coach (the first council of war 
that hath been in my time), where I read the letter and 
declaration ; and while they were discoursing upon it, 
I seemed to draw up a vote, which being offered, they 
passed. Not one man seemed to say no to it, though 
I am confident many in their hearts were against it. 
After this was done, I went up to the quarter deck 
with my Lord and the Commanders, and there read 
both the papers and the vote ; which done, and de- 
manding their opinion, the seamen did all of them cry 
out, ' God bless King Charles ! ' with the greatest joy 
imaginable." This form was repeated throughout the 
fleet, Pepys going from ship to ship reading the Declara- 
tion to vote, " not one through the whole fleet showing 
the least dislike of the business 3 ." The next day 
Mountagu sent, simultaneously, an account of the pro- 
ceedings to the King 4 , and an application to Parliament 

1 Pepys' Diary, May 1st. 

2 " King Charles II. his Declaration to all his loving Subjects, dated 
from his Court at Breda in Holland 4/14 of April, 1660." London, 
1660, 4, pp. 8. 

8 Pepys' Diary, May 3rd. 

* Clarendon M8S. 72, f. 165, also printed in Lister's Life of 
Clarendon t m. 104. 

T. 3 


for permission to send that account to the King. He 
had something about which to be satisfied, he had 
justified his extreme caution and tactfulness in gradu- 
ally educating the fleet up to royalism, in accustoming 
them to the idea of Restoration, by the success with 
which his ultimate appeal met ; and though he thought 
Monk " but a thick-sculled fool " he was willing " to 
let him have all the honour of the business 1 ," knowing 
that the King himself knew the due proportion of merit 
to be assigned to each. Then followed a week of gay 
bustle in the fleet ; ordering of alterations, of music 
and flags, pulling down " all the State's arms in the 
fleet," setting up the King's, and all the other multi- 
tudinous preparations necessary for what was a change 
not merely of rule, but of national spirit. 

Parliament and its commissioners were now the 
Fleet at on ^y cause of further delay of the King's 
scheveiing. re t urn delay which the King begged 
Mountagu to cut short by crossing to Holland. Monk 
too wrote to Mountagu " that the King's friends 
thought his Majesty's present repair to London was 
absolutely necessary, and therefore he wished mee 
(Mountagu) to sail and waft the King over as soon 
as I could 2 ": this Mountagu, after "a high debate 
with the Vice and Rear-Admiral 3 whether it were 
safe to go and not stay for the Commissioners 4 ," 
decided to do without waiting for the Commissioners, 
and on the 12th he sailed for Holland, arriving off 

1 Pepys' Diary, May 3rd. 

2 Quoted from Sandwich M88. Journal by Harris, op. cit. vol. I. 
p 182. 

3 Lawson and Sir Rich. Stayner. 

4 Pepys' Diary, May llth. 


Scheveling on the 14th. On the following day the 
Court moved to the Hague, and there were gay times 
there in which most of the fleet joined as opportunity 
allowed. Pepys for instance, as his habit was, did 
himself well ; and in the experience he had one morning, 
" being not very well settled," of mistaking " the sun 
rising for the sun setting," he was probably far from 
unique in the fleet 1 . The King too had his joys : 
when he received the money that had been brought 
over for him he was " so joyful, that he called the 
Princess Royal and Duke of York to look upon it as 
it lay in the portmanteau before it was taken out 2 ." 

In the meantime several days very rough weather 
prevented the King from visiting his fleet. But on the 
16th he appointed his brother, James, Duke of York, 
Lord High Admiral of England 3 , and on the 22nd the 
new Admiral went out to his fleet amidst general 
salutes, Mountagu offering " all things to the pleasure 
of the Duke as Lord High Admiral." "Nothing in the 
world but going off of guns almost all this day 4 ." 

The fleet of which James then took command 
numbered 32 ships of war of all sides, of which the 
principal were : 

Naseby, Gen. Mountagu, Capt. Cuttance 80 guns, 

London, Vice-Adm. John Lawson 64 guns, 

Swiftsure, Rear-Adm. Sir Rich. Stayner 60 guns, 

Richard, Capt. Jno. Stoakes 70 guns, 

besides four other ships of over 50 guns. 

1 Pepys' Diary, May 14th-26th, contains a full and vivid account 
of the festivities before and during the King's crossing to England. 

3 Ibid. May 16th. 3 The patent only dates from June 6th. 

4 Pepys' Diary. 



On the following day the King himself came on 
board with the rest of the Court amidst 
" infinite shooting off of the guns, and that 
in a disorder on purpose, which was better than if it 
had been otherwise." After dining in great state Charles 
purged the fleet of the more obtrusive of the unpleasant 
memories by rechristening a number of the ships : 
the Naseby became the Charles, the Richard the James, 
the Speaker the Mary, the Dunbar the Henry, the 
Winsby the Happy Return, the Lambert the Henrietta ; 
some lower rate ships also changed their names. 
" That done," says Pepys, " the Duke of York went 
on board the London and the Duke of Gloucester 1 the 
Swiftsure. Which done, we weighed anchor, and with 
a fresh gale and most happy weather we set sail for 
England." The voyage was short and prosperous; all, 
from the King downwards, very merry. On the 25th 
the fleet arrived off Dover and the general spirits rose 
still higher. At breakfast the King and the two Dukes 
paid a tactful compliment to the seamen to whom they 
owed so much ; " there being set some ship's diet 
before them, only to show them the manner of the ship's 
diet, they eat of nothing else but pease and pork, and 
boiled beef 2 ." Gifts of 50 for Mountagu's servants 
and 500 for the officers and men of the King's ship 
were an earnest of the practical nature of the gratitude 
to the fleet Charles felt and meant to demonstrate. 
The reward of the rest of the fleet and of Mountagu in 
particular was yet to come, and in the meantime the 

1 Charles I's youngest son : died of smallpox in September of 
that year. 

2 Pepys' Diary, May 25th. 


King and Court landed at Dover and set off for London 
to the accompaniment of enthusiasm that was almost 
hysterical in its fervour. 

The fleet had done its work ; it remained for the 
country to do due honour to the King who 
had been brought back to them. The 
combination of tact, patience and bluff had proved 
successful : tact with the seamen, patience and bluff 
with the nation : it is not surprising that Mountagu 
was pleased with himself for his share in the proceedings. 
" My Lord," says Pepys 1 , " almost transported with 
joy that he had done all this without any the least blur 
or obstruction in the world, that could give an offence 
to any, and with the great honour he thought it would 
be to him." 

He had not long to wait for the expected reward. 
The day after the King's departure a letter arrived 
from the Lord Chancellor announcing to Mountagu that 
he had been created an Earl and asking what style he 
would take so that the patent might be prepared 2 : on 
the following day came Sir Edward Walker, Garter 
King-at-Arms, with the George and Garter, and in the 
presence of all the commanders Mountagu was forth- 
with installed as Knight of the Garter. The rest of 
the fleet had longer to wait : but anticipation the 
King had promised a month's pay all round kept 
them merry ; Pepys tells of Cuttance, Stayner and 
Lawson " drinking all day," and perhaps it was to 
check the exuberance of spirits that on the 4th " the 
King's Proclamation against drinking, swearing and 

1 Diary, May 25th. 

2 Carte MSS. 223, f. 210. 


debauchery, was read to our ships' companies in the 
fleet 1 ." It was not until July that the ships received 
the promised ' gratuities,' of which the principal were 
the Charles (late Naseby), 801. 19s. 6d., the London, 
580. 13s. 6d., the Swiftsure, 444. 13s. 6d., and the 
Royal James (late Richard), 369. 4s. 3d. 2 Lawson and 
Stayner were knighted on September 25th. 

1 Pepys' Diary, June 4th. 

2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSB. 9311. 



1. Civil. Navy Office. 

THE restored Stuarts had every reason for having a 
due regard for the Navy and its importance. During 
their exile Cromwell's effective naval policy both in 
home waters and in the Mediterranean, and the prestige 
it had gained for the English Navy, pointed a moral of 
the truth of which they had had practical experience 
before their restoration, when they found how necessary 
for them was some sound naval support. The effect- 
iveness of that support once gained gave added point 
to the moral. Fortunately for the Navy, however, 
inclination and interest, as well as strategy and diplo- 
macy, were present to encourage the Stuarts to a prac- 
tical care for Naval affairs ; not only was there Prince 
Rupert, the enterprising leader of the forlorn royalist 
squadron of 1649-50, but James, Duke of York, the 
King's brother and now Lord High Admiral, had been 
destined for that post from boyhood, and if ever 
personal interest and administrative skill could compen- 
sate for lack of practical experience, they did so in his 

It was no easy task that James took up when he 


became head of the Navy. The Commonwealth and the 
Protectorate had bequeathed two things to him: a 
policy, and a debt. The policy was, briefly, that of a 
large and effective fleet both for political and com- 
mercial purposes ; and herein lay the sting of it for the 
new rulers ; it was a compulsory policy. Had James 
been inclined to neglect or reduce the fleet public 
opinion, or rather commercial opinion, would soon have 
made itself effectively felt through Parliament. Divine 
Right was no longer a working doctrine in practical 
politics ; petitions out of Parliament and resolutions 
in it, neither could be ignored without risk of unplea- 
santness, unpleasantnesses might be dangerous, and 
the dominating principle of Charles II's rule was his 
determination not to go on his ' travels ' again. Crom- 
well's regard for the protection of trade, and the further 
increase of that trade, had led to a far higher standard 
of expectation on the part of merchants, and the 
political consciousness which no amount of ' loyal ' 
declarations or the like could destroy, gave that 
expectation a practical power. 

It was the irony of fate that, at the same time that 
he inherited an unavoidable policy, James 

Initial Debt. . ..,.,'. , 

also inherited with it a heavy debt that 
could not but dog any efforts he should make towards 
securing increased efficiency. As we have already 
seen, the political chaos that followed on the death of 
the Protector, the weak and changing governments, the 
general sense of insecurity, had had their inevitable 
effect on the Navy ; mismanagement and neglect had 
left the department practically bankrupt. In February 
of that year the wages debt to seamen alone amounted 


to nearly half a million 1 , some ships having gone 
unpaid for as much as four years, and the total debt of 
the Navy in June must have amounted to over three 
quarters of a million 2 . 

It was organisation rather than reorganisation that 
the Navy needed. Cromwell had made a practical 
weapon of the fleet and had demonstrated some of its 
uses, but the machinery behind it had been personal 
and individual rather than official and departmental : 
and, despite its drawbacks, departmental administra- 
tion is absolutely necessary to give reliability and 
permanency to a great service. In other words, the 
Navy had to be officialised and formalised into the 
shape of one of the public services. 

James recognised what was necessary, and the best 
test of what he did to meet that need is the fact that the 
structure he set up lasted without any vital changes 
until the beginning of the 19th century. 

In the meantime, however, the Navy could not stand 
still while new arrangements, new organisations were 
being devised. It was like building a coach on a chassis 
already and continually in motion a process having 
both its advantages and disadvantages, the advantages 

1 8. P. Dom. ccxxn. 23. 

8 Tanner in Camb. Mod. Hist. v. 170, says they amounted to 
" more than a million and a quarter " : but by * debt ' he apparently 
means the total charge, which was being continually though inade- 
quately met. According to the official report of July, 1659, the charge 
of the Navy (including all debts) up to December 1st was estimated 
at 1,253,193. IQs. 3d., " towards which the provision already made 
exceeds not the sumrae of 260,000," " present action " needed 
20,000 a week and upward, but " since May 31 has not been 
received above 8000 a week." (Admiralty Lib. MS. 8. Orders 
and Warrants, 1658-60.) 


of evolution and the disadvantages of patchwork. The 
first step was, on May 31st and June 2nd, to order the 
provisional continuance of all the standing arrange- 
ments with regard to the Navy, the issuing of " monies 
for the necessities of the Navy " and of " victuals and 
all things necessary for the Navy, as formerly, until 
further orders 1 ," and in the respite thus given a definite 
scheme of establishment was drawn up in the form of 
proposals by Sir Wm. Penn in the name of the Duke 
of York. On June 27th a committee of eight, including 
the Duke, Monk and Mountagu now Earl Sandwich 
was appointed " to meet on. . .the 30th of this instant, 
at eight of the clock in the morning, to consider of a 
Paper delivered in by his Royal Highness touching the 
regulation of the Navy, this day read at the board ; 
and. . .to make report unto His Majesty of what they 
conceive fit to be done thereupon 2 ." And on July 2nd, 
upon consideration of that report, the existing commis- 
sions were ordered to " forbear to act 

New officials. ' ... 

from henceforth 3 , and four " principal 
officers " : Sir George Carteret (Treasurer), Sir William 
Batten (Surveyor), an unnamed comptroller 4 , and 
Samuel Pepys (Clerk of the Acts), were appointed, to 
be assisted by three " commissioners for the navy " 
Lord Berkeley, Sir Wm. Penn, and Peter Pett, esquire. 
Two days later the salaries of the new officials were 
fixed : the Treasurer 2000 per annum, the Comp- 
troller 500 (including former allowances), Surveyor 

1 Penn, Memorials of Sir Wm. Penn, n. 241. 

2 Penn, u. 242; the Proposals are printed in Appendix T. 
pp. 589-92. 

3 Ibid. n. 243. 

4 Sir Robert Slingsby was subsequently appointed. 


490 (including allowances), Clerk of the Acts (including 
allowance) 350, and 500 per annum to each of the 
commissioners. Thus the new form of administration 
was a compromise between the systems of the Common- 
wealth and pre-Commonwealth times ; the offices of 
Lord High Admiral and the principal officers had been 
revived only to be part of a commission which came to 
be known as the Navy Board, and the Commonwealth 
system of a fixed salary had been combined with the 
older one of fees and allowances. The choice of new 
officials afforded on the whole a good omen for the 
future management of the Navy : with one exception 
the new men were all men of experience 1 in some 
branch of military service : the exception was Pepys. 
Sir George Carteret had already served as Comptroller 
in 1659, having been brought up to the sea. The 
testimony of his enemy Sir Wm. Coventry is telling: 
"he is a man that do take the most pains, and gives 
himself the most to do business of any man about the 
court, without desire of pleasure or divertisements," 
" which," remarks Pepys, " is very true 2 ." Sir 
Robert Slingsby was " almost the eldest sea captain 
surviving 3 ." Sir Wm. Batten had already been Sur- 
veyor of the Navy from 1638 to 1642, besides having 
seen considerable active service. Sir Wm. Penn was a 
seaman born and bred, " bred up under Sir Wm. 
Batten 4 " ; the debt which the Restoration Navy owed 

1 There are short biographical notices of most of Pepys' colleagues 
at the Navy Office in Wheatley's Pepyaiana (companion volume to 
the Diary], chap. iv. 

2 Diary, October 30th, 1662. 

8 Col. S. P. Dom. 1660-61, p. 16. 
' Diary, August 21st, 1660. 


to him was almost incalculable, he was the best English 
commander whether of a ship or a fleet, and he was a 
seaman who could turn s his practical experience to use 
in an administrative office ; as we have seen, he was the 
chief framer of the new naval constitution. Lord 
Berkeley had served in active service under Turenne 
for over three years ; while Peter Pett had already 
served nearly thirteen years as commissioner at Chat- 
ham Dockyard, and though his loyalty to the ship- 
building family of which he came made him unpopular 
with those not related to him, it is questionable whether 
it seriously lessened his value to the State as an experi- 
enced shipwright. And finally Samuel Pepys, though 
he had acted as Mountagu's secretary with the fleet in 
the Baltic and at the Restoration, can have known 
little or nothing of the Navy, and " so little of accounts 
that apparently he learned the multiplication table for 
the first time in July, 1662 1 ." 

Nor was the principle of utilising experience neg- 
lected in the following years. Sir John Mennes, who 
succeeded Slingsby on the latter's death in 1661, had 
had wide experience of naval service, though it vexed 
Pepys " that so great a trust should lie in the hands of 
such a fool 2 " : and when in 1664 two additional 
resident commissionerships were created, at Portsmouth 
and Harwich respectively, the appointments went to 
men of practical experience ; while in the case of the 
two other additional commissioners appointed, lack of 
experience once again notably justified itself in the 
person of William Coventry, who became one of the 

1 Wheatley's Life of P., prefixed to vol. i. of Diary, p. xxvii. 
* Diary, April 7th, 1663. 


most capable officials in the Navy Office, and ranked 
very high in Pepys' estimation 1 . 

Such was the machinery for the reorganisation and 
regulating of the Navy. How far the work that ensued 
was that of one or two men it is very difficult to estimate 
with any certainty of justice. There can be no doubt 
that the official head of the Navy, prince though he 
was, was far from being a mere figure-head : Pepys 
frequently refers to his practical interest in his office, 
"he do give himself up to his business 2 ," and a mere 
glance through his official letters 3 will show into what 
details he went. Beyond that it is impossible with 
justice to ascribe merit to him, since in his position as 
Lord High Admiral orders, reforms, and suggestions 
come above his name though they might be the work of 
his subordinates : Pepys, Coventry, and especially 
Penn, were undoubtedly the originators of many of the 
alterations and improvements in naval administration 
during the period preceding the Treaty of Breda. 

The most pressing question to be dealt with was 
that of the debt of the Navy which was, 

Retrenchment T- u i TJ* i 

and reform. says Pepys, in very sad condition, and 
money must be raised for it 4 ." By the end 
of August an estimate of the debt had been drawn up and 
submitted to the Council, at the same time that Parlia- 
ment received a message from the King " hoping that 
care would be taken to raise moneys for paying the 
debts of the Navy 5 ." It was not, however, a process to 

1 Diary, October 30th, November 20th, 1662 et passim. 

2 Diary, January 20th, 1664 et passim. 

3 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-67. 

4 Diary, July 31st, 1660. 

c Col. 8. P. ~Dom. August 31st, 1660. 


be completed in a month or two, though immediate 
measures were taken in the form of paying off twenty- 
five ships then in harbour and provision of 70,000 per 
mensem for eight months 1 . On November 12th, an 
estimate was presented to the Commons which set the 
Navy debt 2 at 1,300,819. 8s. Od., of which 670,868. 
Ss. Od. was needed for " present supply and advance- 
ment " : "all his Majesty's stores," it was also stated, 
"are now empty both of victual and all other necessaries 
for the fleet 3 ." It is not surprising therefore to find, 
more than a year later, the Navy Board complaining to 
the Duke of " the bad condition of the Navy for want 
of money 4 ," and, still later, Pepys exclaiming : " God 
knows ! the King is not able to set out five ships at 
this present without great difficulty, we neither having 
money, credit, nor stores 5 ." Nevertheless the strenu- 
ous efforts made to extinguish the debt met with fair 
success in the end : on December 3rd, Pepys records : 
" this day Sir G. Cartaret did tell us at the table, that 
the Navy (excepting what is due to the Yards upon the 
quarter now going on, and what few bills he hath not 
heard of) is quite out of debt ; which is extraordinary 
good newes, and upon the 'Change to hear how our 
creditt goes as good as any merchant's upon the 

1 Commons Journal, September 13th, November 6th ; also 
Parl Hist. iv. 143, 149. 

2 i.e. current charge including unpaid debts. 

3 Parl. Hist. iv. 143. 

4 Pepys' Diary, November 13th, 1661. 

5 Ibid. June 28th, 1662. On March 14th, Albemarle wrote to 
the Duke entreating " a hearing in council for the petition of the 
hundreds of poor people concerned in the debts incurred for the 
Navy. He wished to see so many families whom he had a hand in 
engaging, freed from ruin." Cal S. P. Dom. March 14th, 1662. 


'Change is a joyfull thing to consider, which God 
continue 1 ! " 

The Navy Board, although it was a primary neces- 
sity with them to clear off the debt, did not, however, 
fail to realise that the truest retrenchment is that 
which is founded on increased efficiency, and though 
ships were paid off and establishments reduced 2 , special 
care was directed against unnecessary or wasteful 
expenditure. As early as October, 1660, an order was 
given against the excessive use of pilots, it having been 
found " by dayly experience, that his Majestie's ships of 
all rates, have gotten a custome not to stir out of the 
Downes, unto any place without an extra Pilott 3 ." 
Another item of wasteful expenditure was " unnecessary 
and unfitting expense of Powder " by " unusuall 
salutes 4 ," which was to be put an end to by means of 

1 Diary, December 3rd, 1663. It is questionable how far Sir G. 
Carteret's statement may be considered reliable when we consider an 
entry Pepys makes hi April, 1665 : after speaking of " money to be 
got for the Navy, or else we must shut up shop," he complains " how 
Sir G. Cartaret do order business, keeping us in ignorance what he 
do with his money " (Diary, April 7th, 1665). There can, however, 
be no doubt that at the end of 1663 the debt was, for a short time, 
brought within control. 

8 Alterations in establishment (in March and October, 1660) 
(Pepys' MSS. 2873). 

March. October. 

War. Peace. 

Soveraine ..700 600 500 

Henry .. ..380 340 280* 

Victory . . ..320 280 250 

Dreadnought .. 240 210 180 

Mountague .. 269 220 180 

* Raised to 430 in 1664. 
Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9311. 
4 Adm. Libr. MS. 23, Orders of D. of Y. 


the definite rules regulating salutes which the Duke 
issued at the beginning of December : that this regula- 
tion may probably not have been, from a financial point 
of view, the minor detail it appears, is evident when 
one occasion, for example, is noticed on which each ship 
of an English fleet of over 20 ships fired at least 43 
guns and that duly according to regulation 1 . 

The main process of reform and regulation can, 
however, best be appreciated as the whole that it was 
if it be considered along the three principal lines of 
1 Civil Administration,' ' Personnel,' and ' Discipline.' 

The first essential towards any reorganisation of 

civil the civil side of the service was the pursing 

tion- out of the unnecessary, the impotent, or the 

incapable ; and on January 28th, the Duke wrote to 
the principal officers giving directions to that effect. 
" I desire you," he wrote, " that your first care be to 
discharge unnecessary workmen in the yards, and y e 
next to sett a mark on such who shall appear to have 
served either deceitfully or negligently that they may 
not hereafter be entered into his Majestie's yards upon 
any occasion of work for the future " : "the ordinary 
in H.M.'s yards " was to be examined, " who I am 
informed is in some of them rather fit for an Hospitall 
than the King's service " : report was also to be made 
" if you find any to be prodigall," or " if y e master 
shipwrights have put y e King to unnecessary charge in 
repairs, if they have exceeded their estimate 2 ." Apart 

1 Bodl. Libr. Tanner MSS. 296. 

2 Printed in Penn, n. 265, with error of " commanders " for 
"commissioners" (vide Tanner in Introd. to Cat. of Pepysian MSS. 
p. 21 n.). MS. copies in Pepysian MSS. 2867, p. 352 and 2611, p. 121. 


from these preliminaries the real need, however, had 
been truly summed up in 1660 by Sir Robert Slingsby ; 
he then proposed that, for the regulation of the Navy 
Office, " which by the frequent vicissitudes of form is 
still in great confusion, whereby neither are accounts 
exactly kept, nor sufficient order taken for the recti- 
fying of known abuses, or preventing the like for the 
future... his Royal Highness would vouchsaf e . . . to 
regulate the navy by his princely instructions, to be 
preserved in the office in a book fairly written, as a 
direction for every officer to walk by in the execution 
of the duty of his place 1 " : and the Duke's letter 
covered a set of instructions just such as Slingsby 
had outlined. 

These instructions were not new or original, and 
James speaks of them as a ratification of instructions 
issued by Buckingham in 1640 " with some small ad- 
ditions and alterations 2 ." They had been prepared by 
Penn in 1660, but the issue of them had been deferred, 
as the Duke says, " until the want (of money) and in it 
the pretence of offending 3 " was removed. In one 
point alone did the new regulations differ from the 
previous ones in a matter of importance, and that was 
in an attempt to remedy a serious abuse. In Article 9 
the Navy Board and all inferior officers are " to take 

1 Discourse of the Navy (printed with Hollond's Discourses [Nav. 
Rec. Soc. vol. vn.]), p. 342. MS. copy in Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 11,602. 

8 Buckingham's instructions are in the Penn Collection at the 
Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS. 3232. The instructions of 1662 in Brit. 
Mus. Earl. MSS. 6287 and 7464, also in Pepysian MSS. 2867 and 
2611 : an imperfect copy of them was printed in 1717 entitled 
Oeconomy of H.M.'s Navy Office. 

8 Penn, n. 266. 
T. 4 


care " that they do not " trade in any such commodities 
as were used in the navy," " or go sharers with any 
merchant in any way for commodities sold to the navy, 
lest way was made " for serving and receiving in unfit 
commodities and at exorbitant rates 1 ." In general, 
however, there are two noteworthy points in connection 
with these regulations. In the first place there was 
what they lacked. The very fact that they were in all 
vital points identical with those issued in 1640 is the 
root of their insufficiency and consequent failure. The 
Navy during Buckingham's tenure of office was very 
different to what it was under James just the differ- 
ence between a small profession and a great national 
service ; the increase in purely official business con- 
nected with the Navy in those twenty years was enor- 
mous. Even after the revival and growth under the 
Commonwealth the increase was very large. Pepys 2 
gives some idea of the growth of the work of his office 
when he compares the two Dutch wars : 

Between May, 1652 and December, 1653 

Letters 390") 

Orders 288 > 678 

Contracts J 
Between September, 1664 and September, 1667 

Letters 5329) 

Orders 3113J- 8848 

Contracts 406* 

The result of this growth was naturally that the old 
arrangements were absolutely inadequate. One prin- 
cipal official could no longer do work that would occupy 

1 Earl. MSS. 7464. 

2 Pepysian MSS. 2242 in a marginal note. 


a whole department, and yet, the subordinate officials 
being given no power of initiative or responsibility, the 
service fell between the two stools. The other note- 
worthy point is the spirit that the instructions attempt 
to foster. Article 18 enjoins that the officials are " to 
be able to trace one another in their distinct and severall 
dutys." To know his neighbour's duty as his own was 
to be each official's ideal ; a process of mutual spying 
which experience has seldom proved efficacious. 

Six and a half years later the Duke issued to the 
Navy Board some caustic " Reflections 1 " upon the 
Instructions of 1662. These ' reflections ' were, from 
beginning to end, entirely the work of Pepys 2 , and, 
since their truth was practically admitted by the officials 
in question, form solid support to the opinion that has 
been widely upheld that he was one of the keenest 
and most efficient officials this country has had. The 
work of each of the chief officials is criticised first 
separately in detail and then jointly. As some idea 
may be gained therefrom of the way in which the 
higher administration of the Navy was carried on during 
this period, a few quotations from them will not be out 
of place. The Treasurer has "failed in the Annuall 

1 Earl. MSS. 7464, also 6003. Pepysian MSS. 2242 contains 
these ' Reflections ' and a whole series of papers and notes concerning 
the enquiry into the conduct of the Navy, 1660-8. 

2 On July 24th, 1668, Pepys " did long and largely show him 
(the Duke) the weakness of our office, and did give him advice to call 
us to account for our duties, which he did take mighty well and 
desired me to draw up what I would have him write to the office " 
(Diary). This Pepys did, " though I know," he says, " it will set the 
Office and me by the ears for ever" (D. August 22nd), and on the 
27th the Duke signed a copy of Pepys' letter " without alteration of 
a syllable" (Diary). 



makeing up of his accompts and presenting them to his 
fellow officers. ..(they being seldome less then Two 
yeares in arreare)." Concerning the Comptroller, the 
muster books have been " kept undone many months 
after, and then committed unto uncertaine hands and 
many tymes to hands the least qualified for that trust " : 
he " hath not to this day either in peace (when y e 
worke was more easy) or warr (when ... it became the 
more necessary) stated or examined the Accompt of 
one storekeeper," and also " by the totall ommission 
(as farr as I can understand) [of the 10th article] the 
Treasurer's and victualler's accompts have att noe 
tyme beene knowne to any but themselves 1 ." " Soe 
farr hath the surveyor beene from a Constant know- 
ledge of the state of H.M.'s shipps. . .that I doe not 
remember that I have ever hitherto upon my commands 
of what shipps were most in Keadynesse for this or 
that Perticular Service received other Answer. . .then 
that he would send downe to the yards to informe 
himselfe " ; also, despite many loans of H.M.'s stores 
" noe Kegular Accompt thereof is knowne to have 
beene kept. By which how wide a doore hath beene 
opened to the defrauding his Majesty." Of Pepys' 
own post as Clerk of the Acts, " there hath not as yet 
occurred to me any perticulars wherewith to charge 
him with failor 2 ." 

1 Cf. Diary, April 7th, 1665 " . . .Sir G. Cartaret do order business, 
keeping us in ignorance what he do with his money." 

2 This was through no lack of effort on Pepys' part to find out 
his own failings. Cf. Diary, August 15th, 1665, P. told Coventry : 
" I did depend still upon his promise of telling me whenever he finds 
any ground to believe any defect or neglect on my part, which he 
promised me still to do ; and that there was none he saw. . .." 


In other words the Instructions of 1662 had been 
utterly ignored, and with such conduct in high offices 
it is not surprising that the lower ranks of the service 
became rotten with corruption and neglect of duty. 

Apart from the structural weaknesses of the instruc- 
tions in themselves and their essential inadequacy 
must continually be borne in mind when criticising 
the Restoration official the causes of this failure are 
not far to seek. Pepys' keen eye towards efficiency 
saw very near to the root of the trouble when, in the 
course of conversation with Sir W. Coventry over 
" the unhappy state of our office," he said " that, 
though the backwardnesses of all our matters of the 
office may be well imputed to the known want of 
money, yet perhaps, there might be personal and 
particular failings 1 ." Those " personal and particu- 
lar failings " were the failings that had become the 
characteristics of England after the Restoration. Under 
a King and a Court without honour to man or woman, 
a King who regarded his kingdom as a source of income 
and amusement to himself, a Court employed in appro- 
priating that income to itself on every opportunity, it is 
not surprising that official life was rotten with the 
same rottenness that ran through the Court. Official 
honesty was a thing unknown, incomprehensible ; to 
steal from the State was not to steal ; neglect of official 
duty was too general to be even remiss. Even the 
conscientious Pepys, though after a lapse he frequently 
reproaches himself for neglect of duty and could on 
occasion refuse a bribe, " resolving not to be bribed to 
despatch business 2 ," had no scruple in making a gain 

1 Diary, August 15th, 1665. 8 Ibid. August 7th, 1665. 


for himself provided he could set against that some 
gain to the State also ; as for example on one occasion 
he makes note : "In one business of deales in 520 
I offer to save 170 and yet purpose getting money to 
myself by it 1 ." 

The financial embarrassment that dogged the Navy 
Office from their assumption of office was 

Renewed . .. .. 

Financial an obvious reason for many of the defects 

Troubles. . . . ' _ 

in their administration. No sooner had 
they got under hand the cumbersome debt which they 
had inherited, than fresh shortage of supply met them 
accompanied by the hugely increased needs brought 
on by the second Dutch War. Any collection of 
naval papers covering the period 1663 to 1667 teems 
with complaints from officials, entreaties from victims, 
evidencing the criminal shortage of supply to the Navy. 
The State Papers and Pepys' Diary are specially 
eloquent on the subject. There are stories of mer- 
chants ruined, both great and small, of seamen and 
workers starving or stealing. Constance Pley, a lady 
merchant at Portsmouth, writes " beseeching speedy 
reimbursement for the great sums expended ; is deeply 
in debt ; the total amount owing is 17,234, her French 
creditors, on rumour of war and plague tumble in their 
bills all at once, and she has not 600 pence to pay with ; 
she begs for money to keep the life in the poor men to 
whom it is owing 2 ." Her partner, Col. Reymer, also 

1 Diary, September 26th, 1664. Cf. also November 23rd : " Sir 
G. Cartaret here this afternoon ; and strange to see how we plot to 
make the charge of this warr to appear greater than it is, because 
of getting money." 

2 Gal. 8. P. Dom. 1664-5, September 3rd, 1665 : 1665-6, 
pp. xxxix, xl, November 5th, 1665 et passim. 


writes that he " would have been aground long since 
but for his woman partner 1 ." One James Kember 
writes that he " has served for two years as master, 
mate, and gunner, without ever receiving one farthing. 
Is utterly undone, not having a farthing in the world 2 ." 
The streets of London and the seaport towns were 
filled with the unfortunate victims ; Pepys writes of 
" the horrible crowd and lamentable moan of the poor 
seamen that lie starving in the streets for lack of 
money. Which do trouble and perplex me to the 
heart ; and more at noon when ... a whole hundred of 
them followed up ; some cursing, some swearing, and 
some praying to us 3 ." The inevitable consequence 
to the Navy Office of this lack of money was loss of 
credit. When experience taught that the office could 
neither pay its bills nor its men, men refused to serve 
or to trade with it. Dealers refused to supply the 
government with goods except for ready money. 
Comr. Thorn. Middleton writes from Portsmouth that 
he " is put to his wits' end for want of masts and money : 
he cannot procure broom, candles, timber, oars or any 
necessaries 4 ." Even when credit was obtained it had 
to be paid for in hard bargains : Penn and Pett write 
from Chatham that they " will contract for plank and 
elm at the best terms possible, but for want of ready 
money, must pay 4s. or 6s. a load extra 5 ." " Reddy 
money," wrote Middleton, would "save y e Kinge 2/6 

1 Cal. 8. P. Dom. September 3rd, 1665. 

2 Ibid. September, 1665, vol. cxxxn. No. 81. 

3 Diary, October 7th, 1665. 

* Cal S. P. Dom. October 27th, 1665. 
5 Ibid. October 25th, 1665. 


att least in y e pound . . . besides I finde men not will- 
inge to sell for London pay, saying it cost them more 
tyme and expense to goe to London to beg it 1 ." Appeals 
on the part of Pepys and his colleagues met with no 
success : Pepys gives a graphic account of one such 
interview where he had given " a large account of the 
charge of the Navy, and want of money. But strange 
to see how they held up their hands crying, ' what 
shall we do ? ' Says my Lord Treasurer, ' why, what 
means all this, Mr Pepys ? This is true, you say ; 
but what would you have me to do ? I have given all 
I can for my life. Why will not people lend their 
money ? Why will they not trust the King as well as 
Oliver ? ' And this was all we could get, and went 
away without other answer, which is one of the saddest 
things that, at such a time as this, . . . nothing should 
be minded, but let things go on of themselves, do as 
well as they can. So home, vexed 2 ." 

In short, the civil administration of the Navy of 
the Restoration, in so far as it was modelled by the 
Instructions of 1662, failed, and failed utterly. But it 
is a failure that must not be separated either from the 
ultimate success towards which it was a stepping- 
stone, or from the great administrator who arose amidst 
the ruins and never forgot the lessons of experience he 
learnt there Samuel Pepys. 

1 3. P. Dom. Chas. II, ex. f. 61. 

2 Diary, April llth, 1665. 


2. Discipline. The Fleet. 

Money, or rather the lack of it in the right, and its 
presence in the wrong places, perpetually hampered if 
it did not ruin the Duke of York's disciplinary measures 
also. Yet, nullified sometimes, hampered always, as 
they were, in more than one case do his measures mark 
important developments in the Navy. 

It was one of the charges most frequently brought 
against the management of the Navy after 

Personnel, . J , 

'Gentlemen the Restoration, that it had resulted in the 

Captains.' ' 

appointment of gentlemen to commands 
in the fleet and that to them was due the slackened 
discipline, the immoralities, the mistakes and the failures 
from which the Restoration Navy was far from free. 
It is a subject offering opportunities of rhetoric that 
have been seized on by many, from Macaulay back to 
the gentleman whose " illiberal and improper obser- 
vations 1 " shocked the author of Marine Architecture. 
To a certain extent a substitution of ' cavalier ' 
officers for others whose religious or political sentiments 
made them unreliable, was inevitable. As we have 
already seen there was a certain amount of weeding 
out done by Mountagu and Lawson previous to the 
actual Restoration, and no doubt that process was con- 
tinued both by voluntary and compulsory resignation. 
One of the best known seamen who thus disappear from 
the Navy was Vice-Admiral Goodson, no gentleman 

1 Charnock, Marine Architecture, vol. I. pp. Ixxiv-xcv, says 
" it might have been wished for the sake of decency and propriety " 
that he " had conveyed his animadversions in somewhat less vulgar 
terms." MS. of the pamphlet in Rich. Gibson's Collection at the 
Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 11,602. 


sailor but a true old salt bred from cabin-boyhood up. 
There is one article of the 1662 Regulations which gives 
official recognition to the process and at the same time 
shows the care James took to obviate its drawbacks as 
far as possible. On the return and paying off of any 
ship the Commissioners are to make a " strict enquiry 
... of y e ability and behaviour of all standing officers 
dureing the voyage (because it hath been necessary 
to remove and appoint divers warrant officers rather 
upon presumption of their good affection than that 
there could be any certainty of their ability) soe that it 
will be necessary to have a reviewe of such as have been 
so put in, after experience of them by a voyage 1 ." 
Complaints of " that great evill of putting our navall 
strength into the hands of our gentry 2 " were plentiful, 
and not always from the prejudiced or ignorant only ; 
Pepys tells of Coventry referring to the " unruliness 
...of young gentlemen captains 3 ": one ingenious 
writer traces one disaster after another, including the 
loss of St Christopher, back to the loss of the ship 
Coventry, owing to the incompetence of its gentleman 
captain, and from his elaborate chain of consequences 
draws an equally elaborate chain of arguments 4 . All 
these writers, however, seem to have been so struck by 
the convenience of certain definite examples of their 
case, that they have not looked further and have missed 
the fact that the spirit they so much deplored in the 

1 Supra, p. 49. 

a Brit. Mus. Enquiries. . .relating to Safety awl Strength at Sea. 
Add. MSS. 11,684, f. 26. 

3 Diary, July 27th, 1666, also June 2nd, 1663, January 10th, 
1665, etc. 

4 Add. MSS. 11,602, ff. 36-46. 


Navy was at the time pervading the whole nation. 
When for instance we find John Lawson, the stern Ana- 
baptist seaman born and bred, solid old Puritan if ever 
there was one, when we find him broaching bottles of 
wine for the King's health, or spending a whole day 
drinking with a little company of his fellow-officers 1 , 
then we get some idea of the way in which the spirit 
of the Restoration infected the whole Navy, puritan 
as well as cavalier. It was the universal reaction from 
puritanism more than occasional appointments of 
4 gentlemen captains ' that was largely responsible for 
the sapped discipline in the fleet. 

Nevertheless ' Gentlemen Captains ' there were, 
and ' Gentlemen Captains ' there would be while there 
was a cavalier government and the Navy as a service 
was popular with the gentry. And James took steps 
to utilise that popularity in a regular and reliable 
manner. How far he realised the ultimate direction 
of that step it is impossible to say ; but, deliberately or 
accidentally, he laid the foundations of the present staff 
of naval officers. On May 7th, 1661, Sir Wm. Coventry 
King's Letter issued an order to the effect that "His 
Boys/ Royal Highness (being desirous to give 

encouragement to such young gentlemen as are willing 
to apply themselves to the Learning of Navigation, and 
fitting themselves for the service of the Sea), hath 
determined that one Voluntier shall bee entred on evry 
shipp now goeing forth ; and for his encouragement 
that hee shall have y e pay of a Midshipman 2 " ; he 

1 Pepys' Diary, May 7th and June 1st, 1660. 

2 Adm. Lib. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-8, May 
7th, 1661. 


was also to be shown " such kindness as you shall 
judge fitt for a Gentleman, both in the accommodating 
him in your Shipp, and in farthering his Improvement." 
These new arrivals into the fleet were the first of the 
modern midshipmen. Hitherto the ' midshipman ' 
had been merely a petty officer, having to serve seven 
years before appointment, but with the appearance of 
this new class of gentlemen probationers the old office 
died out 1 . In other words James was determined that 
since gentlemen must join the Navy they should as far 
as possible be properly trained to the sea, and from that 
determination dates the birth of the modern naval 
officer. That is, briefly, the outline of the one reform 
during James' administration which had more far- 
reaching effects than all his other reforms put together. 
There was in that connection one other order 
which again shows the endeavour to remedy the abuse 
of the ' gentry,' also of undue ' influence ' generally, 
and incidentally gives a glimpse of the manner in which 
appointments were too often ' managed.' With re- 
gard to the filling of vacancies, order was given in 
November, 1664, that instead of the examination being 
held at Trinity House, "which is done perhaps formally 
and slightly and without any regard to the Courage, 
Prudence, Sobriety or Good Behaviour of the person," 
it was to be held at Portsmouth " by some of the 
able commanders, and certificate made in writing of the 
fittness of y e men to be preferred to that charge " ; 

1 At the same time as the above order, order was given that one 
midshipman less per ship was to be carried : and in September, 
1662, order was given " wholly to omit midshipmen in Ye Narrow 
Seas." (Adm. Lib. MS. 24, September 1st, 1662.) 


enquiry was to be held into their qualities and skill : 
for " this will be an encouragement to able men to come 
into the fleet. . .when they know the preferrment is to 
arise from (ability) 1 whereas now they have noe hopes 
of those preferrments but by keeping at London to 
bee in the remembrances and knowledge of the 
office 2 ." 

The laisser faire policy, of which we have already 
seen Pepys complaining in the Treasury, was in fact 
very far from being the policy of James or the Narvy 
Office towards the discipline and management of the 
fleet. It was one continual fight against two or three 
main springs from which flowed innumerable abuses ; 
yet it was a fight that was maintained with determina- 
tion and imagination, against lack of funds and against 
the spirit of the Restoration. The reform of abuses was 
indeed of vital importance where the manning of the 
fleet was concerned. In spite of the powers of the press- 
gang the popularity or otherwise of the 
Navy as a service and a profession made 
all the difference both to the quantity and quality of 
the men available. At the time of the Restoration 
men were actually " solicitous to be admitted into the 
service 3 " ; but after a few years of Restoration finance 
there was a different tale to tell. In the meantime, 
however, the Duke and his advisers were quite awake 
to the need for encouraging a good temper among the 
men, and one of the first acts of importance dealing 
with the Navy was the institution of an enquiry into 

1 Word illegible in MS. 

2 Bodl. Libr. Rawl MS8. A. 174, f. 478. 
8 Slingsby's Discourse of the Navy. 


the Chatham Chest 1 . " Notwithstanding," wrote 
James to the Navy Office, " that there are sevrall 
persons who have received hurts and been maimed in 
H.M.'s Navall Service, which are at present in great 
want and necessity and cannot receive reliefs from the 
Chest at Chatham (notwithstanding they have usually 
contributed to the same) in regard of the great debt 
at present lying upon the said chest, I desire you will 
forthwith cause a strict enquiry to be made into the 
business of the Chest 2 ." On February 4th, 1661, he 
wrote of it again, " having as yet received noe returne 
from you concerning that business, ... I have thought 
fitt to remind you... 3 ." The reminder had little 
effect, and in July, 1662, Pepys discovers " what a 
meritorious act it would be to look after " the Chest 4 , 
an act which lost none of its attractions when 
he found it would " vex Sir W. Batten, which is one of 
the ends (God forgive me) that I have in it 5 ." As a 
result of Pepys' endeavours a Commission was appointed 
and met twice, but did nothing ; " unless I have time 
to look after it," he writes nearly two years later, 
" nothing will be done, and that I fear I shall not 6 ." 

1 It was a fund for relief which had " from the year 1588 or 1590, 
by the advice of the Lord High Admiral and principal officers then 
being, by consent of the seamen, been settled, paying sixpence per 
month, according to their wages there, which was then but 10s. 
which is now 24*." Pepys' Diary, November 13th, 1663. (N.B. 
In August, 1663, A.B.'s wages were 21s. and contribution to chest 
Is. per month, cf. Rec. Off. Adm. In Letts., August 18th 1663.) 

2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9311, October 21st, 1660. 

3 Adm. Lib. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-8. 

4 Diary, July 3rd, 1662. 

5 Ibid. August 20th, 1662. 

6 Ibid. March 30th, 1664. 


His fears regarding both lack of time and its results 
were well founded, and throughout the second Dutch 
War the conduct of the Chest remained a public scandal 
and a crying injustice to those who depended on it. 

Early in 1661 the grievance that was in a year 
or two to assume alarming proportions, had already 
appeared, and reverence and admiration for their 
Royal Highnesses had so far been overcome by the 
feelings aroused by systematic refusal to pay wages 
with hard cash, that as early as February of 1661 the 
seamen petitioned 1 for payment of overdue wages. 
True to his policy the Duke did not ignore the matter, 
and on February 21st he wrote to Lawson of it : "I 
. . . chose to be silent in it, untill I had effected somewhat 
which might bee of advantage to the persons agreived " ; 
though full relief must wait till the next Parliament, 
" the Commissioners are," in the meantime, " resolved 
to use soe speedy a way for the Payment of the Ticketts 
(the dilatory way for which seemingly prescribed in the 
Act, I suppose was none of the least Grievances) as 
that is wil bee as satisfactory to the seamen as if they 
were paid at the same moment with the Shipps 2 ." 
Money due for short allowances was to be paid immedi- 
ately out of royal treasure, and two days later the Lord 
Treasurer was ordered to supply 7000 to pay the 
latter 3 . That was, however, the merest palliation, and 
bad finance soon resulted in a rotten fleet. Starvation 
turned many men almost to madness, and mutinies 
and riots were frequent at all the dockyards. In August, 

1 Copy of Petition in Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 511. 
8 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters. 
8 Ibid. February 23rd, 166L 


1663, we hear of Sir John Mennes being attacked by 
starving workmen and lucky to escape " out of the 
hands of so rude a multitude 1 " (though Pepys says he 
" did act as much like a coxcomb as ever I saw any man 
speak in my life 2 "), in September, 1665, of Pepys being 
" set upon by the poor wretches 3 ," whereon he remarks 
that they "in good earnest are not to be censured if their 
necessities drive them to bad courses of stealing or the 
like, while they lack wherewith to live." In October, 
1666, matters were so serious that we hear of "twelve 
well fixed firelocks " being asked for " for the defence 
of the Navy Office 4 ." On board the fleet itself, mutinies 
were less frequent since there the men were at least fed 
and clothed 5 ; grievances on the ships were rather 
about another effect of bad finance bad victualling. 
The ' ticket ' which was the direct subject of grievance 
was a kind of I.O.U., signed by the officers of the man's 
ship, specifying his length of service, which, when signed 
by the Navy Board, was in effect a warrant on the 
Treasurer for payment of wages. At first the King 
had opposed the adoption of the ticket system, " which 
the King do take very ill 6 ," Pepys tells us, but the 
partial adoption of it payment of wages " half in 
ready money and tickets for the other half, to be paid 
in three months after 7 " soon developed until the 

1 Rec. Off. Adm. Nav. Board, In Letts. 1663. 

2 Diary, September 2nd, 1663. 
Diary, September 30th, 1665. 

Hist. MSS. Comm. XV. Rep. App. Pt. 2, Hodgkin Papers, f. 167, 
quoted in Tanner's Introduction to Pepya* Catalogue, p. 119. 
They could get clothes on their tickets : vide sub. 
Diary, December 3rd, 1660. 


Navy was practically run on this paper credit. Had 
these tickets been promptly paid on presentation no 
harm would have been done and they would have been 
negotiable for the seamen at very small loss, but the 
delays and absolute uncertainty of payment depreciated 
their value and the seamen would lose as much as 
25 per cent, or even more in exchange 1 . 

Impotent as he was to remedy the primary source 
of all the trouble, James did his best to meet the 
secondary difficulties. " I am," he writes in March, 
1665, " soe sensible of the necessity of keeping the 
minds of y e seamen in good temper in this tyme of 
service that I cannot but recommend . . . that as often 
as any shipps come into port which have been long 
out, you present the seamen's demand of Pay by giving 
them a fitting proportion of their pay for support of 
their Familyes 2 ." The Duke, however, favoured more 
definite and practical remedies than the one so suggested 
and on December 8th he issued a " Remedy for the 
uncertain payment and consequent high rates " con- 
taining 14 articles 3 . The articles dealing with the 
ticket question ordered that any tickets " under y e 
value of twenty pounds be paid when tendered without 
observation of time or order of payment " ; those over 
20 were to have precedence ; failure on the part of 

1 Col. 8. P. Dom. 1666-7, p. 426; 1665-6, p. 75. 

2 Adm. Lib. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-8. Pepys makes 
a note in this connection of the " unreasonable hardship of y e general 
practice of our Navy of paying those Ships off first where the least 
sume clears y most men : those who have served longest, and there- 
fore need their pay most being postponed to those who have served 
least." (Pepysian M8S. 2866, Naval Minutes.) 

3 Bodl. Libr. Tanner M8S. 45 ? f. 41. 

T. 5 


one man to tender his bill for payment was not to 
" hinder the next to be paid before he come," and " his 
money shall be reserved for him in the Treasury untill 
demanded and then paid 1 ." Eighteen days later 
further Remedies were issued 2 which included the pro- 
vision of a separate court for bills under 20 (except 
Pilotage and Bills of Exchange) that is to say, for 
most seamen's tickets. The unavoidable saving clause, 
however, effectually nullified these remedies : payment 
was to be made " as fast as the state of his Maj 1 ' 8 
Treasure shall permit 1 " ; the only real remedy was set 
forth by the Navy Office in reply to the House of Com- 
mons Inquiry of 1667 " a supply of money in every 
place, at all times, in readiness, where and when . . . any 
. . .occasions of discharging seamen shall occur 3 , 4 ." 

Systematisation and regulation were as much the 
need of the military as of the civil side of the naval 
service, and even during the first seven years of his 
office some of the Duke of York's orders mark import- 
ant stages in naval development. Curiously enough in 
this, as in the case of the civil ones, the new Regula- 
tions were far from being original. 

1 Bodl. Libr. Tanner MSS. 45, f. 41. 

2 Ibid. 45, f. 51. The preamble is very typical of the careful and 
practical nature of most of the Duke's reforms : " I omitted severall 
particulars," he writes, " least in this time of action the introduction 
of too many new Rules might obstruct other services untill the 
practise of those then given being by use become easy should make 
the addition of others more seasonable." Cf. also the opening of his 
reply to the Seamen's Petition, February, 1661 supra. 

8 Perm's Memorials, n. 509. 

4 Another minor point showing the Duke's politic regard for the 
rights of the seamen is an order of August 13th, 1663, for wages to 
be paid to men who had been prisoners their captivity to count as 
service. (Adm. In Letts. 1663.) 


The act of 1661 (13 Car. II. c. 9) " for the Regulating 
and better Government of his Majesty's Navies, Ships 
of War, and forces by sea " was founded directly upon 
the articles of war of 1652, which were an elaboration 
of the ordinances passed in 1647 for Warwick's fleet. 
They are directed mainly at discipline in the fleet, and 
set forth in detail the powers and limitations of the 
courts-martial. Though neither original nor novel in 
its articles this act remained as the basis of naval 
discipline for a century ; it was only repealed by 
22 Geo. II. c. 33. 

The duties of the captain were set forth and regulated 
N e w by the ' ' General Instructions to Captains ' ' 

instructions. o f 1663, and from them it is possible to gain 
some idea of the inside of naval life. The first instruction 
provides that " Almighty God be duly Served. . .twice 
everyday by the wholle Ship's Company according to the 
Liturgy of the Church of England 1 ." Nine articles deal 
with duties connected with the stores and provisions of 
the ship, and the check to be kept on the Purser and other 
persons dealing with them. Of the other articles, one 
provides for a daily muster of the whole ship's company, 
another that no man is to be employed as an able seaman 
unless he " hath continued seaven yeares at sea " and 
is 24 years of age, and no one as midshipman unless he 
" hath served at least seaven yeares and can navigate 
the ship " : the captain, in council with the master, 
boatswain, and gunner, has power to appoint inferior 
officers and enter them in the ship's book : in port he 
is to take care to keep officers and men together : he 
is to protect H.M.'s subjects and trade : he is to compel 

1 Adm. Libr. MS. 23, Orders of the Duke of York, 1660-5. 



ships to strike their flag, and to exact payment from 
English ships for any shots that may have been neces- 
sary : prizes in war are to have their hatches ' spiked 
up ' immediately : lights and fires to be out after 
setting watch, no candles for ship's use except in Ian- 
thorns ; no tobacco is to be taken except in the fore- 
castle over a tub of water (if this regulation was kept 
the spectacle of a huddled circle of seamen solemnly 
smoking their pipes over the prescribed * tub ' must 
have been not without its humour) ; the top men are 
not to be hazarded in ' blowing weather ' : any 
foreign ship to be searched for any Englishmen serving, 
but the master of such a ship is to pay such men their 
due wages (note again the consideration for the sea- 
man) : detailed instructions are given as to the occasion 
and quantity of salutes and on no account is a salute 
to be given unless a return of it is certain. The two 
final instructions are of special interest, one because 
it was rarely kept, the other because it shows us what 
training in gunnery was considered necessary. Instruc- 
tion xxx forbids the captain to take in any merchan- 
dise except gold, silver or precious stones ; trading on 
the part of naval captains was one of the chief of the 
minor breaches of discipline, and throughout our period 
this article was far more honoured in the breach than in 
the observance. Instruction xxix orders that " for 
the first month the men be exercised twice every week 
to the end they may become good Fire Men, allowing 
six Shott to every exercising. That the 2nd month 
they may be exercised once every week, and after that 
only once in two months allowing six shott to each 
time of exercising." 


A month earlier the Duke had issued another set 
of instructions, which, though they were far from being 
a deliberate imposition of a uniform, yet must have 
resulted in more or less uniformity of dress among the 
seamen. As a matter of fact they were primarily in- 
tended to relieve seamen from the extortion of the 
' slopsellers ' as the clothes vendors were called. Only 
the " under-mentioned cloathes 1 " were to be sold on 
board the ships ; and here again the ' council ' of the 
captain, master, boatswain, and master gunner (or any 
three of them) was to have decisive powers, in this 
case to settle the rates, which were not to be higher 
than the under-mentioned : 

" Monmouth caps . . . . 2/6 

Red caps . . . . . . 1/1 

Yarn stockings p. . . . . 3/0 

Irish ... ,. 1/2 

Blew Shirts ,,.* 3&**\ .. 3/6 

White Shirts .,. . ,.. . _. ( ) 2 

Cotton waistcoats . . . . 3/0 

drawers p. . . ... . 3/0 

Neat leather shoes . . . . 3/6 

Blew neckcloathes . . . . /5 

Rugs of one breadth . . . . 4/0 

Canvas suits . , . . . . 5/0 

Blew suits .. ' .. 4. 5/0" 

The sale of clothes was to be held " always above 
decks at the Maine Mast in presence of the Captain, 
officers and the whole Ship's company," largely in 
order that " Tobacco, Strong Waters or other such like 

1 Adm. Libr. MS. 23, Orders of the Duke of York, 1660-5, March 
2nd, 1663. 

1 No price set either in this or in other copy of orders in MS. 20. 


comodityes be not sold as cloathes." Debts for 
clothes could be put down on the seamen's tickets 
an unavoidable concession when the men received no 
ready cash for their wages. The clothes of any deceased 
seaman were to be sold " at the maine mast " and the 
proceeds sent to his executors. Though it is evident 
that these rules must have resulted in a certain uni- 
formity of dress, the fifth article shows that such was 
not the deliberate intention of them, for it orders that 
" none of the said cloathes be permitted to be sold to 
any of the ship's company two full months from their 
entrance 1 ." 

The question of the division of prizes and prize- 
money was another that needed regulation, for not 
only did it nearly affect the temper of the men, but 
also it was an important item in the income of the 
Navy 2 . Embezzlement of prizes meant serious loss 
to the revenue, and insufficient partition of them meant 
further discontent among seamen and increased 
difficulty in manning the fleet 3 . At the outbreak of 
the war the matter became urgent, and in January, 
1665, the Prize Court appointed local sub-commis- 

1 This was made void in November, 1664, owing to the filthy 
state of many of the new men's clothes. (Adm. Libr. MS. 23, 
November 22nd, 1664.) 

2 Arms and ammunition taken on prize ships formed no small 
addition to the Ordnance ; vide orders for delivery to Ord. Dept. 
Harl. M88. 1510, f. 660 et passim. There are two volumes in the 
Brit. Mus. of Proceedings of H.M. Commissioners for Prizes, 1664-7. 
Harl MS8. 1509, 1510. 

8 The difficulties and abuses of the press-gang, though the outcome 
of the financial muddle, are more properly connected with the pre- 
parations for war in 1664-5, and are treated of in that connection, 
vide pp. 106-9 infra. 


sioners " in the ports of London, Dover, Portsmouth, 
Plymouth, Bristol, Hull, Newcastle, and other places 
where it may be thought necessary 1 " (their work having 
previously been entrusted to the local customs officials 2 ), 
and instructions were issued to them urging them " to 
exact performance of their duties 3 . ' ' Two months earlier 
than this the other side of the question had been dealt 
with in order to meet and check the growing scarcity 
of men : on October 28th, 1664, the King issued a 
declaration for the " encouragement of seamen and 
marines 4 " which settled their share of prize-money. 
Seamen, whether serving on King's ships or merchant- 
men, were to receive 105. per ton on all prizes, 6. 135. 4d. 
for each piece of ordnance, 10 a gun for every man- 
of-war sunk or destroyed, and the pillage of all mer- 
chandise on or above the gun deck. In March, 1665, 
the Duke of York diplomatically granted a wider 
application of these regulations to the case where the 
prize ship had not resisted, for, he said, " the restrayn- 
ing y e seamen from an indulgence formerly given them 
would have a consequence too dangerous to be recom- 
pensed by y e vallue of those goods which wilbe (what 
ever y e order be) very hard to preserve 5 ." 

1 Col. 8. P. Dom. 1664-6, January 21st. 

2 A class much despised by the naval officers. 
* Brit. Mus. Harl MSS. 1509, ff. 1-102. 

8. P. Dom. Chas. II, cm. 146 (1). 

6 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, March 8th, 1665. 



IT is difficult to estimate how far the Mediterranean 
cromweii policy of Cromwell and his successors in the 
B?editer- government in England was the deliberate 
piece of diplomatic strategy that it appears 
to the latter day observer. To the Mediterranean 
Powers whom it influenced so vitally it could not but 
seem deliberate : it was so effective. But on the Eng- 
lish side, on the other hand, there appears but the most 
doubtful appreciation of the true inwardness of the 
policy which later developments have made so distinct. 
Blake, in 1654, by reason of a three weeks' wait at 
Gibraltar against which he and his men fumed had 
prevented the junction of the two parts of the French 
fleet, frustrated Mazarin, and thus offered to modern 
eyes the first practical example of the true significance 
of the " Gibraltar defile 1 ." His actions within the 
Mediterranean also had had wide effects and had been 
the cause of much discomfort and many fears to the 
Italian powers and France. The convenience of the 
position of Gibraltar had not escaped Cromwell's 
notice, and, if we are to believe Pepys (on the authority 
of Sir Robert Haddocks), " had not y e ship which was 
sent by Oliver with spades and wheelbarrows been 

1 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, I. chaps. 7 and 8. 


taken, he had certainly taken Gibraltar 1 ." The domi- 
nant idea in Cromwell's foreign policy, however, was 
the war against Spain as a part of his religious policy 
of Protestantism : and the opportunity of making 
Dunkirk the base of operations against the Spanish 
power soon put the idea of Gibraltar in the background, 
and Mountagu with the largest ships was recalled. 
Blake, however, remained on the station using Lisbon 
and Tetuan as his bases, and his famous attack on the 
Plate fleet in the harbour of Santa Cruz is the most 
notable naval exploit of the century. But of Medi- 
terranean policy there was now no sign. The two 
ports mentioned acted as an efficient substitute for the 
coveted Gibraltar : and at the end of that year (1657), 
when it was learned that the much vaunted Spanish 
fleet preparing at Cadiz was never likely to get to sea, 
all but ten sail were ordered home 2 . The remaining 
squadron was ordered to protect English trade from 
the depredations of the pirates of Tunis, Tripoli, and 
Majorca. It may be said that the continuation of even 
so small a squadron in the Mediterranean was an up- 
holding and continuance of the policy of a ' Mediter- 
ranean Fleet,' a part of a strategic plan. It is difficult 
to believe that, had the home government actually 
realised the strategic lessons of the preceding occur- 
rences in the Mediterranean, they would ever have let 

1 Pepyaian MSS. 2866, Naval Minutes. I have been unable to 
trace any other reference to this ship : a note on the plan in Sheere's 
Discourse concerning the Medit., however, gives some colour to the 
story : it is placed beside the neutral ground and runs " Oliver 
Cromwell had a design on this place and would have cut this neck of 
land to make Gibraltar an island." 

2 Corbett, op. cit. pp. 332-5. 


loose their hold on the instrument whose power had 
been so strikingly demonstrated. It is true that the 
maintenance even of so small a squadron as the one 
under Stoakes in 1658 meant in effect the maintenance 
of the English influence. But it would seem rather 
far fetched to read such deep designs of policy and 
strategy into the simple orders with regard to pirates 
that were issued to John Stoakes as the commander 
of the squadron. The question of the protection of 
trade in those waters had become one of real seriousness. 
Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and Majorca were the bases 
for the piratical raids of small flotillas of Turkish and 
Majorcan privateers which respected no flag and were 
indiscriminate regarding the nationality of those whom 
they sold into slavery 1 . " I wish something could be 
done against the Majorcans," wrote Blackborne to 
Stoakes in September, " there is a great cry here of the 
damage our English merchants have lately sustained 
from them 2 ." 

In the meantime, however, while Cromwell's policy 
was showing itself in its true light as a repetition of the 
Elizabethan one of attacking Spain in her Atlantic 
trade with the addition of the local action round 
Dunkirk Mazarin showed that he had, in a practical 
way, learnt the lesson of Blake's Mediterranean actions. 
In April, 1658, he asked for, and received, the co-oper- 
ation of part of the English Mediterranean squadron. 
Capt. Whetstone was told off with six frigates to join 
the French at Toulon where he remained, much to his 

1 Playfair, Scourge of Christendom, and Poole, S. L., Barbary 

2 Cal 8. P. Dom. September 16th, 1658 


disgust, for more than a month in enforced idleness. 
" All that hath been done," he wrote after three weeks 
of it, " has been nothing but the whole fleet making a 
show before Marseilles. . .and yet no appearance of the 
removal of this fleet, our merchants meantime not only 
suffering very much, but the enemy growing more and 
more numerous and insolent every day 1 ." The junc- 
tion of the fleets did, however, satisfy Mazarin's object, 
and there is no doubt that it formed in the end a very 
substantial addition to the persuasion towards peace 
that" her reverses in the Netherlands were to Spain. 
In the meantime also, Stoakes had successfully con- 
trived a treaty with Tripoli 2 . In other words, one of 
the last noteworthy events Cromwell had the opportu- 
nity of seeing during his lifetime was a striking demon- 
stration of the Mediterranean policy in practice ; yet 
within a week of his death, in an order which must 
have been planned by him, the Admiralty commis- 
sioners wrote to Stoakes " The Council has now 
ordered that only 6 frigates be kept abroad this 
winter and that the rest be called home 3 " : the 
remainder were to receive victuals to " enable them to 
keep at sea, and protect trade, much annoyed by the 
Majorcans and other pirates in those parts." 

Such were the antecedents of the Mediterranean 
' policy ' at the death of Cromwell. It is in the light 
of them that the developments of Charles IPs reign 
must be considered. The policy as it is known at the 
present day, the diplomatic use of the strategic power 

1 Col. 8. P. Dom. August 3rd, 1658. 

2 There is a copy of the treaty in Rawl MSS. A. 185, f. 293. 
Col. S. P. Dom. September 9th, 1658. 


of a fleet in or at the mouth of the Mediterranean, had 
been, almost unconsciously, demonstrated ; but as a 
potential weapon it was not yet understood by those 
in whose hands it lay. Further demonstrations of the 
principle in practice were needed before its possibilities 
could be more than vaguely realised. Were it not 
for that fact, not only Cromwell himself, but Charles 
and all his advisers also, would lie under the charge of 
blunders of omission and commission that would have 
been inexcusable. 

It was not long before the universal muddle that 
followed the death of the Dictator began to have a 
two-fold effect in the Mediterranean. The squadron 
being so distant from home, and its importunities for 
stores and money the less effective, it was the first to 
feel the effects of the loosened rein, to suffer from 
neglect. " I earnestly beg that you would seriously 
provide for it in tyme," wrote Mountagu to Thurloe as 
early as July, 1658, " the distance is so great to them 
and the prejudice so intolerable if relief e come not from 
England ; and truly I give you an account of a neces- 
sity e to change some of them 1 ." The victualling ship 
sent out in September was merely a stop-gap, and 
Stoakes had a hard winter of it. The next spring he 
writes, somewhat pathetically, of a small and almost 
sinking vessel which he had " made shift to tow " to 
Toulon, " being unwilling to lose anything, that may 
make money, be it ever so little 2 ." 

The political effect also of the changes in England 
was soon noticeable in the Mediterranean. France 
appreciated the principle of the ' policy,' if England 
1 Thurloe S. P. July, 1658. 2 Ibid. April 12th, 1659. 


did not, and with the loss of Cromwell's name the 
English fleet lost prestige, and with that its force as 
a diplomatic weapon. Not merely was Whetstone's 
small squadron no longer desired, but the English ships 
began to find themselves no longer welcome at Toulon. 
In the same letter as that quoted above 1 , Stoakes 
writes, " the different face wherewith I am now treated 
from my last, makes me jealous these people have 
already embraced the Spanish interest and do seek to 
weary us off their port," a fact which led him to add " if 
there be not a way thought of to procure a port in this 
seas of our own, the squadron will not be very secure, 
our interest being so small in these people." A further 
example of the precarious position of the English influ- 
ence in those seas comes from Tripoli in the plaintive 
complaints of the English consul there, who, after 
bewailing the lack of pay and begging the Admiralty 
" to consider the remoteness of y e place," says, " Here 
are several who labour all they can to make a breach 
by persuading the Bassha and others that the peace is 
of noe force since the death of Oliver Lord Protector 
in whose name it was concluded," and in the mean- 
time he himself is treated with but little respect 2 . 

However, the home government was at this time 
far too interested in its own domestic tangles to look 
at the Mediterranean squadron from other than a 
purely financial point of view : peace had been made 
with some of the pirates, others had been suppressed, 
the war with Spain was over 3 , what further need could 

1 Thurloe S. P. April 12th, 1659. 

2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 22,546. 

Peace was first made on May 3rd, 1659. 


there be of a fleet in those waters ? On June 17th 
Stoakes was recalled with all the remaining ships. 
No doubt the political unrest in the fleet itself had its 
share in bringing about this withdrawal. Soon after 
the death of Oliver, when the officers had been asked 
to sign the general declaration expressing goodwill to 
Eichard, trouble had broken out. Capt. Whetstone, 
who had already given Stoakes " just cause for com- 
plaint 1 ," had to be sent home under arrest 2 , and in a 
kind of ' sympathetic strike ' one of the other officers, 
Capt. Saunders of the Torrington, deserted with his 
ship and came home to find himself imprisoned in 
the Tower. 

The first naval move made by England after the 
Mediterranean Restoration, in the direction of the Straits 
the > st?aits nd or Africa, was of a commercial and more 
or less unofficial nature. As early as 
October 3rd, 1660, the Duke of York was speaking 
of a " great design " that he and a number of others 
had " of sending a venture to some parts of Africa to 
dig for gold ore there " : they intended " to admit as 
many as will venture their money, and so make them- 
selves a company, 250 the lowest share for every 
man 3 ." The project matured, and in the following 
spring a small expedition was sent out to the Guinea 
Coast of Africa under command of Captain Robert 
Holmes. Details are lacking as to its operations, and 

1 Thurloe S. P. Adm. to Stoakes, July 29th, 1658. 

2 There is a collection of papers covering the whole incident in 
Bodl. Libr. Rawl. MSS. C. 381. 

8 Pepys' Diary, October 3rd, 1660. 


its interest lies principally in its position as the fore- 
runner of the official expedition to the same coast in 
1664. It sufficed, however, to irritate the Dutch who 
considered they had a right to the monopoly of the 
Guinea trade. 

In the meantime, however, diplomatic negotiations 
were in progress which were to bring the Straits once 
more into prominence. Even before the Restoration 
the Braganzas had opened tentative negotiations 
regarding a marriage between Charles II and Catherine, 
the King of Portugal's sister. Alliance with England, 
the natural enemy of Spain, offered obvious advantages 
to Portugal in their struggle to maintain their indepen- 
dence, and she was prepared to pay a high price 
for it. In return for a promise of military and naval 
assistance the Portuguese offered a dowry of two 
million ' crusados ' and the cession of Tangier and 
Bombay 1 . Both these ports were valuable posses- 
sions, but since Spain claimed the one and the Dutch 
threatened the other, it was but a wise bargain to sell 
them for a tangible return before they were lost for 
nothing. The treaty was signed in June, 1661, and 
England was embarked on an enterprise which she 
neither understood nor valued at a fraction of its true 
worth. Indeed it would have been foresight extra- 
ordinary had the full importance of the Straits been 
realised at this time ; for the Mediterranean was still 
eclipsed by the Atlantic in both political and commer- 
cial importance, and Louis XIV and Colbert had not 
yet raised France to that position which made the 
Straits a determining factor in European politics. On 

1 Camb. Mod. Hist. v. 105. 


the whole it does not seem to have been considered in 
England as an especially good bargain, though for 
reasons of the Portuguese trade it was not unpopular. 
Tangier was much talked of by some, but then " as 
the foundation of a new empire 1 ." Lawson, however, 
one of the few persons who seems to have had an inkling 
of the strategic possibilities of the Straits, speaking 
from personal experience, said those who possessed it 
could keep it " against all the world, and give the law 
to all the trade of the Mediterranean 2 ." Sir R. South- 
well speaks of Tangier making England " masters of 
the trade in the Mediterranean 3 ," but then he was 
voicing the opinion of the Portuguese among whom he 
had lived ; and they, in contemporary opinion, exagge- 
rated the value of it as much as the English depreciated 
it. " Tangier," writes Fanshaw from Lisbon, " is as 
much over-valued in Cabales heer, as undervalued in 
England, and it must be only the improvement and 
enlargement thereof by changing master that can 
justify these and confute those 4 ." 

However, with the acceptance of these terms came 
immediate need for a fleet to take possession of the 
new ports, and also to fetch the future queen. There 
was also another matter that called for naval action. 
The withdrawal of the English from the Mediterranean 
had had a stimulating effect on the Algerines, and their 
fleet of corsairs had begun to assume large proportions. 
A list towards the end of 1659 gave its numbers as 7 
ships of between 30 and 40 guns, 8 of between 16-30, 

1 Burnet, Hist, of My Own Times, I. 

2 Clarendon, Life, etc., n. 151. 

3 Kennett'e Register, p. 91. 

4 Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 592. 


and 3 galleys of 21-28 pairs of oars holding 400-500 
men 1 , a total of nearly 7000 men. Complaints of 
them from English merchants became more frequent ; 
and early in 1661 their fleet must have numbered 
over 30 ships 2 . Later in the year, when Sandwich 3 
was already in the Mediterranean he received a petition 
from some 160 British slave- prisoners in Algiers, also a 
list of ten small ships taken there in the course of two 
months 4 . 

On June 14th, Sandwich, with Lawson for his vice- 
admiral, sailed from the Downs with instructions 5 to 
obtain a peace treaty with Algiers which should include 
an undertaking not to search or molest English ships, 
and he was authorised to bombard Algiers if necessary 6 . 
Favourable weather brought him to Malaga early in 
July and to Algiers by the 29th. No time was lost in 
sending ashore the articles of the English proposals to 
the Governor. But " hee presently stumbled at y e 
second article y* our shipps should be free from search- 
ing and without much considering y e rest sent me word 
y* they would have noe peace w th me rather than Ad- 
mitt y e Article 7 " : and on the following day he sud- 
denly opened fire on the fleet. " Wee resolved to veere 
in two or three cables nearer y e shore and bestowe our 

Bodl. Libr. Bawl MSS. A. 185, f. 76. 

Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 343. 

Mountagu had been created Earl Sandwich in the summer of 

Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, ff. 606, 7. 

Bodl. Libr. Ibid. 74, f . 338, draft copy of instructions, cf. also 74, 
f. 449 ; 274, f. 2 ; and 73, f. 512. 

At the same time the Earl of Marlborough was sent out with 
live ships and some troops to take possession of Bombay. 

7 Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 520, let. fr. Sandwich, August 8th. 

T. 6 


Broadsides upon them the w h we did for two or three 
houres together 1 ." However, as the wind was con- 
trary and would have made it difficult to reach the 
Turkish ships it was decided to " warp off out of Shott 
and waite for a fitting opertunitie of winde and weather 
to carry in y e Fleete and Fireships." Sandwich's 
characteristic caution was not repaid on this occasion 
and no better opportunity arrived. The Algerines 
made the most of the opportunity thus given them and 
in a week had made " a Strong Boome of Masts from 
y e Mouldhead to y e Fish Grate, and mounted more guns 
and made that worke exceedinge more difficult and 
hassardous." With somewhat more justification for 
his caution Sandwich decided to give up the attempt. 
He realised that the essential duty of the fleet was 
" not y e performing one single attempt but to main- 
taine themselves saileing in these Seas," and disposed 
his force to " y e best advantage for anoyinge them at 
sea." Patrols of two or three ships were sent eastward 
and west to the Straits while Lawson with the main 
body of 9 or 10 remained to ply in the vicinity. Sand- 
wich himself sailed with the remainder of the fleet for 
Lisbon, there to carry out the diplomatic part of his 
duties, and arrange for receiving Catherine and as much 

1 Op. cit. There is a glorious printed account of this action in Carte, 
M88. 223, f. 248 : the title is sufficient description : " The Demands 
of his O. Majesty the King of Great Britain to the grand seignior or 
Emperor of Turkey . . . with a true Relation of the great and bloudy 
fight between the English and Turks, the dividing of his M.'s R. Navy 
into several Squadrons by the Victorious Earl of Sandwich and ever 
Renowned Sir Jno. Lawson, the battering down of half the City, and 
all the Castle Walls, the dismounting of the Turkish cannon, the 
sinking and burning of 18 Great Ships with above a thousand piece 
of Ordnance, etc., etc." London. Printed for G. Horton, 1661. 


of the money part of her dowry as he could squeeze 
out of the reluctant and according to his own account 
impecunious Portugee. 

While Sandwich was performing these not altogether 
pleasant duties Lawson was doing some effective ser- 
vice, and we hear of him keeping in "25 sayle of those 
Pirates that are fitted and ready to come out 1 ," besides 
taking one or two small prizes. But questions of far 
wider import were now coming to the fore and the war 
with Algiers sinks to insignificance before the threats of 
a European war between the chief naval powers. The 
Portuguese were not the only people to appreciate the 
value of their concessions to England. As we have 
seen, those precise ports were coveted by Spain and 
Holland respectively ; but the prospect of such acces- 
sions to England aroused still wider interests. The 
Papal Powers were roused by the support given to 
Portugal against the leader of the Catholic Powers 
Spain, while antagonism to her led Louis to give 
Charles the secret support that finally decided his 
acceptance of the offer. The main issue, however, lay 
between Spain and Holland on the one hand, and Eng- 
land and Portugal on the other. In the spring of 1661 
it had become known in England that a powerful 
squadron under De Ruyter was preparing in Dutch 
waters ostensibly to protect Dutch trade in the Medi- 
terranean. Scepticism was general regarding this 
alleged object, and many were the doubts concerning 
the real aim of it. " What the intention of it may be 
is uncertaine," wrote the Duke of York in October, 
" but as for any attack upon y e fleete, I cannot thinke 
1 Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 596, September 24th. 



that they so much desire warr w th us, as unprovoked 
as to goe about it 1 ." As a matter of fact the Dutch 
themselves were almost as much in the dark, and De 
Ruyter was only to divulge his orders to two or three 
principal officers on strictest secrecy, " aux termes du 
serment qu'ils avoient prete 2 " : he was to co-operate 
with the Spanish, not to seize Tangier as many had 
feared, but to protect the expected Plate fleet. Though 
such were his actual intentions, the danger in the eyes 
of the English was that he would seize Tangier before 
they had time to occupy it, and for weeks the tension 
was acute. Both Sandwich and Lawson had met De 
Ruyter's fleet and there was an outward show of 
cordiality. Lawson even naively asked De Ruyter for 
his secret signal " aim qu'en poursuivant les Turcs on 
put se reconnoitre de jour et de nuit 3 ," but there is 
no evidence that the confidence trick 4 was successful. 
But with the Dutch fleet an unknown quantity, cruising 
now one side of the Straits, now the other, the English 
could not but be on tenter-hooks. The Dutch might 
at any time be heard of as having seized Tangier, 
annihilated one of the smaller English squadrons 
the Dutch numbered 22 ships in September 5 any- 
thing might happen at any time : the air was full of 
vague rumours and sudden alarms, and Sandwich was 
helpless in his ignorance. That the English were not 
the only victims of ' nerves ' is instanced by a letter 

1 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, October 21st, 1661 
(to Sandwich). 

2 Brandt, Vie de De Ruyter, p. 261. 

3 Brandt, op. cit. p. 163. 
* Corbett, op. cit. n. 24. 
5 Brandt, op. cit. p. 162. 


from Tetuan : Sandwich had visited that port to make 
a trade treaty 1 , which simple fact so scared the inhabit- 
ants that " now," the writer says, " they are hard at 
fortifying, even calling in Jew merchants to help 2 ." 
At the beginning of October a more powerful scare 
than the previous ones sent Sandwich post-haste to 
Tangier. He had " expectations to have found a 
fleet of Spanish and Dutch men of Warre before this 
place, and prepared for all events accordingly," only 
to find all quiet and " hardly a sail of any kinde in the 
place 3 ." 

The situation was now, however, somewhat easier, 
for in addition to Sandwich's squadron at Tangier 4 , 
Lawson was cruising in the Straits in case of eventu- 
alities. The news that De Ruyter had put in to Port 
Mahon to careen still further eased the tension. But 
until there was an English garrison in Tangier the crisis 
was not over or the position without danger. A letter 
written from on board the Royal James gives us a 
glimpse into the thoughts of the English there at the 
time, and incidentally shows how practical experience 
brought that appreciation of the strategic value of 
Tangier which was so lacking in the home diplomatist 5 . 
" Lord Sandwich," it runs, " is almost sick with staynge 
for the Garisons, and with fears lest any plott should be 

1 Harris, Sandurich MSS. Journal, I. 154. 

2 Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 623. 

8 Hist. MSS. Comm. 15th Rep. App. pt. 2. Hodgkin MSS. p. 161. 

4 He sailed from Lisbon with the Royal James, Mary, Mountagu, 
Hampshire, Princesse, Colchester, Forester, and five small vessels. 
(Harris, Sand. MSS. Journ. I. 160.) 

6 Cf. Lawson on the subject. Sandwich also was always enthu- 
siastic about the possibilities of Tangier (Harris, I. 


betwixt y e Spanyards and people of Tanger. Really 

y e Garison's stay is very dangerous This place 

makes all the world Jealous. Y e Spaniard will not 
beleeve we shall have it yet, and the Duch make them 
beleeve strange thinges ; indeed this place will make 
our king feared by all this part of the world 1 ." Two 
days after this letter was written, on January 14th, 1662, 
an opportunity arose which, being taken by Sandwich, 
decided the fate of Tangier. Up to that time he had 
not received the best of receptions from the Portu- 
guese ; they resented the transfer of their town to the 
English 2 and were showing no signs of being over-eager 
to hand it over to the prospective English garrison. 
On January 14th, however, an ill-judged sortie against 
the Moors, who kept the town in a continual state of 
semi-siege, threatened to end so disastrously that the 
governor was forced to ask for aid from the English. 
Nothing could have been better for Sandwich ; and 
when he sent, first 80 men, then 120 under Sir Richard 
Stayner, to help in the defence of the town, the English 
occupation was assured. " Now," wrote Pepys on 
hearing the news, " the Spaniards' designs of hindering 
our getting the place are frustrated 3 ." On January 
29th Lord Peterborough and the garrison arrived, and 
the occupation was complete. From that time on, the 
connection between Tangier and the fleet is conspicu- 
ous Ly its absence. In the early days of the building 
of the mole the harbour was inadequate for the protec- 
tion of a squadron of any size 4 , and at no time does any 

1 Bodl. Libr. Tanner MSS. 49, f. 139. 

2 Corbett, op. cit. n. 27. 

3 Diary, February 20th, 1662. 

4 Routh, Tangier, 1661-84, p. 79. 


attempt appear to have been made to use it as a naval 
base for the control of the Straits and Mediterranean. 
On two occasions in particular does this inability or 
unwillingness to make use of the port as a point whence 
to control the Straits come into especial prominence. 
First, in December, 1664, when Capt. Thomas Allin, 
while waiting for the passing of the Smyrna fleet of 
merchantmen, chose to ply up and down in the Medi- 
terranean rather than station his small squadron at 
Tangier and use patrols. On the second occasion the 
omission had more far-reaching results, for it led to the 
fatal division of the English fleet in June, 1666, that 
caused the virtual defeat in the " four days battle." 

After the successful occupation of Tangier, Sand- 
wich returned to the less pleasant diplomatic task await- 
ing him at Lisbon. Haggling over the payment of 
Catherine's dowry was a lengthy process, and although 
he could write to Charles that " things have been 
despatched here with greater haste than this people 
have been known to make 1 ," yet it was the third week 
in April before he set sail for England with the future 
Queen on board 2 . The voyage was uneventful, though 
unpleasant to Catherine who was a bad sailor, and on 
May 1st the fleet reached Plymouth. 

Lawson, in the meantime, had been doing some use- 
ful work against the Algerines. " I can con- 

The Corsairs. b to , 

ceive y 1 nothing can be better husbandry 
than y* it be pursued vigorously 3 ," James had written 

1 Clarendon 8. P. m. app. p. 20. 

1 His fleet included the Royal Charles, Henry, Roy, James, York, 
Mountain, Lyon, Princesse, Breda, Dover, Rubye, Pearl, Elias, Dart- 
mouth, Colchester. (Sand. Journ. in Kennett, op. cit.) 

3 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, February 6th, 1662. 


in February, and Lawson had carried out that policy 
with such success that by April he had succeeded in 
exacting a treaty from Algiers, " they agreeing not to 
search our ships 1 ." Without Algiers the Corsairs were 
but weak, and Tripoli and Tunis soon followed suit in 
making treaties with England. At the end of the year 
Lawson returned home with the squadron " with great 
renown among all men, and mightily esteemed at Court 
by all," yet Pepys " found him the same plain man 
that he was, after all his success in the Straits, with 
which he is come loaded home 2 ." In the spring of 
1664 he returned again to the Straits with the new 
governor for Tangier, the Earl of Teviot. But the lesson 
he had taught the Algerines was not yet forgotten and 
he had no serious work until the following year when, he 
and the fleet having once again returned home in the 
winter, the Algerines took the absence of the English 
to be a sign of impotence, and returned to their 
old habits of preying on English ships. On his return 
to the Mediterranean he declared war with Algiers 
again, ""though they had at his first coming given back 
the ships (to the number of eighteen) which they had 
taken, and all their men," because they had " refused 
afterwards to make him restitution for the goods 
which they had taken out of them 3 ." The work, 

1 Kennett's Register, p. 697 (Sandwich's Journal). 

2 Pepys' Diary, January 5th, 12th, 1663. Clowes, n. 422, says, 
after leaving Sandwich in May, 1662, he " took an Algerine pirate of 
34 guns ; but, ere he was able to effect more, he was recalled to 
England, Capt. Thomas Allin. . .superseding him in command of the 
station." Lawson was only recalled permanently, and Allin appointed, 
on the eve of war at the end of July, 1664, vide p. 91 infra. 

Pepys' Diary, May 3rd, 1664. 


however, was unfinished when the imminence of war 
demanded his presence at home, and it was his successor, 
Capt. Thomas Allin, who finally renewed the treaty of 
peace on August 30th 1 . 

Not one of the most creditable facts in Mediter- 
ranean history is the absolute failure on the part of the 
Christian European powers to unite in any way to crush 
the " Scourge of Christendom," as the Moorish pirates 
have justifiably been called. On the contrary, the 
Moors knew that to make a good bargain with one power 
they could not do better than repudiate agreements 
with another, and in 1664 they offered to the Dutch " to 
Re-establish all things again upon a good Foot, and 
to break the Treaty concluded with the English 2 ." 
Experience, however, had taught the worth of the 
Moors' promises, and the Dutch rejected the offer and 
proposed to England, France and Spain, that a quad- 
ruple fleet should be made up to destroy the Corsairs 
and " utterly ruine their abominable and insupportable 
Domination 3 ." When that proposal was made an 
incident had already occurred which meant an end to 
any effective co-operation whatsoever. Lawson's fleet 
and De Ruyter's had met ; to a landsman observer it 
might have seemed that all the due formalities of a 
naval greeting had been gone through gun answering 
gun in the precise proportions laid down by naval 
etiquette but there was a fly in the ointment. De 
Ruyter had dipped his flag in salute, but Lawson, while 

1 Copy in Somers Tracts, vn. 554 ; they are identical with those 
made by Stoakea in 1658. 

2 Life of Tromp, p. 230. 

3 Ibid 


duly answering gun with gun, had not lowered his flag. 
Lawson sent word to De Euyter to say that his omission 
was not intended in the least degree as a slight, but that 
his orders forbade him to lower his flag to any other 
nation. De Ruyter was not to be mollified, and 
parted from the English nursing the incident as an 
insult to his country, and determined never to lower 
his flag to them again. He wrote an indignant com- 
plaint home recounting the incident and proclaiming 
his intention. John de Witt, however, had a keener 
wit than De Ruyter, and was also doing his best to avoid 
a war which the English seemed intent on launching 
on him. He sent immediate word that the Dutch flag 
was to be lowered to the English whenever they met, 
but at the same time such meeting was to be avoided 
whenever possible. In other words De Ruyter was to 
swallow the insult. De Witt was not, however, moved 
to this order solely by his desire to avoid hostilities ; 
he gave the ulterior reason in his letter to the Admiral. 
" L'intention de 1'etat," he wrote, " a toujours ete de 
ne faire sur ce sujet aucune distinction de lieux ; mais 
de faire salue d'une seule et meme maniere en tous 
climats indifleremment, afin que les Anglais ne 
puissent pas alleguer en terns et lieu et inferer de ce 
qu'on aurait tenu une pratique ailleurs que dans les 
mers Brittaniques, qu'on aurait reconnu qu'ils auraient 
un plus grand droit dans ces dernieres mers, que dans 
les autres 1 ." Such precautions, however, could not 
prevent minor disputes arising on the same subject 
continually, and the ill-feeling produced thereby 
played its part in the ever accumulating mass of 
1 Brandt, Vie de De Ruyter, p. 199. 


jealousies and spites that were to cause two more wars 
before their venom was exhausted. 

When one fleet is spending its time avoiding another 
for fear of being insulted co-operation is scarcely likely, 
and what further action was taken against the pirates 
was carried out by English and Dutch independently. 

In the summer of '63 Tromp replaced De Ruyter, 
only to be rejoined and reinforced by him a year later 
about the same time that Capt. Thomas Allin was sent 
out to relieve Lawson. In the meantime matters were 
drifting on towards the inevitable conflict and it was 
in the Mediterranean that the tension was the keenest. 
It was there that the only active squadrons of the 
future belligerents were plying, each ostensibly with 
the same object in view, each crediting the other with 
deep-laid plots. The late proceedings of Holmes along 
the Guinea coast and elsewhere were scarcely calculated 
to deaden the already smouldering animosities nourished 
by the Dutch against their would-be trade rivals, and 
the expectation of reprisals made the English watch 
the Dutch movements as a cat does its enemy. 

It was on August 19th, 1664, that Capt. Thomas 
Allin 1 on the Plymouth sailed from the Downs with a 

1 Born 1612, served with Rupert's squadron 1649-50. For details 
of his proceedings while on this service the best first-hand source is 
his own personal journal, though for the most part the details with 
which it is full are more of doubtful meteorological than of 
historical interest. The first lines in a day's note are always on wind 
and weather whether a " handsome gale " or what he quaintly 
calls " very rainy hurry durry weather " ; in addition to such purely 
professional matters, the chance of a fight or a lost opportunity of 
one are put down with evident joy or disgust. A seaman and a 
fighter, his bare, unliterary journal often little more than a log- 


small squadron, to replace Lawson who was needed 
in England in view of the preparations against the 
Dutch. Allin's instructions 1 were to consult with Law- 
son as to the best methods of carrying on the war 
against Algiers and of preserving the English trade in 
the Mediterranean. In general he was to " contrive 
as much as may be to give convoy to his Maj ts Subjects 
in all their Trade in those parts, . . . that the Turkes 
may be weary of Warre with his Map and be brought to 
a good peace, the obteyning of which " he was " still to 
ayme at " ; though no peace was to be made " unlesse 
the Shipps of His Maj ts Subjects may passe free from 
search or any kind of molestation." He was to draw 
the fleet together at times and have scouts watching 
De Ruyter so as to be ready for any emergencies against 
the Dutch, " but not to act anything against them un- 
till further orders unlesse they shall first have done 
some act of hostility." 

It was not till near the end of September that he 
met Lawson and took over the command of the Medi- 
terranean squadron : he parted from Lawson at Cadiz 
on September 28th and notes, " I put up my Flagg 
upon the Maynetopp on this morne about 6 aclocke 
28 Sept. 1664 2 ." Two days before that the English 
and Dutch fleets had for the last time before the war 
met and parted amicably De Ruyter bound for 
the Guinea coast with a squadron of 12 men-of-war 
with " express orders from the States, to sail towards 

book gives a vivid sketch of what the life and work of himself and 
his squadron was. (Tanner MSS. 296.) 

1 Bodl. Libr. Tanner MSS. 47, f. 193. 

1 All following extracts are from the journal unless other reference 
is given. 


Cape Verd and the Coast of Guiney ; to reduce the 
English to reason, and to make them restore by force 
what they had unjustly usurpt 1 " ; Lawson for England 
in order to do service against the Dutch in the Channel ; 
and Allin to the service in the Straits where his attack 
on a Dutch fleet proved to be the first open act of war 
in the second Dutch war. Perhaps it was the know- 
ledge of what the next meeting would be that caused 
the ironical cordiality of the farewell greetings on both 
sides. After plentiful saluting and answering, " De 
Ruyter," says Allin, " came under our sterne and 
asked me how I did and saluted me with 7 gunnes and 
dranke to me I dranke to him and answered him 7 he 
thanked me 3 the which I answered 2 , when De Ruyter 
was clear from the Fleet he shott 7 gunnes to bid Sir 
John farewell ... he answered him 7 and then he shott 
of 7 more." 

Allin did not go direct to Algiers, but cruised along 
the coast of Spain as far as Carthagena without meeting 
any Turks or pirates ; and it was not till October 31st 
that he anchored off Algiers, and made efforts to con- 
clude a peace. Possibly the news of Holmes' expedi- 
tion on the Guinea coast, or more probably Allin's 
capture of five of their men-of-war, inspired the Algerines 
with a respect for the English which they had not 
displayed for the Dutch in their negotiations with De 
Ruyter in June ; anyhow, from the commencement of 
the negotiations 3 , the English representatives met with 
consideration, and with what was apparently an honest 

1 Life of Cornelius Tromp. 
- The punctuation is Allin's. 

3 Details of the negotiations are in Allin's Journal; and Cal. 
8. P. Dom. November 4th, 1664. 


desire for peace accompanied by as honest a deter- 
mination to obtain it as cheaply as possible. The 
Turks refused any compensation for damage and injuries 
to trade or for their ill-usage of the consul, and declared 
that, as the English prisoners had mostly become the 
property of private men, they could not arrange for 
their restoration ; even the " mayne Article of nott 
modelling or searching our shipps was much debated, 
before they would agree with it." However, peace 1 
was finally concluded, and to inform the fleet of the 
agreement " instead of 3 gunnes " (as ordered) " they 
shott 30 or upwards from all their castles and forts." 
A sumptuous present was sent off to Allin " 300 small 
loaves of bread, ten leane small beast, not fitt to eate 
and ten as ill sheepe and a dussin Hens." On November 
3rd the articles were signed, two Turkish, two English 
copies and one French copy. Unsatisfactory though 
the terms were in many ways, yet they strengthened 
English prestige in the Mediterranean, both by admit- 
ting to England the freedom of those seas and by having 
a chastening effect on two other trade disturbers- 
Tripoli and Tunis. 

About this time Allin must have received definite 
instructions 2 to seize Dutch men-of-war or the rich 
Smyrna fleet that was soon due through the Straits. 
He and his captains were spoiling for a fight. On 

1 From Clutterbuck at Leghorn. " The peace with Algiers is 
laughed at, no satisfaction being given for any damage sustained, 
but if the Dutch war continue, it may prove advantageous, as the 
King's ships will have the Dutch only to look after." Gal. 8. P. Dom. 
December 5th, 1664. 

8 Referred to by W. Coventry, Cal. S. P. Dom. November 15th, 
1664. Clowes, op. cit. u. 424, writes as though Allin had no orders 
to attack the Dutch. 


November 28th at Malaga he was insulted by two Dutch 
men-of-war who manoeuvred so as to force him to cut 
his cable, and jeered him as he left. " I wish he had 
indured it to a breech, that we might have had a just 
occasion to have done the like to them in the King of 
Spayne's Chamber it troubled me much." Though it 
was his aim to catch the Dutch in the Straits there is 
no sign that he ever contemplated making any use of 
the new English station at Tangier. On December 
1st he writes, " all the captains very earnest to goe to 
sayle for Trafalgar to lay there expecting the comming 
of the fleett of Hollanders." A day later in very rough 
weather he gave chase to a visionary ' Smyrna fleet ' 
off Gibraltar, but owing to bad weather, bad piloting, 
and darkness, nearly every one of his nine ships ended 
the chase on shore ; the Nonsuch and the Phoenix were 
lost, the Bonaventure more or less crippled by leaks, 
and some of the others damaged to a lesser degree. 
Some of the ships grounded twice before getting clear ; 
misfortunes that were not improved by the continu- 
ance of very stormy weather for more than a week 
before which time Allin had not unnaturally " had 
enuffe of it " or by the fact that when the squadron 
got back to Gibraltar again on the llth the Governor 
there refused them assistance. The next day they 
received news of the Dutch fleet of 33 sail at Malaga, 
and after a council of war renewed their resolve to go 
to Trafalgar and wait there, first calling at Tangier 
to pick up two other ships of the squadron, thus making 
the squadron up to eight sail 1 . In the meantime 

1 On the 13th the Bonaventure sprung a fresh leak and had to 
make for Cadiz. 


amended instructions 1 had been dispatched to Allin on 
November 21st from England " notwithstanding any 
orders to the contrary ... to seize all such ships and 
vessels belonged to the United Provinces of the Nether- 
lands as you shall meet with." It is certain, however, 
that Allin did not at the earliest receive them for over 
three weeks, for on December 17th he complains that 
he is " hindered taking a dozen great Dutch ships by 
twos and threes, because only allowed to attack their 
men-of-war or their Smyrna fleet, and that not in 
Spanish ports 2 ." 

The Dutch 3 fleet had weighed from Malaga on the 
16th ; a fleet of about 30 merchant ships, great and 
small, convoyed by three frigates under command of 
Commodore Brakel. The Dutch account runs thus : 
"we made all together towards the Mouth of the 
Streights and having passed it on the 28th with some 
Merchant Ships separated from us ; the same night 
being arrived within 3 miles of Cadiz Bay, Comm. Brakel 
gave the signal to anchor ; the next morning at break 
of day, we set sail again, and some of our Merchant 
Ships were scattered from us : The 29th in the morning 
we met 8 or 9 English ships, upon which Brakel advan- 
cing towards their Flag, saluted it with some Guns, 
but the English Admiral waiting his opportunity till 
Brakel came up side by side with him, powered in upon 
him a whole Broadside. When we saw that, we repaid 
him his change." The Dutch fleet only numbered 

1 Eec Off. Adm. Nav. Off. In Letters, 1664. November 21st. 

2 Col. 8. P. Dom. December 17th, 1664. 

3 For this Dutch account cf. Life of Cornelius Tromp, pp. 258-9. 


14 1 when they came in sight of the English, and before 
the encounter it was still further diminished by six mer- 
chantmen who " contrary to the Orders of their High 
and Mightinesses, and in contempt of their honour. . . 
basely deserted us to Retire into the Road 2 ." The 
fight was sharp but short owing to the weather : Brakel, 
and Roelofsze on the Koning Salomo appear to have 
met the brunt of the sudden English attack ; Brakel 
was killed and his ships severely damaged, Roelofsze 
sank with his ship after an hour's fight. The stormy 
weather prevented the English from using more than 
their upper guns, " our ship laying downe side soe much 
that we could ope noe more ports," and also prevented 
them tacking to return to the fight. Two of the English 
ships never came into action, though one of them 
captured an isolated merchantman the Santa Maria : 
the only other prize was the Abraham Sacrifice taken 
by the Oxford. " What was done we did the most, 
had God pleased to have sent us fayre weather, we had 
done great service but it was a frett of wind that we 
could nott handle our sayles to fight 3 ." Such was the 
somewhat ignominious action by which the English 
opened the Dutch War : on hearing of the encounter 
the States General published on January 14th 4 a De- 
claration of War, ordering the seizure of all English 
ships ; and though Charles did not officially declare 
war until March, it was only the season of the year and 

1 Journal, and Col. 8. P. Dom. December 25th, 1664. Cf. Clowes, 
op. cit. n. 423, " thirty merchantmen and three ships of war" at 
time of action. 

2 Life of Cornelius Tromp, p. 258. 

3 Allin's Journal. 

* English (old) style. 

T. 7 


a mutual need for preparation that postponed further 

During the course of the war the Mediterranean saw 
but little naval action. Concentration with a view to 
decisive action was the policy of both English and 
Dutch, and so thoroughly did the former act up to it 
that they withdrew Allin and his squadron and left no 
ships of war in the Straits or Mediterranean. Even 
Tangier was left to itself to be entirely self-defending : 
a fact which offers some idea of the completeness 
of the extinction of the ' Mediterranean policy ' if 
indeed that policy had even yet penetrated into official 
circles in England. The Dutch, however, were not the 
men to allow their policy of concentration to prevent 
the use of the opportunity thus offered. The three 
men-of-war that were lying in Cadiz harbour awaiting 
Allin's departure served as a nucleus for a small fleet 
sometimes numbering over a dozen ships which 
succeeded not merely in annoying English trade, but 
also in seriously endangering the safety of Tangier. 
They made no attempt on Tangier itself, for they " durst 
not come within reach of the cannon 1 " : instead they 
contented themselves with " hovering about the Straits 
mouth, sometimes in and sometimes out, to wait for 
our merchant ships 2 ," and in October they struck a 
blow which was far more effective than any bombard- 
ment promised to be. The victualling ships intended 
for Tangier had already been long delayed when in 
September they set sail under the convoy of the Merlin 
and in the company of some fifteen merchantmen. 

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Heathcote MSS. p. 192. 
1 Ibid. p. 195. 


When off Cadiz this fleet met nine of the Dutch men- 
of-war. As a result of the pluck and tenacity of the 
Merlin's captain, who " behaved himself bravely with 
his 'twelve guns' 1 ," only four merchantmen and the 
Merlin actually fell into the hands of the Dutch : 
nevertheless the incident was a serious blow to the 
garrison, shattered and inadequate as were the victuals 2 . 
The only step taken by the English government in any 
way to compensate for the lack of warships in the 
Straits, was to grant letters of reprisal to privateers, 
and in the spring of 1665 the State Papers contain 
references to eleven ships thus licensed 3 . In other 
words the Mediterranean ' policy ' of England in 1665 
was no deep-laid strategic or diplomatic scheme, but a 
vague idea of ' tit for tat,' of petty private piracy 
licensed by the State. 

So long as the war was confined to England and 
Holland the English neglect of the Straits and Mediter- 
ranean is at least comprehensible, inasmuch as the 
desired concentration must be in English waters, and 
Dutch interests in the Mediterranean were compara- 
tively small. With the entrance of Louis XIV into the 
arena, however, the range of naval action widened, 
the importance of the ' Gibraltar defile ' begins. The 
English successes of the first year's war, coupled with 
the ever growing power of Tangier as a naval station, as 
the mole stretched out further and the harbour grew, 
gave Louis a prospect of England supreme at sea holding 

1 Heathcote MSS. p. 211. Col. S. P. Dom. November 3rd, 5th, 
10th, 14th, 1665. 

2 Routh's Tangier, p. 83. 

8 Col. 8. P. Dom. January 28th and March llth, 1665. 



the key to the Mediterranean with which she could 
lock out all hopes of France's naval growth. Peace over- 
tures failed, so in January, 1666, Louis declared war on 

The French fleet was divided, part at Toulon under 
de Beaufort, part under du Quesne on the west coast. 
Colbert's intention was that Beaufort should have 
joined du Quesne and if possible united with the 
Dutch fleet before the English fleet came out 1 . Pre- 
cisely at this time, however, England made a move 
which seemed to show the fullest appreciation of the 
importance of the Straits and Tangier : Sir Jeremy 
Smith, a man with a fighting reputation, was sent out 
to the Straits with a small but strong squadron. To 
all but the English the move seemed brilliant and 
deliberate. With Jeremy Smith in the Straits, Beau- 
fort's fleet could not be induced to budge, and in the 
meantime the Anglo-Dutch War continued and France 
was helpless. And then, as it were to confirm and 
strengthen that move, a small additional squadron was 
sent out to escort Sandwich to Spain. In reality, 
however, Sir Jeremy Smith was sent out primarily to 
convoy the Levant ships home, and Sandwich's squad- 
ron was sent, not to reinforce but to recall. Smith and 
his squadron were recalled and the Straits left open 
and neglected at a time when they were the most 
important of any of the strategic points in European 
waters. In the light of this fact it is difficult to see 
how it can be in the least credible that the strategic 
value of the Straits ' defile ' was appreciated or at all 

1 Lettres de Colbert, in. i., February 8th-25th, March 2nd-16th ; 
cf. Corbett, op. cit. pp. 63-5. 


understood by the English authorities. It is true that 
Albemarle was a firm believer in the doctrine of concen- 
tration, but his name as a sound strategist would be 
gone if he had enslaved himself to that doctrine know- 
ing, as we now know and as Colbert then knew, that the 
mere presence of that small squadron at that one spot 
could cancel all the naval efforts of France and make 
her fleet a helpless pawn. This incident was the first 
of the great lessons that English naval strategists 
needed before they could see what all Europe already 
knew. Nor was that the whole lesson. Fate, in the 
guise of false news of the French approach and an 
order, perhaps from Charles, to divide the fleet so as 
to meet Beaufort, was to drive the moral home; the 
fleet was to meet disaster and suffer heavy loss by 
reason of a division of forces which could have been 
avoided by a true comprehension of the fundamental 
fact lying at the root of what has since come to be 
known as England's Mediterranean Policy. 



1664. Preliminaries. 

THE occurrences in the Mediterranean and on the 
coast of Africa were but incidents in a movement that 
was rapidly and inevitably leading England and Hol- 
land into war. At the root of it all was commercial 
jealousy. The Dutch held the carrying trade of Europe, 
and the English growth threatened what they pleased 
to consider as their monopoly. The English too, as 
Albemarle said, were determined to have a larger share 
of the trade. " The trade of the world is too little for 
us two," remarked a naval Captain, " therefore one 
must down 1 ." The Navigation Acts had done their 
work in irritating the Dutch, if not in actually exclud- 
ing them in the way intended. Frequent disputes 
on the vexed questions of the salute and ' Dominion 
of the Seas ' claimed by England added to the general 
tension. Goaded as she was beyond all patience, 
Holland was not over-eager for war, and it was a 
difficult question how the war could be precipitated 
and at the same time blamed to her with at least 
some show of plausibility. 

1 Pepys' Diary, February 2nd, 1664. 


" It seems the King's design," says Pepys, " is by 
getting underhand the merchants to bring in their 
complaints to the Parliament, to make them in honour 
begin a warr, which he cannot in honour declare first, 
for feare they should not second him with money 1 ." 
The court was ' mad ' for the war and the idea was 
intensely popular in the country. There were not 
wanting, however, sober opponents of it, and Coventry, 
" setting aside our ability to goe through with it, or 
rather taking that for granted (to which possibly some 
objections might bee made from the posture of His 
Majesty's stores and treasure) 2 ," was of the opinion 
that the expected trade advantage was of more than 
doubtful probability, and besides, "it is not a popular 
discourse, but it is a true one that the crowne may pay 
too deare for some present advantage to the People." 
But he was a prophet in his own country and the nation 
was hurried on into the war. The merchants did not 
need much encouragement to petition to Parliament 
for redress for their alleged wrongs estimated in cash 
at over 4J millions, including four millions for the Isle 
of Poleroon taken by the Dutch nearly 50 years pre- 
viously. The intentionally truculent representations 
made to the States on the subject by the English 
Ambassador, Sir George Downing, fanned the smoulder- 
ing hatred and gave ample proof of the determination 
of Charles to force a war. 

In the meantime naval preparations were necessary 
and in May Pepys notes, " Mr Coventry prepares us 

1 Diary, March 30th, 1664. 

a Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 32,094, S. 48-50. Notes against a 
Dutch war shown only to Lord Arlington. 


with expectation of an order for y e very speedy setting 
out a squadron of shipps to answer y e Dutch prepara- 
tions 1 ." In July a small fleet was ready though it 
seems to have been little more than a reinforced Summer 
Guard 2 and on July 20th Sandwich hoisted his flag on 
the London in the Downs, and soon after took his fleet 
out into the Channel to practise them. His orders were 
to obtain as continual and complete information of the 
Dutch fleet as possible, and to " preserve His Majesty's 
honour 3 ." 

The despatch of Sandwich's fleet was in fact a 
defensive measure, intended to cover the multitudinous 
preparations that were still necessary before anything 
like an effective fleet would be ready for offence in the 
Channel or North Sea. The Dutch also were for the 
time absorbed in defensive measures. With them 
safety of trade was the first consideration and they 
warned their merchant shipping to sail round the North 
of Scotland rather than through the Channel. Tromp 
with a squadron of 25 ships was sent to meet and con- 
voy home the incoming East Indiamen 4 . Thus it was 
long before any offensive action was taken in home 
waters ; apparently neither wished to attack until 
their preparations were complete. In August both 
England and Holland had a squadron preparing to go 

1 3ec. Off. Adm. Nav. Off. In Letts. May 18th, 1664. 

2 It consisted of the London, Gloucester, Happy Return, Dover, 
Kent, Drake, Plymouth, Dreadnought, Crowne, Breda, Guernsey, Lily, 
Revenge, Elizabeth, Hampshire, Pearle, Hector, and Nonsuch. Vice- 
Adm. was Allin and Rear- Adm. Berkeley. (Harris, Sandwich Journal, 
i. 214.) 

3 Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 193. 

4 He met them off Fair Isle in August and convoyed them home 
without meeting any English. Life of Tromp, p. 245. 


to Guinea, the latter 1 ostensibly to convoy four West 
Indiamen there, the former to follow the latter, convoy 
some Guinea ships and presumably to protect Holmes' 
conquests. On the 19th, writes Pepys, " Mr Coventry 
and Sir W. Pen and I sat all the morning hiring of ships 
to go to Guinny, where we believe the warr with Holland 
will first begin 2 ." On the 20th, Lord Sandwich writes 
that he has heard that he is to follow the Dutch fleet to 
Guinea, but says he thinks that the fleet " that first 
arrives will succeed, and the later one be frustrated 
or put to disadvantage ; therefore a squadron should 
instantly set out to stop them or sail as soon as they 3 ." 
This is almost the first authoritative suggestion of 
offensive action. The command of the squadron, 
however, was finally given to Rupert. " I doubt few 
will be pleased with his going," remarks Pepys, " being 
accounted an unhappy man " : objections to which 
Rupert's hot reply was " God damn me, I can answer 
but for one ship, and in that I will do my part ; for it is 
not in that as in an army where a man can command 
everything 4 ." It was not until the beginning of 
October that the English fleet for Guinea was ready to 
sail. In the meantime it was reported that the small 
squadron under Kampden had been increased to 15, and 
was to be conducted through the Channel by Tromp 
and Opdam 5 ; but it had not sailed when Rupert 
weighed from the Hope on October 5th with 12 ships 

1 10 ships under Kampden. 

'- Pepys' Diary, August 19th, 1664. 

3 Cal. S. P. Dom. August 20th, 1664. 

4 Pepys' Diary, August 31st, September 5th, 1664. 

5 It was probably the news of this proposed ' bravado ' that led 
to the staying, alteration and increase of Rupert's ' Guinea ' fleet. 


bound for Guinea. Rupert never got further than 
Portsmouth. He reached there on the 15th and the 
squadron stayed there weatherbound. 

The following month was one of feverish haste in 
naval preparations of every description in England and 
Holland. In England one of the main difficulties in 
preparing the fleet was lack of men. The press-gang 
varied very much in its efficiency in different parts of 
the country. In the Eastern counties men were ready 
to volunteer to serve if it had not been for the fact that 
thus they would have missed their press money. A 
letter from Norwich says " By the countenances of the 
men they seem very willing to be employed. A com- 
pany of 40 marched through the town, with drums 
beating and other expressions of joy at their taking the 
water. There would be volunteers enough against the 
Dutch, if they were to be fought at home and not at 
Guinea 1 ." And from Yarmouth, " The press goes on 
hotly along the coast ; throngs are mustering up and 
down the streets, frolicking away their press money, 
and saying, when their friends try to dissuade them from 
going, that they could not serve a better master 2 ." 
Hull sends 300 men, the full number charged on the 
port 3 . But in London and in the South and West of 
the country it was a very different matter. In London 
and the neighbouring docks, partly owing either to 
corruption or sheer inefficiency among the press-masters, 
and partly to real lack of the right type of men, 
large numbers of landsmen even apprentices were 

1 Gal. S. P. Dom. October 24th. 1664. 

2 Ibid. October 26th, 1664. 

3 Ibid November 15th, 1664. 


impressed, many of them the merest boys, and complaints 
were frequent and urgent. " Most of the pressed men 
are fitter to keep sheep than to sail in such great ships 1 " ; 
" pitiful pressed creatures who are fit for nothing but 
to fill the ships full of vermin 2 ." From Dover comes 
the complaint frequent throughout the country 
that " there are many fit for service, but the magis- 
trates will not do their duty 3 ." It often happened 
that the local authorities in a seaport being personally 
interested in the men and the ships they served would 
give warning of the arrival of the press-gang, and would 
even directly oppose it. 

In Portsmouth, where the so-called Guinea fleet was 
being rapidly increased, the difficulty was paralysing. 
Coventry writes for the hastening on of the Thames 
ships with as many supernumerary men as possible, 
" for here is great want of seamen 4 ." At the end of 
October an attempt had been made to attract seamen 
to the service by the issue of a declaration for the 
" encouragement of seamen," settling the proportion 
of prize money to be allowed seamen : Coventry orders 
its issue to all ports for " it hath much encouraged the 
men heere and was receaved with great joy 5 ." The 
benefit done by it was not, however, very far-reaching, 
and the greatest difficulty began to be experienced in 
keeping the men when pressed. The Duke of York 
went down to Portsmouth and inspected the ships there 

1 Cal. 8. P. Dom. October 21st, 1664. 

2 Ibid. December 1st, 1664. 

3 Cal. 8. P. Dom. November 20th, 1664. 

4 Bodl. Libr. Rawl MSS. A. 174, ff. 491-3. 
6 Ibid. 


on the llth of November, and reports 1 that things were 
" in pretty good forwardnes excepting the seamen and 
somewhat of the victualling 2 ," the men either did not 
appear after being pressed or deserted after appearance : 
" it is grown so comon with them to offend in both 
these kinds, that the pressing of men is of little effect, 
other than the expending of the King's Treasure " ; 
within four days " neere 200 men " had deserted 3 . In 
hopes of remedying this he offered a reward of 6d. per 
head to people especially managers of entertainments 
who should secure the return of any such deserters. 
This, however, had little effect ; 6d. was not enough. 
The only remedy was the vigorous pursuit of runaways 
and stern treatment of some as an example. " Nothing 
but hanging will man the fleet " writes Wm. Coventry 
three times in three successive letters to Sec. Bennett 4 . 
Numerous remedies for the lack of men were suggested. 
" The King approves your proposal," writes the Duke 5 
to Rupert and Sandwich, " of turning over y e men out 
of y e Company's Shipps into y e King's Shipps now 
lying in Harbour and securing y e Company's Shipps in 
y e Harbour untill a fitter occasion for setting them forth. 
I desire you imediately to put it into Execution ; 
Leaving on board y e Company's shipps y e officers and 
some few men such as you shall judge fitt to Looke to 
them and their Lading in Harbour." It was also 

1 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-6. 

2 One of the first signs of the administrative defect that hampered 
the English fatally throughout the war. 

3 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-6. 

4 Cat. S. P. Dom. November 13th, 14th, 16th, 1664. 

5 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, November 2nd, 


suggested that seamen could be obtained from Guern- 
sey and Jersey and " thus French and Flanders seamen 
engaged on the King's side who will else be taken by the 
Dutch 1 ." It was even proposed that possible or useful 
men should be sent home from Jamaica 2 . 

Nevertheless the numbers were increased above the 
usual war establishment 3 ; order was given that all 
the King's ships remaining in harbour were "to be 
repaired with all possible speed, and rigged and fitted 
forth to sea 4 " ; the ships in the Thames and Downs 
that were in serviceable condition were to go to Spit- 
head to join the squadron already there. In the 
meantime, in the absence of any English fleet in or near 
the Downs, the Duke suggested the provision of some 
fireships at Dover " that soe in case y e Dutch should 
come into y e Downes with a Fleete opportunity might 
be taken in y e night of doeing service upon them by 
fireships 5 ." 

Meanwhile the ' Guinea ' fleet got no nearer its 
objective. On October 31st Lord Sandwich had 
hoisted his flag as joint commander with Rupert ; and 
Rupert writes that " the ships will soon be in better 
condition to meet an enemy, the merchants' goods 
being put in good order, and Lord Sandwich's arrival 
will hasten forward those that are in port 6 ." Early 

1 Col. S. P. Dom. November 22nd, 1664. 

2 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, November 17th, 

8 Rec. Off. Adm. Nav. Off. In Letts. November 17th, 1664. It 
had previously been lowered, below the usual peace rates. 

4 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, November 4th, 

8 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, November llth ; 1664. 

Cal. 8. P. Dom. October 30th, 1664. 


in November the primary objective of Guinea must 
have been made secondary to an engagement in home 
waters with the Dutch fleet under Opdam, to which end 
Spithead was made a rendezvous for the effective 
ships in the Thames and Downs. On the llth and 
12th inst. instructions had been given for the seizure 
of all Dutch ships, " by force if necessary 1 ." On the 
llth the Duke of York went to Portsmouth to take 
command of the fleet " where his appearance was 
useful in forwarding preparations, and delighted the 
seamen 2 " : he divided it into three squadrons 3 , Law- 
son and Berkeley as vice and rear admirals of his own, 
Myngs and Sansum of Rupert's, and Ayscue and 
Tyddeman of Sandwich's squadron : he also had the 
men in the Guinea company's ships taken out and put 
on the King's ships 4 . Yet the fleet seemed fated not 
to sail ; on the 13th it was hourly expected to weigh 
anchor, and the decks were cleared for a fight, yet on 
the 18th it was still at Spithead and had become by 
this time a laughing-stock 5 . On the 19th Coventry 

1 Rec. Off. Adm. In Letts. November llth and 12th, 1664. 

2 Cal. 8. P. Dom. November 12th, 1664. 

3 Containing respectively 13, 12, and 12 ships (there were also 14 
ships not yet ready or assigned to squadrons), Tyddeman was sent to 
cruise in the Channel with four or five ships to " teach refractory 
Dutchmen their duty." Cal. S. P. Dom. November 13th, 1664, and 
8. P. Dom. Okas. II, civ. f 143. 

4 In pursuance of the suggestion supra p. 108. 

6 Earl of Peterborough is " sorry to see the protection designed 
for Guinea made the subject of raillery." Gal. 8. P. Dom. Novembe 
18th, 1664. The Duke of York was the mainstay of the preparing of 
this fleet ; he was " indefatigable " and Coventry writes, " Those 
who know with what earnestness his Royal Highness entered on this 
voyage, and how he hastened from London only to be out of impor- 
tuning against it, will not easily believe him returning. It is certain 


reports that it is " so nearly manned that it may now 
be completed from privateers 1 ," and on the same day 
the ships from the Thames arrived bringing its numbers 
up to " 43 of the bravest ships ever seen 2 ." 

In the meantime Tyddeman and his small squadron 
had opened the campaign of attacks on trade which 
formed the usual preliminaries of a naval war. He 
opened well on the 20th by capturing the greater part 
of the Dutch fleet from Bordeaux laden with French 
commodities. Once opened, this lucrative campaign 
went on apace. The State Papers tell us of 3 prizes 
on December 5th, 8 on the 6th, 23 on the 7th ; 
indeed on the 10th Col. Walter Slingsby reports that 
no less than 150 sail of all sizes have been brought 
in between Dover and Plymouth since the commence- 
ment. On the 27th, the Duke at length succeeded in 
getting his fleet ready to sail, and weighed from Spit- 
head with a fleet of 45 to 46 sail in rough weather 
extraordinarily late in the year for so large a fleet to 
set out. Coventry writes of it, ". . .what weather we 
went out in, of w ch if you had been a witnesse you 
could have judged that lesse resolution or lesse con- 
cernment for the King's service then that of his R.H. 
would scarce have carryed anybody to sea in such 
weather. But it seemed the critical time in w ch the 
Dutch must pass if they would attempt it at all, and 
therefore his R.H. would not be in port 3 ." The Dutch 
fleet never came out and after five days James decided 

nothing under Heaven but the King's commands will bring him back 
again." Cal 8. P. Dom. November 17th, 1664. 

1 Ibid. November 19th, 1664. 8 Ibid. 

9 8. P. Dom. Chas. II, cv. f. 125. 


to return to port, leaving a small squadron of eight or 
nine sail under Sir Wm. Berkeley to sweep the Channel. 
" Doe what wee could wee have not been able to keepe 
the fleete together," says Coventry, and it was by twos 
and threes that it straggled back to port. All energies 
could now be concentrated on the preparation of the 
fleet for the coming year. " It cannot but be of great 
advantage to H.M.'s service," writes James, " that his 
fleete should be ready before the Dutch," and he gives 
order that " noe costs may be spared on the King's 
part that may be conduceing to this service 1 ." 

1665. The War. 

" Englishmen, and more especially seamen, love 
their bellies above anything else, and therefore it 
must always be remembered, in the management of the 
victualling of the navy, that to make any abatement 
from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the 
victuals is to discourage and provoke them in the 
tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted 
with the King's service than any one other hardship 
that can be put upon them." 

Pepys' Naval Minutes. 

Such might have been either text or moral of the 
war, so well is its truth borne out during 


victualling the course of the war. Indeed, the truth 


goes even deeper and further than Pepys 
traced it, for a fleet without food is as immobile as a 
sail without wind, and time and time again in the war 

1 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, December 16th, 


has the same tale to be told of opportunities missed or 
left for lack or delay of victuals. Even at the end of 
1664 the Duke of York had complained that the fleet 
had less than the due proportion of victuals 1 ; and when 
in '65 the setting forth of a fleet again became immediate 
the fatal weakness was straightway brought into strong 
relief. It was, moreover, a hopeless weakness while 
the arrangement of the victualling remained as it had 
been established at the Restoration, when the provision 
of " all victuals to be provided for His Majesty's ships 
and maritime causes 2 " had been put into the hands of 
a single contractor Denis Gauden. The fault did not 
lie with him personally ; on the contrary, it is very 
striking to notice how in one complaint after another 
it is expressly stated that it is not directly against him 
personally. Of the fleet that went out in April it was 
written, " noe fleete was ever soe ill supplied for quan- 
tities of provision, as, to do the victualler right, none 
ever better for the goodnesse, against which there is not 
one complaint 3 ." " The victualler is a man of good 
words, and provides good victuals 4 ," writes Coventry 
at a time when he was nearly frantic with worrying 
over insufficient victualling. The difficulties were partly 
inherent in such an attempt to make one man control 
and arrange the victualling of the whole navy : reliable 
as he himself evidently was, he could not oversee the 
work in two or three ports at once : "he usually 
gave good dispatch, but he could not be in all 

1 Gal. S. P. Dom. November llth, 1664. 

2 S. P. Dom. Chas. II, Docquet Bk. p. 46, cf. Tanner, Catalogue 
of Pepysian MS8. p. 152. 

3 S. P. Dom. Chas. II, oxxi. f. 128. 

4 Col. 8. P. Dom. April 15th, 1665, 

T. 8 


places 1 ." It was, however, the financial difficulty 
that most hindered efficiency, and afforded Gauden 
an unanswerable explanation for most breaches of 
contract ; he could not keep his side of the contract 
unless the government kept theirs, and granted him 
"an immediate supply of a considerable sum of 
money and a certain weekly payment " : he was 
not, he said, "in a capacity unless supplied with 
money to make the provision necessary 1 ." It was 
" too much for any one man's purse 2 ." 

The factor, however, that gives this question the 
vital importance the loss of mobility, the delays and 
lost opportunities is best seen at work, where its 
results can be traced down through the whole course of 
this war. " The delay in victualling is intolerable," 
comes the complaint early in April. " After all this 
expense and pains the fleet is likely to remain unser- 
viceable through defect on the victualler's part 

It will be said that if the victualler send bad victuals 
it is his loss, they must be flung overboard ; but that 
will not repair the King's loss, if his fleet cannot keep 
the sea when he has most need of their service." And 
pessimistically the letter winds up, " Blind and general 
discourses that ' we have a brave fleet and we will 
beat them ' will not avail, where there is neither money, 
victuals nor materials to carry on the war 3 ." 

On April 20th, the fleet set sail for the Dutch coast, 
ill provisioned and ill stored. " Mr Gauden," wrote 
Coventry from on board the Royal Charles, " hath taken 

1 Cal 8. P. Dom. November 13th and 21st, 1665. 

8 S. P. Dom. Chas. //, cxxxn. f. 10, September 2nd, 1665. 

Cal 8. P. Dom. April 4th, 13th, 1665. 


care wee shall not be able to stay long abroad, therefore 
we hope well of the mettle the Dutch pretend to have, 
and they will come immediately out to us 1 " : "If the 
Dutch find out our condition as to victuals, they will 
play their game very ill if they come out 2 ." He was 
also much concerned because the men's ' slops ' had 
been left behind. " I thinke," he writes, " the health 
of the men concerned in their clothes, and men are soe 
hard to gett that I should be sorry to loose them so 
slightly 3 ." As regards the actual manning, however, 
things were not so unsatisfactory. " The proportion of 
land soldiers is large, yet on the whole the commanders 
who had experience in the late Dutch war say that the 
fleet is better manned now than then 4 ." 

The Dutch prohibition of all commerce had shown 
strategy of their determination that all their force 
the war. should be concentrated on their battle 

fleet, and that that fleet's primary object should be 
" to seek out and destroy that of the enemy 5 ." For the 
English, prohibition of commerce was not so necessary, 
for English trade neither had the volume of that of the 
Dutch, nor was it so easily threatened on many of its 
routes : nevertheless decisive engagement was equally 
the aim of the English fleet. " To try if the Dutch will 
come out and venture a battle 6 " was the aim of the 
English admiral. Though both belligerents wished for 
a decisive battle, there was, however, a difficulty 

Bodl. Libr. Eawl. MSS. A. 174, f. 458 (to Pepys, April 21st). 

Col. S. P. Dom. April 22nd. 

Rawl. MSS. A. 174, f. 458. 

Cal 8. P. Dom. April 18th, 1665. 

Corbett, Maritime Strategy, p. 158. 

Cal 8. P. Dom. April 20th 



hindering their attainment of that end. The strenuous 
efforts that had been made in order to get the fleet out 
as early as possible had resulted in James' forestalling 
the Dutch, and when the English fleet was at sea the 
Dutch were still divided in harbour at the Texel and Vlie. 
It was obvious that so long as a united English fleet 
was cruising between those places the divided Dutch 
squadrons were not likely to come out to be attacked 
piecemeal. In other words the presence of the English 
fleet was the very opposite to an incentive to the Dutch 
to give battle : the very strength of the strategic 
position the English held in dividing the Dutch, pre- 
vented the attainment of the desired decision 1 . There 
was, however, one factor to provoke the Dutch. De 
Ruyter with booty from his tour of reprisal (com- 
plementary to that of Holmes) accompanied by some 
merchant ships, was expected home soon : the Dutch 
might be enticed out to defend such an important 
acquisition of strength. " We thought," says Sand- 
wich, " the hinderinge their trade to come home, the 
best provocation to make the enemye's Fleet come 
out 2 " : and consequently the Fleet was ordered to 

1 Coventry gives some idea of the difficulties by which the English 
admirals were faced : he puzzles as to " what to be done if the Dutch 
won't come out but send their East India and Smyrna ships to some 
foreign port, and then do as they please in the Straits and Guinea," 
and puts the case succinctly " If we divide our fleet they may 
come out and do what they please here ; if we do not, they carry all 
before them there" (Col. S. P. Dom. April 28th, 1665); he is 
apparently thinking not only of the Texel and Vlie but also of home 
waters and the Mediterranean. 

2 Sandwich MSS. Journal, I. f. 270 (quoted in Harris, i. p. 289). 
Harris gives a detailed account of discussions in council concerning 
these questions of strategy : based on the Sandwich Journal. 


ride at a station some twelve leagues N.W. of the Texel, 
while patrols supplied what information could be 
obtained. Impatience, however, soon outweighed 
strategy, and after two days it was decided to stand in 
close to the Dutch coast. On the 28th they rode " so 
near the Dutch fleet as to hear their guns fire 1 ." For 
ten days the English fleet plied up and down along the 
coast, having come to none but negative decisions not 
to attack the Dutch in the Texel, not to prevent their 
junction " because it would certainely hinder theire 
cominge out to engage us which is the chiefe thinge to 
be wished for 2 ." But now Mr Gauden's care that the 
fleet should not stay long out began to have effect : 
on May 10th it was decided to return home to re victual 
or rather to make up the stores which had never been 
complete and on the 15th the fleet reanchored in the 
Gunfleet. " You will see what a great disappointment 
I have had," writes James, " for had he (the victualler) 
kept touch I had not been forced to come back, and I 
may say I believe never any great fleet ever ventured 
to go so far from home and upon an enemy's cost with 
so smal a proportion of Drinke, for many of the great 
ships had not one days beere on bord when I came in 3 ." 
In short, the strategic advantage gained by being first 
at sea was thrown away by bad victualling, not merely 
lost, but thrust into the hands of the Dutch. 

Immediately on the return of the fleet preparations 
were hurried on and an attempt made to make up the 

1 Cal. 8 P. Dom. April 28th, 1665. 

2 Sandurich MSS. Journal, I. f. 275 (quoted by Harris, op. tit. 
i. 291). 

S. P. Dom. Chas. II, cxxi. f. 113. 


deficiency of beer, food and men. The manning of the 
ships did not improve as time went by ; short rations 
and shorter pay did not encourage faithfulness, and 
desertions were frequent : " sicknesse and the Colliers' 
great wages having taken many from us since wee came 
in. The colliers give 8 and 9 per voyage, w ch is as 
much as 7 months pay in the King's ships and may be 
performed in a moneth and noe limbes hazarded, the 
security against being pressed being added what hopes 
is there our men should stay with us or that others 
should come to us 1 ." Bad weather also hindered the 
going out of the victualling ships, and the completion 
of the stores proceeded at a very slow rate ; promises 
and forecasts remained unfulfilled. " For all they say, 
the fleet cannot saile this fortnight, though they knew 
the Hollanders were out ; except more victuals come 
downe speedily we shall be at a stand 2 ." " The delay 
of our victuals is the only stop of our going forth to 
seeke the Dutch whom we are very willing to meet 3 ." 

In the meantime, however, the Dutch had come to 
sea, and proceeded to make the most of the opportunity 
afforded by the absence from the seas of the English 
fleet. They had only been out of port six days when 
they fell in with a fleet which they at first mistook for 
the English fleet : it proved to be an English fleet of 
merchantmen from Hamburg laden with the most valu- 
able stores. The mistake concerning nationality had 
been mutual, and the man-of-war convoy " mistaking 

1 S. P. Dom. Chas. II, cxxi. f. 128. 

2 Ibid. cxxi. ff. 112, 113. 

3 Ibid. f. 128. 


the Dutch fleet for the English, fell into it 1 ." The 
loss was a serious one to the government, depending as 
they did so largely upon the Baltic countries for naval 
stores, and on receipt of the news the outcry was general. 
On the 31st Pepys writes, " to the 'Change, where 
great the noise and trouble of having our Hambrough 
ships lost : and that very much placed upon Mr Coven- 
try's forgetting to give notice to them of the going 
away of our ships from the coast of Holland. But all 
without reason, for he did ; but the merchants not being 
ready, staid longer than the time ordered for the convoy 
to stay which was ten days 2 ." However, whatever 
the direct cause of the disaster, it was very obvious 
that had James not been forced to return for lack of 
victuals, the whole thing would never have occurred. 
Consequently there was a general demand that the fleet 
should put to sea forthwith to meet the Dutch, and on 
the 29th, news of the proximity of the Dutch having 
apparently been received, the fleet were ordered to be 
ready to sail the next morning. It was the King's 
birthday, but, writes Sir Thomas Allin, " we were 
commanded to fyre noe gunnes only pendants and mast 
clothes abroad 3 ." Early on the 30th the fleet weighed 
from the Gunfleet. 

Numerically speaking the rival fleets were evenly 

The two balanced. The English numbered 109 

warships, including hired merchantmen, 

and 28 fireships and small craft, it carried 21,006 men, 

including marines, and mounted 4192 guns. The flag 

1 Col. 8. P. Dom. May 29th, 1665. 

2 Pepys' Diary, May 31st, 1665. 
8 Tanner MSS. 296. 


officers and squadrons were : Lord High Admiral (Red 
Squadron), H.R.H. James, Duke of York, with Sir 
Wm. Penn as Captain of the Fleet on the Royal Charles ; 
White Squadron Admiral Prince Rupert, Vice- Admiral 
Sir Christopher Myngs, Rear- Admiral Robert Sansum ; 
Blue Squadron Admiral Earl of Sandwich, Vice- 
Admiral Sir George Ayscue, Rear- Admiral Tho. Tydde- 
man ; Red Squadron Vice-Admiral Sir John Lawson, 
Rear-Admiral Sir Wm. Berkeley 1 . The Dutch num- 
bered 103 men-of-war and 30 small fry, including 11 
fireships, carried 21,631 men, and mounted 4869 guns. 
It was divided into no less than seven squadrons, the 
first, second and fifth of which were commanded re- 
spectively by Admirals Opdam, John Evertsen, and 
Cornelius Tromp ; Opdam was commander-in-chief. 

In morale and personnel, however, a gap widens 
between the English and Dutch. The opportune 
arrival of the colliery fleet on June 1st had enabled 
James to meet the fleet's " only lack that of men 2 " ; 
and colliery ships' men were some of those most sought 
after for manning the King's ships. There was no 
disaffection among the English. There is no evidence 
that there were any serious differences among the flag 
officers, while among the lower officers and the men 
there were no signs of serious discontent or ill discipline. 
Officers and men alike were eager for the fight, " no 
rhodomontade but an assurance of beating them 3 ." 
Moreover, as regards the unity of the fleet, the appar- 
ently useless excursion to the Texel in the previous 

1 Clowes, op. cit. n. 256. 

2 Cal S. P. Dom. June 4th, 1665. 
8 Ibid. April 18th, 1665. 


month must have been most valuable in securing a 
certain amount of cohesion in the fleet, in practising 
the amateur tactics of the merchant captains until they 
had become adapted to fleet discipline. Sandwich 
apparently had the professional fighter's distrust of 
the amateur in his attitude towards the merchant 
captains, for in the council of war he suggested their 
relegation to the rear of the line, saying the King's 
captains were " more entire and resolved to aid one 
another than it is to be feared the others are 1 " : but 
on this occasion his fears were scarcely justified in the 

The Dutch fleet on the other hand was in a far less 
sound state. Officers and men were in many cases un- 
reliable and disaffection was widespread. The fact 
that after the battle four captains were tried and shot 
for cowardice not a usual Dutch failing and six 
others otherwise punished, affords striking evidence of 
the morale of the Dutch. Cohesion was almost entirely 
lacking. The multiplication of squadrons, the lack of 
cordial co-operation between certain of the flag officers, 
coupled with the very large proportion of merchant 
captains, made any practical unity impossible. " Es 
war somit das Band der Zusammengehorigkeit sehr 
locker und in Korpsgeist kaum vorhanden 2 ." 

On the 1st of June, writes Allin, " we spied the 
Battle ff fleett, Captain Lambert first, he fyred a 

un an( * ^ ett kis topgallant sheets fly. 
Soe did I and stood for the fleett. They 
all wayed and stood off to the S.E. the wind E.N.E. 

1 Sandwich MSS. Journal, I. L 294, cf. Harris, op. cit. I. 299. 
Stenzel, Zeekriegsgeschichte, m. 161. 


fayre weather 1 ." Opdam's instructions were to the 
" destroying the English at water or at land, wherever 
they can meet them 2 ," so it is not quite comprehen- 
sible why he thus deliberately refused, or at least 
postponed, battle, at a time when he held the advantage 
of the weather-gauge. On the 2nd, resumes Allin, " we 
made sayle towards them but was very little wind all 
the forenoone easterly afternoone a fine gale and we 
raysed them much, we saw one of their ships blowne up 
but it proved a fireship." The fire was caused " by 
the Imprudence of him that commanded it, who was 
got drunk 3 ." The wind veered to S.W., and early on 
June 3rd the two fleets were some 14 miles N.N.E. of 
Lowestoft, the English having the weather-gauge. 

At about 3.30 a.m. the action began, the fleets, 
each in line ahead, passing each other on opposite 
tacks, S.E. and N.W. The White squadron led the 
van of the English, the Duke with the Red was the 
centre, and the Blue the rear. Vice-Admiral Myngs 
opened the firing, " but very farr off, and soe they fought 
the first passe to little or noe puepose, the wind at 
S.W. 4 " About 8 a.m., both fleets tacked again and 
passed, but again " very farr off that few shott reached, 
and those layd at Randum 4 ." The Dutch were 
endeavouring to win the weather-gauge but the superior 
manoeuvring powers of the English balked all such 
attempts ; particularly did the Red squadron do service 
in this direction, guided by the tactical skill of Penn in 

1 Allin's Journal Tanner MSS. 296. 

2 Sandwich MSS. Journal, i. ft. 259-263, Harris, op. cit. I. 298 

3 Life of Tromp, p. 269. 
* Allin's Journal. 


the name of James. At the end of the second pass, as 
they tacked again, there seemed some chance of the 
Dutch getting the gauge, but the position of the Red 
squadron prevented 1 ; the Duke had gone so far to 
windward that supposing they had weathered Rupert's 
squadron they would still be to the leeward of James, 
and thus between two fires. So they tacked again to 
the leeward of Rupert. Thereupon the Duke to pre- 
vent a recurrence of the danger tacked into and with 
the Dutch 2 , and gave order for others to follow suit. 
With that move the English line became completely 
disarranged, the Dutch could not tack again, and the 
battle degenerated into a long straggling melee. In 
the course of this, it is unknown whether by accident 
or design 3 Sandwich with his squadron broke through 
the Dutch line, a proceeding that must have had a deep 
and rapid effect on the already weakened morale of the 
Dutch, and soon after it they began to take to flight. 
But the fighting in the meantime had been no child's 
play. The Dutch flagship with Opdam on board had 
been blown up, but before she went she had crippled 
the Royal Charles, and Lord Falmouth, Earl Muskerry, 

1 Life of Tromp, p. 270. " Because the Duke of York's squadron 
kept the Weather gage without engaging in Fight, it was impossible 
for the Dutch to win that Advantage." 

2 Sandwich MSS. Journal, I. f. 297. Harris, op. cit. I. 303. " His 
Royal Highness, suspecting the enemy would weather our fleet if we 
stood on and tacked in our proper berths to make good the like, . . . 
tacked after the enemy, and commanded me to tack." Allin's Jour- 
nal. " His Highness sent me word to stand in, and I presently stood 
in soe neere as nott to shoote in vayne." 

8 Harris, op. cit. p. 304, apropos of this, gives no quotation from 
Sandwich's Journal to show that the move was deliberate. Hannay, 
Hist, of R. N. i. 341, suggests that some of the Dutch centre flinched 
and, lying back, left a gap through which the white squadron came. 


and Mr Boyle, a son of the Earl of Burlington, had all 
been killed by a single shot at the very side of the Duke. 
Vice- Admiral Lawson also was mortally wounded. 
Some idea of the melee nature of the fight may be gained 
from the following extract from Sir Thomas Allin's 
Journal : "I plyed my gunnes very hard for two houres 
uppon Generall Opdam another flagge man and 2 ships 
laying on a lyne and a vice Admirall and 4 more 9 in 
all, but they payd me handsomely . . . my masts yards 
sayles and hull very much torne. I setting my mayne 
sayle to streach ahead from the flagship, cam two new 
frigatts or scouts fresh upon me I was forced to take 
and receive all to gett off but pay'd the biggest frigatt 
(Young Everson) soundly I went and mended what I 
could but it was late 3 aclocke before I was fitt to fight, 
in that time Generall Opdam's ship blew up ... I was 
at the taking or beating to yield severall, and at the 
beating the fleet together that three gott together and 
were burnt by one of our fire shipps, the same formerly 
burnt 4 ship all tould of one another. We followed all 
night 1 ." 

The flight and chase were remarkable for two things : 
the splendid tenacity of Tromp, who had collected what 
ships he could and covered the retreat until his seamen 
"openly ascribed to a Miracle the Preservation of his 
Ship and Person 2 ," thus considerably lightening the 
disaster ; and the failure of the English properly to 
follow up their victory, which, says Evelyn, " might 
have been a complete one, and at once ended the war, 
had it been pursued, but the cowardice of some, or 

1 Tanner MSS. 296. 

2 Life of Tromp, p. 274. 


treachery, or both, frustrated that 1 ." There seems 
little reason to doubt the truth of the strange story told 
by Clarendon, supported as it is by the Commons 
Journal report of the examination of Harman in April, 
1668. Briefly put it is this : during the night after 
the fight, when the English were hard in pursuit, 
Brouncker, one of the Duke's servants, came up to 
Captain Harman saying the Duke had ordered sail to 
be slackened ; after some demur, and a clever trick on 
the part of Brouncker, sail was slackened and the rest 
of the fleet followed suit. " The Duchess had given a 
strict charge to all the Duke's servants to do all they 
could to hinder him to engage too far " such is Clar- 
endon's explanation of the business. Be the truth of 
that as it may, by the time the Duke arose in the morn- 
ing the Dutch were safe in reach of their harbours and 
the English had lost such an opportunity of crushing 
the Dutch Navy as they never had before or after 2 . 
" To confirme the reputation of their victory and to 
protect themselves against malice and artifice 3 " the 
council of war decided to return to the Downs with 
the whole fleet. On June 10th they anchored in South- 
wold Bay, and on June 18th the fleet was divided 
between Osely Bay, Harwich, Chatham and the Nore 4 . 
The prizes taken from the Dutch numbered about 
14 ships, including the Huis te Swieten, 70 guns, the 

1 Evelyn's Diary, June 8th, 1666. 

2 Allin says : " We stood along and saw them at ancor as many 
as could gett close to the Boys. . .had we had many fyre ships and 
gone upon them shooting we had distroyed many of them." Journal, 
June 4th. Tanner MSS. 296. 

8 Harris, op. cit. p. 309. Sandwich MSS. Journal, I. f. 302. 
4 List of ships assigned to each, Rawl. MSS. A. 196, f. 82. 


Hilversun, 60 guns, and the Carolus Quintus and 
Nagelboom, each 54 guns 1 : and in addition at least 
12 ships had been sunk or burned. The Dutch had 
taken the Charity. But two English flag officers and 
three captains had been lost : Vice- Admiral Sir John 
Lawson, Kear-Admiral Rob. Sansum, Captain James, 
Earl of Marlborough, of the Royal James, Captain 
Kirby of the Breda, and Captain Ableson of the Guinea. 
Apart from these concrete gains and losses this over- 
whelming victory did not bring much real gain to the 
English : owing to the failure to follow it up it was 
very far from having crushed the Dutch. Indeed on 
the whole it brought rather loss than gain ; it made 
the Dutch desperate, and, as Penn said. " the courage 
of the Dutch was never so high as when they were 
desperate 2 ," and it was instrumental in scaring Louis 
into joining the Dutch in their fight against the threat- 
ened naval predominance of England. 

The fight off Lowestoft had given England for the 
time being almost undisputed command of the sea and 
the Dutch began to entertain fears for two homeward 
bound fleets De Ruyter on the way back with his 
booty from the Guinea expedition, and the rich East 
India fleet of some 30 sail estimated to be worth many 
millions : either or both of which would have fallen an 
easy prey to the English fleet. The English designs on 
these two fleets were agreeably aided by an 
Strflue and ingenious and opportune suggestion from 
fiasco. gir Gilbert Talbot, the English envoy at 

1 Coventry's list in S. P. Dom. Chas. //, cxxra. f. 29, but not 

8 Clarendon, op. cit. 


Copenhagen. Though the proposal originally came from 
Talbot it appears to have met with great approval from 
the Danish King, approval that was, however, only 
practical as far as the cowardice, tempered by greed, 
which was characteristic of that monarch, would allow : 
the plan was of the simplest, though the word-play that 
accompanied it was often of a wonderful subtlety ; it 
was that when the East India fleet, relying on the 
neutrality of Denmark, anchored in one of the ports of 
Norway Bergen, in all probability the English fleet 
was to attack it unhindered by the Danish forts ; the 
price for which abstention was to be a half share in the 
spoils. To increase the chances of success and lessen 
the danger of any trouble falling on Denmark no 
declaration or notice was to be given to the Dutch 
ambassador until it was " too late for him to give 
advice thereof to that fleete to avoid their coast 1 ." 
By some delicate reasoning this was " somewhat to 
justify the Honour of the King of Denmark to the 
world," and was not to " be drawne into consequence 
that Denmark consenteth to the violation of their 
ports, for it is to be understood but a connivance 2 ." 
Possibly such subtleties were too much for the Danes 
though it was more probably nervousness and cowardice 
wrought up by long suspense ; however, Talbot found 
that his statement on June 17th " all is now well " 
was somewhat premature. The East Indiamen were 
long in reaching the coast of Norway and the 
Danes' fear of being involved in anything beyond the 

i Bodl. Libr. Raid. MS8. A. 262, Talbot to Arlington, June 17th, 
* Ibid. 


acceptance of a substantial bribe increased in the mean- 
time. " I met with a greate clamour that I went about 
to engage this crowne in present warr," Talbot writes 
on July 15th 1 ; he could get nothing in the form of a 
definite agreement in spite of assurances and promise : 
" I am heartily sick with having to doe with a timorous 
and unconstant people : For God's sake let me know 
what his Majesty will expect from this crowne and I 
will put them upon a short categorical answer 2 ." 

There was, however, no time to wait for a more 
definite agreement ; for the East India fleet was by 
this time in Bergen and De Ruyter reported off the 
Faroes, and on July 20th Talbot sent a messenger 
to Sandwich, in command of the English fleet, with 
verbal particulars of the arrangement " as being not so 
fitt to be putt to paper " a comment true in more 
ways than the one intended. The messenger missed 
Sandwich, and on July 24th Talbot wrote 3 explaining 
things and how the governor was to " amuse the 

1 He continues : " They made a greate discourse to me how 
dangerous it would be for them to engage (in this low condition) to 
anything that might provoke Holland against them unlesse they 
might be assured that Sweden would stick fast to England and not 
make any peace with Holland without the consent of England and 
Denmark." July 15th, 1665. Rawl MSS. A. 252. 

2 Ibid. 

8 " I have treated with his Majesty of Denmark to give command 
to the said governor " (of Bergen) " and all officers under him not to 
looke upon you as an enemy when you shall offer any violence to the 

Hollanders that ride there Therefore you are not to be surprised 

if he seem to be highly displeased with your proceeding and that he 
make high complaint thereof against you, which nevertheless will 
be but in show to amuse the Hollanders and excuse himselfe out- 
wardly to the world." Ibid. Talbot to Sandwich, July 24th, 1665. 


Meanwhile things had not been going too well with 
the English naval arrangements. The inevitable trou- 
ble about victualling and stores which hampered the 
fleets at every step during this war, was present on 
this occasion no less than usual ; added to that there 
was some doubt as to the chief command, and a general 
atmosphere of haste and doubt resulted badly for the 
fleet. Apparently there was a suggestion that Rupert 
should share the command with Sandwich 1 , in any case 
there was a delay in settling the command and a further 
delay on the part of Sandwich in taking up the com- 
mand. On Saturday, July 1st, news had been received 
of De Ruyter's fleet being off Ireland, and at a council 
of war held at the Nore, at which the King, Sandwich, 
and Albemarle were present, it was decided to try to 
intercept it. The command was to be given to Sand- 
wich, whom private affairs claimed till Monday, the 3rd. 
In the meantime, whether by mistake or for some 
reason that does not appear, Sir Wm. Penn was given 
the command and full instructions : the fleet was to 
sail at the first possible moment to meet the Dutch fleet, 
to follow them " though they should goe into any Har- 
bour belonging to the King of Denmarke in those 
parts," and if it was possible " to take or destroy them 
within those Harbours . . . nor to neglect the opportunity 
of doeing it 2 ." Sandwich returned on Monday to find 
Penn in command and en route for Sole Bay ; he follow- 
ed and reached there to find that Penn had taken his 
orders to hasten out very literally, and that the fleet 
was just visible on the horizon, bound for the Texel ; 

1 Col. S. P. Dom. July 2nd, 1665. 

2 Rawl MSS. A. 468. 



picking up Sir Jos. Jordan with five sail more, which 
had been unable to get off in such haste, he followed, 
and came up with Penn on the 6th, ten leagues off the 
Texel. The haste in setting out had been the reverse of 
beneficial ; not more than two-thirds of the available 
ships were there 1 , those that were there were " very 
badly furnished with victuals, liquor, yet worse, 
wanting 2500 men to what they had last engagement, 
some shipps boats and men left ashore for hast of getting 
out 2 ." Not merely might most of these defects have 
been remedied by even a couple of days' wait 3 , but also 
the fleet might have united with Sir Thos. Allin's 
squadron before setting out and thus have been free to 
cruise wherever might seem best in order to intercept 
De Ruyter 4 . As it was, Sandwich was bound to a 
limited cruising ground about the middle of the 
Dogger Bank, and it was not until July 17th that he was 
joined by Allin and a squadron of above 20 sail. At a 
council of war held immediately it was decided, as De 
Ruyter was almost certain for reasons both of policy 
and weather 5 to make for Holland by coasting along 
Norway and Denmark, to override the instructions 
directing them to await him about the Dogger 6 and 

1 On July 6th the fleet numbered : King's ships, 54 ; Merchant 
ships, 15. Rawl. MSS. 468. 

2 Rawl. MSS. A. 468 (Sandwich's narrative). 

3 There was a stock of provisions at Harwich. 

4 "...which indigent and disunited condition of the Fleete. . . 
being the Root where unto in all probability may be assigned the 
missing De Ruyter on his returne. ..." Ibid. 

6 " The wind was S.. . .improper to bring shipps along for Hol- 
and from the North." Ibid. 

6 The usual track of ships going to Holland after going round 
N. of Scotland. 


to make direct for the Naze of Norway with the 
minor objective of a Flemish fleet of 15 reported at 

The event justified the policy entirely, but the 
previous delays made it of no avail. On the 21st the 
English were some 30 leagues off the Naze when they 
had news of De Kuyter at Bergen a week previous to 
that. As a matter of fact De Ruyter was by that time 
near the coast of Denmark, and on July 26th, despite 
a contrary wind, he reached Delf-Zell on the Ems 1 , 
having crept along near the coast the whole way from 
Bergen. Penn's precipitate start thus lost England 
a great opportunity of giving a crushing 2 blow to 
Holland's prestige. There remained the opportunity 
of striking a lucrative blow at her trade and credit, and 
if sufficiency of pre-arrangement could give success 
the attempt deserved to be successful. 

Though, owing to his move from the Dogger, Sand- 
wich missed Sir Gilbert Talbot's messenger, yet he 
had a definite idea of the delicate arrangement with 
Denmark 3 though apparently he expected active 
assistance from the Danes. So when, on the 24th, he 
received news of the presence at Bergen of the fleet of 

1 De Ruyter' s Relation in Life of Tromp. 

2 " We thank God for having made us take care to avoid them 
since we were in no condition to have resisted them." Ibid. 

3 " I was induced to expect the King of Denmark's helpe from 
the advice of the King my Master, that S lr Gilbert Talbot had written 
that the King of Denmarke was ready to declare his Treaties broken 
witli Holland, but would be glad to take an advantageous time to 
say it, which would bee when any considerable substance of the 
Hollanders was lodged in theire Ports (that then if the English Fleet 
would attempt them by sea hee would assist and go halfe shares in 
the prize)." Bawl. MSS. A. 468. 



28 sail of Straits, French, Portuguese and Dutch ships, 
it was immediately decided to detach a squadron of 
19 1 ships none above fourth rate 2 ; Sir Thos. Tyddeman 
was given command. Calms and north winds, how- 
ever, hindered their advance and it was July 29th 
before the combined fleet reached latitude 58 46'. 

On the next day a further council of war was held 
which lasted six hours unbroken : the position, so far 
as Sandwich knew it, was a very complicated one the 
only complication of which he did not think (or know) 
being the one which finally ruined the enterprise. 
There were four main difficulties : " the uncertainty 
wee had whether De Kuyter himselfe were within or 
noe, which would need a greater force than to attempt 
only the Harbour at Bergen " ; the question whether 
they could wait for pilots, for they " had not above 3 
weekes beene in the Fleetes and scarce any water, 
which would necessitate speedily to look for supplies 3 " : 
also he was " expecting the whole Dutch Fleete hourely 
to give battle with the rest without " (Bergen) 4 , and 
there was the possibility that the special squadron 
might not have completed its task before the rest of 
the fleet would have to go " for want of subsistance 5 " 
and might so be shut in by the Dutch Fleet from Hol- 
land. There appears to have been a stiff debate on 
these difficulties, " my Lord proposing what was best 
to be acted and pressing to heare every man discourse 

1 Eight merchant men-of-war ; five fourth rates ; four fifth 
rates; two fireships. Allir's Journal, Tanner MSS. 296. 

2 Not more, owing to lack of room in Bergen roads. 
8 Fleet put on 6s. 4d. short allowances on July 26th, 
* Rawl. MSS. A. 468. 

6 Ibid, 


the point of our condition what was best to be done 1 ' 2 ." 
While the council was still in progress matters were de- 
cided by the arrival of news of nearly 40 sail in or about 
Bergen, and it was decided to increase the squadron 
to 20 ships, including one third rate. On that evening, 
Sunday the 30th, the special squadron for Bergen 
parted from the main fleet, Tyddeman being provided 
with every scrap of information as regards the nature 
of the place which Sandwich had been able to procure 3 . 
On Monday, the 31st, Tyddeman and his squadron 
anchored outside Bergen and sent in a messenger. 
The governor received him very favourably, and they 
" sailed merrily on with 14 saile and 2 fireships and 4 
ketches 4 " and anchored close under the castle. The 
governor 5 complained that the English had broken the 
treaty by entering the harbour with more than five 
ships and " was very tender not onely of his owne, but 
his master's honour 6 ." As the English representatives 7 

1 Tanner MSS. 296. 

2 Penn wanted to go back and lie before Texel to meet the Dutch 
Fleet " God had sent us a wind to make use of." Ibid. 

3 " There was scarce a pilot in the fleete that his Lordship could 
hear had ever been at Bergen but that he sent for him and discoursed 
the matter over with him, and for a whole weeks time the map of this 
place, and the discoursing and questioning upon it was his whole 
entertainment." Sir Tho. Clifford's account, Rawl. MSS. A. 256. 

* Ibid. 

5 Van Steignon. It is interesting at this stage to note the follow- 
ing opinion of this man and his actions Clowes, op. cit. n. 427. " The 
governor, unwilling to play the scoundrel upon his own responsibility, 
behaved himself like an honest man and fired upon the intruders." 
This was apparently also the Dutch estimate of him. 

6 Bawl. MSS. A. 256. 

7 The negotiations were conducted on the English side by 
Mr Mountagu (son of the Earl of Sandwich : he fell in the ensuing 
action) and Sir Tho. Clifford. 


were coming away to the fleet a gun was fired across the 
bows of the Sapphire, wounding one man ; the English, 
however, took no notice and continued to berth them- 
selves. Fear of reprisals perhaps led the governor to 
send to ask for further conference, and " now he sung 
another song. . .he thought it improper to oppose us 1 ." 
Then ensued a somewhat unedifying contest of haggling 
over the conditions under which the Dutch ships were 
to be plundered. The English were in all haste to get 
to work so as to be clear before the threatened arrival 
of De Ruyter ; the governor and General Alefeldt 2 on 
the other hand wished for delay, for they were expect- 
ing a Danish fleet of 22 sail by means of which they 
hoped to monopolise the booty 3 : the English attacking 
force was also to be limited to six ships. Tyddeman, 
however, flatly refused to delay, and at daybreak on 
Wednesday negotiations had continued throughout 
Tuesday night the governor " sang yet another 
song " : "he confessed ingeniously that the greatest 
matter that troubled him was the parting with halfe 
the booty," he said he had orders to secure the whole 
if possible 4 and suggested the prizes should be sealed 
up and left at Bergen until advice came from Denmark : 
the English, however, insisted on division, and so the 
conferences 5 ended. Meanwhile the Dutch had been 

1 Eawl. MSS. A. 256. 

2 Commander-in-chief of forces at Bergen, 

3 This fact Alefeldt let slip to Mountagu. 

4 Clifford remarks on this, " Y r Lordship sees this is another 
straine then his being a man of honour as at his first conference he so 
much boasted of." Rawl MSS. A. 256. 

5 Among the varying ' songs ' sung and tales told by the Danish 
Governor and Alefeldt it is somewhat difficult to decide which if 
any had any truth in them, though the last that they wished for 


making the most of their opportunity : on the arrival 
of the English they had been " lying one on another, 
incapable of execution 1 ," but while the negotiations 
were proceeding they succeeded in placing four ships 
in a line athwart the harbour and constructing some 
temporary forts on land. 

Sir Thomas Clifford's account of what followed 
solves most of the contradictions which appear in other 
English and Danish accounts. " At 5 aclocke Wed- 
nesday morning wee fell upon the Dutch, with a strict 
charge and command to each captain not to fire at the 
towne or castle till they fired at us, and for a while the 
castle and forts forbore, for neare space of a quarter 
of an houre, and our men shot low to the Shipps only 
without annoying the towne, and I believe that the 
Castle might still have forborne if the Dutch that were 
called in there, and the rest of them that had placed 
themselves in the towne and about the rocks had not 
begunne it, and then it was impossible to hinder our 
men from firing at them again. About an hour after 
the fight begunne one or two of our Captains say that 
the white flag 2 was hung out upon the castle, but the 
Revenge being to the leeward and perpetually in the 
smoake we could not discerne it, and the captains doe 
affirme likewise that all the while the white flagge was 
hung out, which was for the space of a quarter of an 
the whole prize themselves seems most compatible with their mode 
of conducting negotiations. 

1 Cal. 8. P. Dom. August 21st, 1665. 

1 Danish King gave account to Talbot " that after agreement 
made to leave 6 frigats to keep in y e Hollanders till y e order came, 
the Capt. Shott 200 shott from his whole squadron at y Castle 
before y 6 governor would fire a gunn, nay he hung out his white flag 
but all would not doe ; and then he fired " Rawl. MS8. A. 252. 


houre, the guns from the castle were still fired at us, 
which we suppose to be done by the Dutch that were 
called in to strengthen the castle, but being constantly 
shot at from thence our men would not be hindered 
from answering them and therefore did not cease 
firing at them or take any heed to give the Adm. S ir Tho. 
Tyddeman notice of the white flag out 1 ." After about 
three hours and a half the English were forced to 
retire : it was a hopeless affair ; the wind was South 
and blowing hard almost straight out of the harbour, 
thus preventing any use of fireships for not only 
would they have had to be towed in, but also they 
would have been dangerous only .to the English ships, 
which were " moored fast head and sterne quite th'wart 
of Harbour 2 " also the Dutch, as we have seen, had 
moved their ships' guns so that they could all be 
effective 3 and in addition had landed some 100 pieces 
and erected slight forts. Thus in all probability the 
wind and the Dutch would have proved sufficient to 
defeat the English attempt 4 even had the governor 
given or been able to give the passive connivance 5 

1 Rawl. MSS. A. 256. 

2 Ibid. 468. 

8 Thus giving nearly double weight to their broadside. 

4 "Against the disadvantage of y e Opposition of Heaven Dane and 
Dutch I doe not see what could have been effected." Sandwich's 
narrative, Rawl. MSS. A. 468. 

5 It is possible that the presence of the Dutch in the town and 
forts was not the only reason for the Danish action : about the 20th 
of July the French ambassador had been in Bergen and it was 
reported that " y 6 Towne is full of noise y 1 y e French King will assist 
y 6 Dutch," and on his return to Copenhagen Talbot says of him, 
" M. Terlon is now quite gone from his stile of neutrality and presseth 
this king to declare w th France and Holland to force England to 
conditions of peace." Rawl. MSS. A. 282. 


expected ; on the other hand, had Tyddeman agreed to 
wait till the Friday as suggested which would have 
been very dangerous in the light of the information he 
had received he would have obtained that active 
support from the governor which would have given 
success ; for on that day the belated orders and letter 
reached him from Copenhagen bidding him give active 
support to Tyddeman Talbot had at length succeeded 
in screwing the Danish King's courage to the sticking 
point, just too late. Apart from the underhand 
negotiations the responsibility for which rests on 
Talbot which preceded this expedition, there was 
nothing in its failure to discredit Tyddeman or any of 
the English ships concerned. Possibly the only just 
criticism was that made by one of the Captains con- 
cerned (Coleman of the Hound), " Teddeman is a brave 
man but spent too long in treating with the Dane, who 
proved very treacherous 1 ." 

The English squadron had suffered heavily in the 
fight, though it lost no ships except possibly one of 
the ketches, and brought off " one though deare bought 
prize 2 ." Most of the ships were " shattered more in 
theire masts, rigging and Hulls then scarce ever shipps 
were scene 3 " : the casualties numbered 357, 118 killed 
including the Earl of Sandwich's son and no less than 
6 captains 4 , and 239 wounded 5 . The Dutch claimed 

1 Cal S. P. Dom. August 21st, 1665. 
- Ibid. 

3 Rawl. MSS. A. 468. 

4 Captains Scale of the Breda, Hayward of the Prudent Mary, 
Utber of the Guernsey, Cadman of the Hambro. Mercht., Lawson of 
the Coast Frig., Pierce of a fireship. Rawl. MSS. A. 256. 

6 Cal. S. P. Dom. August 26th, 1665. 


to have lost only about 100 killed and wounded ; their 
masts, sails and rigging were " extreamely endamaged, 
so that they will take us several days time to repair 
them 1 ." 

After he was forced to retire Tyddeman anchored out- 
side the harbour to make what repairs were possible, and 
in the meantime both he and Clifford wished to have 
further negotiations with the governor to see if some 
working agreement could not be arrived at. On Friday, 
August 4th, the governor sent expressions of regret 
and goodwill to Tyddeman, and finally on Tuesday, 
the 8th, at 11 p.m. in spite of opposition in the fleet 2 
Clifford went to meet Van Steignon " in a sayler's habit, 
under colour of getting bread and fresh meat," which, 
he says, " went very much against the haire with me 3 ." 
At the conference the governor informed Clifford that 
" he was descended of a great race, his ancestors for 
700 years gentlemen of the empire, and he would not 
doe any act that should sully the memory of them, that 
he was allyed to the Duke of Holstein, prince Palatine, 
etc., etc. 3 " It is difficult to see what other object 
he had than that of giving Clifford this information, 
for he refused any assistance ; and in the meantime the 
Dutch had moored seven ships in line, triple manned 
them, and brought 30 guns in each ship to bear on a 
boom they had built across the harbour this boom, so 
the governor stipulated, must not be crossed or broken 
by the English. Clifford thought the idea was that the 

1 Life of Tromp. 

2 " Not one of the captains will heare one word of treating with 
y e governor." Rawl MSS. A. 256. 


English were to cripple the Dutch, thus leaving them a 
helpless prey for the Danes under the guns of the castle : 
however, whatever the scheme was, it failed 1 , for on 
the 10th Tyddeman, seeing no reasonable chance of 
ultimate success and being on short rations, sent a 
polite note saying that as the wind favoured a return 
to England he had decided to make use of it : he met 
Sandwich's fleet off Flamborough Head on the 18th and 
on the 21st anchored in Sole Bay. 

Sandwich and the main fleet had in the meantime 
been seriously hampered by insufficiency of stores. 
After they had parted with Tyddeman a gale and very 
rough weather from the south had driven them away 
northwards until August 4th, by which time the dearth 
of provisions made it absolutely imperative for them to 
make direct for the nearest place on the British coast 
where at least water should be obtainable a move 
which, according to their information, left Tyddeman 
exposed to the danger of being overwhelmed by a fresh 
fleet under De Ruyter. It was decided to run for 
Shetland, and on the 7th the fleet anchored in Bressay 
Sound ; whence, having watered 2 ' 3 , it sailed on the 

1 Van Steignon, however, did his best to make up for his dis- 
appointment : he demanded 100,000 thalers from the Dutch ships 
as due payment for the protection he had afforded and was affording 
them, 3000 he took forthwith and was all but taking more when the 
inopportune arrival of De Ruyter forced him to be satisfied with 
effusive thanks from the States deputies. He did, however, retain 
about 40 guns that had been landed " sie miissten diese zur eigenen 
Sicherheit behalten, da ihnen im Gefecht sehr viele eigene gesprungen 
oder zerschossen waren " (Brandt, 318). Cf. note 5, p. 133. 

3 Sandwich complains that it was " very badd," being " redd." 
8 " In meane time I gave myself e to y 6 takeing good obser- 
vation of y e Harbour to give y King an account thereof and to 


13th to reach Sole Bay on the 21st as we have 

On Sandwich's arrival at South wold Bay, every 
effort was made to prepare the fleet for speedily setting 
out again, with the hopes of meeting the main Dutch 
fleet. It was a difficult task : Sandwich needed some 
2500 men 1 he had had to put off over 1000 sick- 
besides repairs and stores of all sorts, and the recruits 
sent to him were not only scanty in number, but so 
unserviceable in many cases that they had to be 
rejected " rather than pester and increase the sickness 
of the fleet 2 ." Some of the least serviceable ships were 
sent into harbour and their crews appropriated to other 
ships. But once again the inadequacy of the victual- 
ling arrangements hampered the fleet both before and 
after its setting out, and was largely responsible for 
the failure to come to any decisive action. 

In spite of hindrances, however, the fleet sailed on 
the 28th, some 110 sail strong. They met with very 
rough weather and it was not until the 3rd of September 
that they reached their intended station off the Texel. 
The same morning they sighted seven or eight sail 
which they chased, and by sunset had captured them 
all, including two East Indiamen and four men-of-war 3 . 

advise in what places it would be usefull to fortifie there." Rawl. 
MSS. A. 468. 

1 Rawl MSS. A. 468. 

2 Cal S. P. Dom. August 25th, 1665. 

8 Two East Indiamen the Golden Phoenix and Fort of Hunin- 
gen ; four men-of-war (three of 50 guns, one of 40), the West-Friesland, 
Groningen, De Zevemuolden and Hope, one Straits man, one Malaga 
man, and other small vessels. The English lost the Hector, a 
fifth-rate frigate. Cal. S. P. Dom. September 5th, 1665 ; Rawl. 
MSS. A. 195, 185-6 ; Life of Tromp. 


From them Sandwich heard that " the late storme had 
separated theire whole fleete off the Naze of Norweigh 
and that they were scattered in the sea round about," 
and that " the greatest Boddy of their Fleet then 
together " was some " 80 sayle 1 ." In hopes of meeting 
this fleet it was decided to tack to the westward, and on 
the following morning further reports of them were 
received. Then ensued three days' calm, and on the 
7th it was decided at a council of war not to stay out 
more than four (? 14) days' time 2 , owing to increase of 
sickness and lack of victuals. On the 9th they fell in 
with a further body of over 15 sail of Dutchmen, most of 
whom were captured four men-of-war, one of 20 and 
three of 40 guns and upwards, two West Indiamen 
and seven or eight fly- boats with provisions for the 
fleet 3 . Midday the same day a fleet of about 30 sail, 
half merchant, half men-of-war, was sighted on the 
weather bow standing for the mouth of the Texel. 
Sandwich gave chase and tried to get the weather of 
them, but at 4.30 p.m. they were still two leagues off 
dead to the windward. The weather worsened, " falling 
so thick that wee could not see them and blowing 4 " : 
Harman, Berkeley and Jordan nevertheless tacked and 
stood with the Dutch, but Sandwich, thinking it unfit 
to endanger so large a fleet as his in a night fight off a 
dangerous lee shore, called off those that were in chase, 
stood away to the westward and finally anchored in 

1 Rawl MSS. A. 468. 

2 Ibid. 

9 Ibid. : also Life of Tromp, p. 317. According to the latter the 
Dutch ships were led within reach of Sandwich by the treachery of 
a pilot. 

Rawl MSS. A. 468. 


Sole Bay on the llth 1 . Thus was another great oppor- 
tunity lost to the English the last opportunity that 
offered that year before bad weather, ill-manning, and 
ill-victualling forced the fleet into harbour for the 
winter. Sandwich was very sharply criticised by the 
inevitable landsman critic on his return for not having 
made an attempt at this squadron, but his own justifi- 
cation of his caution seems sound 2 , and even Harman 
who did not return to the fleet from the chase does 
not seem to have expected the main fleet to have 
followed him. 

Had the fleet, however, been able to stay out 
longer, they might have met the main body of the Dutch 
fleet which did not come to anchor 3 till the 24th, being 
then not more than 80 sail and very weather-beaten : 
it is not surprising that the Dutch thought that " the 
English intended nothing less than a Fight, when they 
saw so fair an occasion to make a Rich Booty without 
it 4 ." A less cautious and more enterprising leader 

1 Rawl. M8S. A. 468 and S. P. Dom. Chas. II, cxxxn. ff. 83 and 
85. In these two encounters the English lost three captains 
Lambert and Langhorne and the Captain of the Hector. 

2 " To engage ships promiscuously in the night when neither 
friend nor foe can be distinguished, may occasion God knows how 
great damage to a Fleete of 150 sayle and upwards as we all were 
Before daylight they would have been in port or have led us ashore 
to y 6 mine of the whole Fleete if wee had persued .... It may be 
remembered wee came ill manned out of Sould Bay, since that wee 
had 3000 prisoners to guard and theire ships taken manned out of 
us. And if wee had come to engage wee must have taken men out 
of the Prizes and destroyed them." (The Royal James did so to a 40 
gun prize without orders, expecting an engagement.) Rawl. MSS. 
A. 468. 

3 At Goree. 

4 Life of Tromp, p. 319. 


than Sandwich might have refused to be overcome by 
unavoidable difficulties 1 , sent home his prizes as weakly 
manned as possible, and kept at sea with the rest of 
his fleet with the object of engaging the shattered 
Dutch fleet at all costs : a decisive blow at that time 
might easily have still further weakened the Dutch 
prestige and morale, have proved a strong argument in 
the winter negotiations, have checked the French alli- 
ance with Holland, and possibly have ended the war. 

The Dutch were more persistent in their endeavours 
to come to some decisive action and on October llth, 
despite continued bad weather, De Ruyter sailed from 
the Texel with a fleet of 90 sail of men-of-war. He 
cruised at the mouth of the Thames for two or three 
weeks, holding a more or less effectual blockade; but with 
that insult to the British ' Dominion of the Seas ' he 
satisfied himself. " The Dutch have sometimes alarmed 
us," writes one Captain Titus, from Margate, " but 
never made us a visit. The Body of theire Fleet hath 
all this time rode betwixt the Long-Sands Reach and 
North Sand Head ; and now and then they send some 
shipps on the back of the Goodwins southwards and 
sometimes into this Rode. But from hence they have 
been Terrified by f ower old Dismall Honey-combd Gunns, 
w ch every time they were shott of more endangered the 
gunners than them. They have now left the Coast 2 ." 

1 Coventry to Arlington : " hopes the fleet is at sea, but unless 
the victualler sends supplies they cannot remain long, so that if De 
Witt stay any time in Norway, they will be obliged to come back 
and lose the opportunity." Col. S. P. Dom. September 2nd, 1666. 
Sandwich, however, gives bad weather and prizes as his chief reason 
for return. 

2 Carte MSS. 223, f. 293. 


Meanwhile sickness was ravaging the Dutch. It 
was estimated that there were 970 sick in the fleet 1 , 
and the number ever increasing. In light of this, the 
approaching winter, and the fact that the English 
showed no sign of coming out, it was decided to return 
to Holland, and on November 1st the fleet set sail 
eastward. With their departure home ended the naval 
movements of the year. 

In the meantime England was under the spell of 
1666 The war ^ na ^ ' visitation ' that, for a time, all but 
Plague. paralysed her life. The ' Great Plague ' 

that, during the previous year, had been sapping the 
very root of Holland's mercantile and naval power, 
now passed into England. Despite official precautions 
it crept into England along the lines of the North Sea 
trade. It first appeared in the East Coast towns and 
London, and gradually oozed, like a sluggish, deadly 
tide, westward over England, inevitable, unconquerable. 
The Navy, however, partly by sheer good fortune, 
and partly by precautions induced as much by panic 
as by wisdom, suffered far less than might have been 
expected, than did the Dutch fleet. This was in part 
due to the fact that during the worst period of the 
visitation the greater number of the ships were laid up 
in harbour unmanned, while the remainder were rigor- 
ously kept away from all contact with sources of possible 
infection. Rather than risk Plague, ships would go 
without full stores or complement. We hear, for 
instance, that " several captains refuse to receive 
clothes, though in great want, for fear of infection 2 " ; 

1 Life of Tromp, p. 321. 

2 Cal. S. P. Dora. October 12th, 1665. 


also of "sicke men that are recovered" lying before 
the doors of the Navy Office day and night, because, 
" having been on shore, the captains won't receive 
them on board 1 ." Thus for the most part the ships 
remained singularly free from the sickness, in striking 
contrast to the Dutch the latter estimated that in 
De Ruyter's fleet off the Thames, besides 140 dead and 
355 returned sick to Holland, there were at least 970 
men sick 2 . There were, of course, exceptions to the 
English good fortune : a noteworthy case is that of the 
Convertine, a small fourth-rate ship carrying 140 men, 
which, in the course of a voyage to Gothenburg, lost 47 
men dead, and at her destination had to put 38 ashore 
besides 10 other sick who stayed on board 8 . The 
Dutch idea that the English were " debarred by a 
raging and pestilent distemper from accepting " the 
offer of battle 4 was but partially true ; the plague was 
but one cause of the lack of men, and, besides men, 
stores, victuals, and money itself, were all equally 
lacking 5 . 

The dockyards, however, did not escape from the 
pestilence as easily as did the ships, and though in 
September Coventry could be grateful that " the yards 
have escaped in this very great contagion 6 ," yet as 
time went on they began to lose their immunity. At 
Deptford, Woolwich and Harwich the death-roll was 
heavy. Portsmouth remained long untouched " a 

Pepys' Diary, September 30th, 1666. 

Life of Tromp, p. 321. 

Cat. 8. P. Dom. December 25th, 1665. 

Life of Tromp, p. 324. 

Of. List of Shortages, Carte MSS. 74 ; f. 234 

Cal. S. P. Dom. September llth, 1665 

T. 10 


strange mercy 1 " but in the spring of '66 the plague 
reached there too, though in a less virulent form. 
Thus, further to hinder the supply of victuals and stores, 
there was added to the existing lack of money a lack 
of men. Beer, almost the most troublesome item of 
naval victualling, threatened to be shorter in supply 
than ever ; it was reported " on account of the sickness 
most of the brewers who supply the Navy have discon- 
tinued brewing, and others do not brew half the 
quantity 2 ." From Gosport comes a typical wail that 
" workmen are dispersed, some dead, others shut up, 

and others gone away Until it please God to remove 

the visitation ' the work ' cannot possibly go forward 3 ." 
The fact that at Portsmouth itself the plague never 
got absolutely out of hand was very probably in no 
little measure due to the scientific precautions devised 
by the energetic Commissioner Middleton when he 
enforced the isolation of some of the carpenters and 
other dock workers in a kind of quarantine ship, the 
Little Francis : " the men are to stay on board it, 
to wash themselves and their clothes, and burn rosin 
and brimstone for 14 days before they are admitted to 
the yard 4 ." 

In view of this added difficulty in the way of victual- 
ling it is surprising to find insufficient 


victuals and stores the subject of far 
fewer complaints during 1666 than during the previous 

1 Col. 8. P. Dom. October 12th, 1665. One physician, no lover of 
Portsmouth it would appear, explains it thus : " the air of Portsmouth 
is naturally so pernicious to man that the man whose body is able to be 
supported in this air is plague free." (Gal 8. P. Dom. April 9th, 1666. ) 

2 Ibid. December 25th, 1665. 

Ibid. April 24th, 1666, * Ibid. April 22nd, 1666. 


years. The improvement may be traced very largely 
to Samuel Pepys. 

As we have already seeiij dissatisfaction with the 
existing arrangements for victualling was widespread ; 
it was recognised that they were hopelessly inadequate : 
and, before the end of the summer of 1665, the Duke 
of York had proposed that "before the time for the 
declaration of victuals comes, some men, diligent and 
able in purse, should be joined with the victualler, it 
being too much for any one man's purse 1 ." A few days 
later the King expressed the same desire, also suggesting 
that " undertakers be employed in the several ports 2 ." 
To find men willing to share the thankless work with 
Gauden was a difficult, if not hopeless, task. The whole 
question was referred to Pepys for enquiry, and his 
enquiries impressed him with the truth of " the want 
of victuals being the whole overthrow of this yeare 
both at sea, and now at the Nore here and Portsmouth 
where the fleete lies 3 ." Early in October he tendered 
his report. Partnership with Gauden had been refused 
by those most fitted for it, and the alternative remain- 
ing was the appointment of local surveyors of victuals 
at each port to check, examine and report. Pepys' 
suggestion met with complete approval, " no more 
said upon it than a most thorough consent to every 
word was said, and directed, that it be pursued and 
practised 3 ." His personal offer was accepted, and on 
October 27th he was appointed Survey or- General at a 
salary of 300 a year. He set about not over- hastily 

1 Gal. S. P. Dom. August 30th, 1665. 

8 Ibid. September 7th. 

3 Pepys' Diary, October 24th. 



drawing up instructions for his subordinates, thereby 
displaying to himself his own ignorance of the subject : 
" I am ashamed I should go about concerning myself 
in a business which I understand so very very little 
of 1 ." He was, however, not the man to be hindered 
by previous ignorance, and these instructions appear 
to have been fairly successful. The State Papers, 
which in 1665 teem with complaints about insufficient 
victuals, are, during 1666, with few exceptions silent. 
In July the Duke of York, who had, however, not been 
at sea with the fleet, told Pepys that his victualling 
account " was a good account, and that the business of 
the victualling was much in a better condition than it 
was last yeare 2 ." The most striking exception to this 
general satisfaction was the letters from the Generals 
at sea a month later, in which they, " in very plain and 
sharp and menacing terms," complained of short sup- 
plies, and " did lay their not going or too soon returning 
from the Dutch coast, this next bout, to the want of 
victuals 3 ." Pepys was certain there was " no reason for 
it," and it is evident that the fault lay less with exces- 
sive detail and officialdom on the part of the Navy Office 
the admirals complained "that instead of supplies 
only accounts are sent 4 " than with lack of detail and 
excess of bluster on the part of the admirals : " there 
hath never," writes Sir Wm. Coventry in reply to the 
complaints, " been any demand made or any account 
stated sent us, which shewed what was wanting, but 

1 Pepys' Diary, December 1st, 1665, 

2 Ibid. July 26th, 1666. 

8 Ibid. August 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 1666. 
Rawl. MSS. A. 174, f. 200. 




y e demands alwayes were to send victual for the Fleet 

to compleat till such a time We had no ground 

upon which to compute a further supply 1 ." There is 
extant an interesting table of abstracts of the victual- 
ling orders and their treatment by the Navy Office 
which shows very clearly the businesslike methods 
that characterised the Navy Office in this connection 2 . 

" 12th October, 1665. Duke 
orders 35,000 men's vic- 
tuals for y e yeare. 

$th October. D. directs at 
what port it is to be pro- 
vided at. 

Uth May, 1666. Admiralls 
desire hasteing of vic- 
tuals to them and keep- 
ing up y e fleete with 4 
months victuals. 

October, 1665. War- 
rant by Navy Office to 
Victualler to goe in hand 
with providing it. 

Uth October. Let. from 
Navy Office to Victualler 
giving same directions. 

17th May, 1666. Victualler 
had pressing let. from 
Nav. Office to that pur- 

llth May. Nav. Office 
tells them so and that 
the want of men in the 
victualling ships is the 
only hindrance." 

The fact that Pepys was so far successful in dealing 
with the question of the victualling offers 
pretty convincing proof of his administra- 
tive capabilities, for the prime difficulty of lack of 
money was, if anything, more persistent and over- 
whelming in '66 than previously. The national morale 
had been further shaken by the plague, and official 

1 Rawl. MSS. A. 174, f. 211 

2 Ibid A. 174, f. 233. 



business suffered both by omission and commission : 
" nobody minding the publique, but everybody himself 
and his lusts 1 ." " Want of money in the Navy puts 
everything out of order. Men grow mutinous ; and 
nobody here to mind the business of the Navy but 
myself," writes Pepys 2 . The debts of the Navy were 
more cumbersome than ever, and early in 1666, " to 
answer a certain expense and debt of 2,300,000 3 ," 
there was barely 1,500,000, including the Government 
grant of 1J million ; a deficit of over 800,000. In 
October of the same year the deficit was estimated at 
930,000 4 somewhat of a contrast to the 852,000 
estimate of 1664 which " God knows " was " only a 
scare to the Parliament, to make them give the more 
money 5 ." 

It was in the face of difficulties such as these that 
the preparations for the dispatch of the fleet progressed 
during the spring of 1666. The lack of trust in govern- 
ment pay once again hindered the supply both of men 
and ships. Merchants had almost to be forced before 
they would hire out their ships for the King's service, 
and the very close similarity between the proposed 
and the ' agreed ' price of hire shows how purely 
formal was the ' bargaining 6 .' While to meet the old 

1 Pepys' Diary, October 15th, 1665. 2 Ibid. October 31st. 

3 Ibid. Febriuuy 19th, 1666 : for details cf. Pepysian M88. 2589, 
pp. 1-3. 

4 Pepysian MSS. 2589, p. 13. 5 Diary, November 25th, 1664. 
6 Cf. List of Hired Merchantmen and prices : Rawl. MSS. A. 195, 

ff. 82-4. In the autumn of '65 and the spring of '66, 23 merchantmen 
of between 3 and 500 tons were hired at an average rate of 9*. Gd. 
per ton. Also of smaller vessels between 50 and 100 tons there 
were hired, in October three, in November five, in January three, 
and in February seven. 


grievance of overdue pay and to facilitate manning, 
the King was forced to ask the East India Company 
for a loan of " 50,000 with all speed on good security 
to pay off the arrears of seamen, without which it will 
be impossible for the fleet to put to sea 1 ." 

Although the evil effects to health, morale, and 
discipline, of a delay in harbour were only too well 
known " the sickness increases and the ships are 
pestered with women ; there are as many petticoats 
as breeches on board some of them and that for 
weeks together 2 " it was not until May 29th that 
Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle arrived in 
the Downs in command of a fleet of 80 sail exclusive 
of small craft. Rupert and Albemarle were to be in 
joint command, despite Rupert's dislike to sharing 
the command and his unpopularity as a leader. 
Lord Sandwich was now on an embassy to Spain until 
a scandal concerning the embezzlement of certain rich 
Dutch prizes had passed over. The question of the 
advisability of dividing the command of the fleet 
between two joint commanders was to be brought 
forward very forcibly by the coming events. 

In the meantime, at the beginning of the year, Louis 
Division of XIV had declared war on England, and 
for months had been preparing a fleet, at 
Toulon and Rochelle, which was to unite with De Ruyter 
and crush England's naval power. On the same day 
that Albemarle and Rupert had joined the fleet, a 
rumour, apparently more or less authenticated, reached 
London to the effect that the united French fleet under 

1 Cal. 8. P. Dom. April 19th, 1666. 

2 Ibid. 


Beaufort was already at the mouth of the Channel. 
At the time, it was believed that the Dutch fleet was 
still in harbour, and while the main fleet under Albe- 
marle was to stay and watch them, Rupert, with 20 
ships, was detached to go down the Channel to meet the 
French 1 . " A pqsition like that of the English fleet," 
says Mahan 2 , " threatened with an attack from two 
quarters, presents one of the subtlest temptations to a 
commander " : that of dividing his forces ; which, 
" unless in the possession of overwhelming force, is an 
error, exposing both divisions to be beaten separately." 
That statement, however, makes the very common 
omission of disregarding the fact that, when the order 
was given, the Dutch were believed to be in harbour and 
likely enough to remain there while the English were 
united and prepared : consequently if Albemarle had 
gone with his whole fleet to meet the French he would 
have left the Thames open to De Ruyter, and, con- 
versely, with all the fleet concentrated against the 
Dutch, Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight would have 
been exposed to Beaufort. The division was not a fault 
" because it was a necessity 3 ." That this fact was not 
unrealised is shown by the promptitude with which, 
on receipt of " certaine intelligence that the Dutch Fleet 
is come forth," the King gave order " that his fleet 
should forthwith bee united " and that Rupert and 
Albemarle should meet each other : " pray hasten all 

1 For official narratives concerning the division of the fleet, by 
Rupert and by Albemarle, with Coventry's notes, cf. Brit. Mus. Add. 
MSS. 32,094, ff. 196-204. 

2 Captain A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 118. 
8 Corbett, Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 137. 


you can " the orders finish 1 . The true authorship of 
the order for division has been the subject of many 
conflicting statements. King Charles is on the whole 
the most popular scapegoat, but Albemarle and Claren- 
don have their accusers. Pepys, on the authority of 
Sir William Coventry, tells a story about it which at 
least equals the others in authoritativeness, and betters 
them in point of probability : it rings true of the petty 
jealousies which infested the post of Admiral of the 
fleet. After saying " that the proposition did first 
come from the fleete, . . . and that there was nothing in 
the whole business which was not done with the full 
consent and advice of the Duke of Albemarle," " he 
did adde (as the Catholiques call le secret de la Masse), 
that Sir Edward Spragge who had even in Sir Chris- 
topher Myngs's time put in to be the great favourite of 
the Prince, but much more now had a mind to be the 
great man with him, and to that end had a mind to 
have the Prince at a distance from the Duke of Albe- 
marle, that they might be doing something alone did, 
as he believed, put on this business of dividing the 
fleete, and that thence it came 2 ." 

However that may have been, the order to rejoin 
reached Rupert too late to enable him to 

The 4 Days' .. .. , 

Fight. June do more than check the evils done by 

ist 4th, 1666. . . 

division. In the meantime De Kuyter 
with a fleet of about 90 sail had come to sea, 
and when, early on the morning of June 1st, the 
wind, which had been easterly, changed to south-west, 

1 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York'* Letters, " May 30th, 1666, 
12 at night." 

2 Pepys' Diary, June 24th, 1666. 


he cast anchor about midway between the North Fore- 
land and Dunkirk. Monk was off the North Foreland 
with the greater part of the English fleet numbering 
60 sail. Early the same morning they had weighed 
with the flood and were standing for Harwich when 
news came of the Dutch. " About 7 aclocke our scouts 
gave y e signall, w cn was leting y e top gallan sailes fly 
and fireing 2 or 3 guns to let us know they discovered 
the enemies fleet to the leeward 1 ." Two hours later it 
became known for certain that they were the main 
Dutch fleet. A council of war was immediately called, 
at which, largely through the determination of the Duke, 
it was decided to attack in the hope that the advan- 
tage of the wind and surprise (the Dutch were still at 
anchor) would compensate for the handicap of numbers. 
After the event Sir John Harman, Rear- Admiral of the 
Blue, told Pepys that " at the Council of War before the 
fight, it was against his reason to begin the fight then, 
and the reasons of most sober men there 2 ." The 
decision, or at least the manner of it, seems to have 
caused considerable ill-feeling : Penn tells of the com- 
manders saying "that they durst not oppose it at 
the Council of War, for fear of being called cowards, 
though it was wholly against their judgement to fight 

1 Carte MSS. 72, f . 37. The following account is based mainly on 
a Narrative from on board the Royatt Charles, Carte MSS. 72, ff. 37-8 ; 
Let. from a French eyewitness, Carte MSS. 72, f. 36 ; Allin's Journal, 
Tanner MSS. 296 ; Narratives of Rupert and Albemarle, Brit. Mus. 
Add. MSS. 32,094, ff. 196-204 ; also A true Narrative, publ. by Th. 
Newcomb, 1666 ; Description Exacte, pp. 1425, publ. Amsterdam, 
1668 ; Life of Tromp, pp. 37-40 ; and, of modern authorities, Mahan, 
op. cit. pp, 119-23, and Clowes, op. cit. n. pp. 169-77. 

2 Pepys' Diary, June llth, 1666. 


that day with the disproportion of force 1 ." The main 
objection to giving battle, apart from the disparity of 
numbers, was that being to the windward was a real 
handicap. " Le meme vent qui leur estoit favorable 
pour venir sur nous," says a Dutch account, " estoit si 
violent qu'ils ne pouvoient pas bien se servir de leur 
artillerie de Flancs, et facilitoit le moyen au nostres 
d'employer avec beaucoup d'effect leur batteries 
basses 2 ." Coventry, however, makes note of one very 
sound justification of the Duke's action that some of 
the heavier ships, being slow sailers, " could not avoid 
fighting 3 ." Moreover, the disparity of force was more 
apparent than real, the English having the advantage 
in size and guns in proportion to numbers. 

At 11 o'clock the Duke gave signal to draw into line 
of battle, and the fleet stood for the Dutch 
in column. The Dutch in the meantime 
lay at anchor in a somewhat disordered array : their 
rear, under Tromp, lay to the S.E. of the centre under 
De Ruyter, and so considerably to the windward of 
him ; the van under Evertsen to the N.N.W., and so 
still further to the leeward of Tromp than was De 
Ruyter. The wind was high and rising still higher 
from the S.S.W., and, the sea being lumpy, the Dutch 
expected the Duke to anchor also ; his attack was a 
complete surprise: it happened, wrote a Dutch captain, 
" whilst we were busy in unmooring, and had our 
Anchors yet but half up ; we were forced to cut our 
cables in all haste 4 ." The surprise, however, proved of 
but little advantage to the English. Apparently no 

1 Pepys' Diary, July 4th . 1666. * Description Exacte, p. 142. 

3 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 32,094, f. 196. Life of Tromp, p. 327. 


attempt was made to send fireships among the tempo- 
rarily helpless Dutch ships. The column in which the 
Duke had chosen to advance was at any time a most 
difficult formation to retain and especially so in such 
weather ; consequently, by the time he came in touch 
with the furthest windward of the Dutch Tromp's 
squadron the line was in some disorder : the Swiftsure 
and six or seven of the head of the van being too far 
to the windward to engage effectively, and the rear 
being somewhat straggling. 

As soon as the remainder of the van and the centre 
came in touch with Tromp, Albemarle put up his helm and 
ran down with the Dutch rear to the 8.E. hotly engaged. 
The Dutch centre and van, however, being thus left to 
the N.N.B. of the English, tacked to the S.W. and 
gained the weather-gauge. At the same time a number 
of the larger of the English ships had borne away to 
the leeward of the Duke, " and not only kept us exposed 
to y e enemies shot but to their owne by fireing through 
and over us to y e enemieV 

After nearly three hours' stiff fighting Albemarle 
tacked back to the N.W. Many of his ships must have 
already suffered fairly heavily : on his own ship, the 
Royal Charles, the " sailes were tome to y e yards in 
peeces, and both flag and ensigne shot downe 2 ." The 
English tacked simultaneously so that the rear became 
the van, and their course took them straight into the 
midst of the Dutch centre and van under De Ruyter 
and Evertsen, which had up to that time been but 
slightly engaged. Had the Duke had one fraction of 

1 Carte MSS. 72, f. 36. 

2 Ibid. 




Wind S.W. 

JUNE l s > 

Wind S.W. 



the genius for tactics with which he has been credited, 
it would be incomprehensible that, having " attacked a 
vastly superior force in such a way that only part of it 
could come into action 1 ," he should deliberately, after 
a severe encounter with that part, have turned to meet 
and engage with the yet fresh remainder. Nevertheless, 
by tacking simultaneously and to the N.W. as he did, 
he made certain that his fleet should bear the very 
fullest brunt of the Dutch attack. The results were 
somewhat disastrous. The movement threw the new 
van into confusion and separated Sir William Berkeley 
still more from the main body : it brought De Ruyter's 
fresh ships to the windward and left Tromp to the 
leeward. The English were between two fires, and both 
to the leeward and the windward some of their ships 
were isolated, among the latter, in addition to the 
Swiftsure, flying Berkeley's flag, was the Henry flying 
the flag of Rear- Admiral Sir John Harman. Both 
these admirals put up an heroic fight. The former, 
though boarded simultaneously from every side, his 
ship disabled and half his men killed, " yet continued 
fighting almost alone, killed several with his own hand, 
and would accept no quarter ; till at length, being shot 
in the throat with a musket ball, he retired into the 
captain's cabin, where he was found dead, extended at 
his full length upon a table, almost covered with his 
own blood." Harman's fight was no less fierce, but 
more successful. He was set on by three fireships in 
succession ; from the first he was freed by " the almost 
incredible exertions of his lieutenant, who, having in 
the midst of the flames loosed the grappling-irons, 
1 Mahan, op* cit. p. 121. 


swung back on board his ship unhurt 1 " ; the second 
set the sails on fire and caused a panic, only checked by 
the Admiral's drawn sword ; while the third was sunk 
by the ship's guns. Evertsen chose that moment to 
offer quarter, but Harman replied with " No, it has not 
come to that yet " and a broadside that killed the Dutch 
Admiral 1 . Harman was in no further danger, and 
succeeded in bringing his ship to Harwich for repairs, 
whence he set sail again a day later to rejoin the fleet. 
" The undaunted Bravery of that English Rear- Admiral 
cannot but be Admired 2 " wrote the Dutch Admirals 
in their official report. The losses were by no means 
entirely on the English side ; besides Admiral Evertsen, 
the Dutch had lost several captains and at least three 
ships sunk, while both Admiral Tromp and Rear- Admiral 
Van Nes were forced to leave their dismasted ships and 
hoist their flags on board fresh vessels. 

In the meantime Albemarle with the main English 
fleet continued on the port tack to the W.N.W., and 
after some desultory fighting the two fleets were prac- 
tically clear of one another by 10 p.m. 

After a night of repairing, the English found the 
Dutch at daybreak on the port tack and to the wind- 
ward. Thanks, however, to better seamanship on the 
part of his captains the Duke was able soon to obtain 
the weather-gauge, and the fleets passed on opposite 
tacks, W.N.W. and ,E.S.E. The English, numbering 
44 sail, were in good order, but the Dutch were crowded 
and in many cases masked each other's fire. Tromp in 
the rear, noticing this, and apparently thinking to 

1 Campbell, Lives of Admirals, IT. 353-4. 

2 Life of Tromp, p. 353. 




remedy it, tacked so as to gain the weather of the 
English van. It was insubordination, however well 



JUNE2 n . d 


intentioned, and it was made far worse in effect by less 
well-intentioned insubordination in the Dutch van, 


which, instead of engaging close, stood broad off to the 
N. De Ruyter with the centre was forced to do so 
also in order to keep his fleet together. In the meantime, 
however, " a most horrid noise of both great guns and 
muskets " reminded him of the danger in which Tromp, 
isolated from his friends and surrounded by the English, 
lay 1 . To succour Tromp, De Ruyter came down on 
the English on the starboard tack, and they, for fear of 
losing the weather-gauge, were compelled to leave 
Tromp and continue on their course. Tromp's squad- 
ron had suffered heavily ; Vice- Admiral Van der Hulst 
had been killed, two ships sunk and three utterly 
disabled, Tromp himself once again having to move 
his flag. 

At the time of the junction between Tromp and De 
Ruyter the Dutch were in complete disorder, " all the 
ships huddled together like a flock of sheep, so packed 
that the English might have surrounded all of them with 
their forty ships 2 ." Yet Albemarle, having gone about, 
appears to have repassed them without making any 
serious attack on them, thereby showing a caution in 
great contrast to the daring of the previous day. 
" Methinks," says a Dutch captain, " he committed 
then a strange fault 2 ." It is very probable that the 
Duke was thinking of the danger which a change of wind 
to the N. (the S.W. wind had already dropped almost 
to a calm) would bring to his shattered little fleet ; it 
is evident also that the discipline in the English fleet 
was not all it might have been ; consequently, late in 
the afternoon, retreat was decided on. " Many of our 
shipps being gone, others not doing their duty, and the 

1 Life of Tromp, p 365. Ibid. p. 347. 

T. 11 


Rest much shattered, it was resolved to make a faire 
retreate 1 ." 

The most damaged ships were put in the van, and 
"16 of the greatest ships " were chosen out "to be a 
bulwark of the rest and bring up the rear in a breast, 
and so he shoved on the other in a line before him 2 ." 
The retreat was to the W.N.W., and the Dutch followed 
in a straggling line without much energy until calm 
and nightfall stopped the fight. 

The calm lasted till noon on the next day, when a 
fresh breeze sprang up from the E. The Duke con- 
tinued his retreat on the Thames, the Dutch again 
following without much display of vigour. About two 
hours later Prince Rupert and his squadron of 20 sail 
came in sight. " Wee then steered towards the Prince 
comforting ourselves w th y e thoughts of renewing the 
fight by returning on y e enemy 3 ." About four o'clock, 
however, half-a-dozen of the Duke's fleet struck on the 
Galloper Shoal. All got off with the exception of the 
Royal Prince, and before the other ships could tack to 
relieve her she had been surrounded and yielded with- 
out a struggle. Probably it was not so much cowardice 
as ' nerves ' after three days' fighting that was respon- 
sible for this incident. The Royal Prince was considered 
to be the finest ship in the Navy, and Coventry wrote 
regretfully : "a little resistance would have preserved 
her, and that she was so well able to stand it out. She 
was like a castle in the sea, and, I believe, the best ship 

1 Carte MSS. 72, f. 37 ; cf. " The Duke had Quite Ruined their 
Fleet before y 6 Prince came in if his shipps had don their parts, for 
he had but 20 of 57 shipps that stucke to him." Ibid. 

2 Gal. S. P. Dora. p. xxi. 

3 Carte MSS. 72, f. 37. 


that ever was built in the world to endure battering ; but 
she is gone and this is an ill subject to be long upon 1 ." 
The Dutch, finding they could not get her off speedily, 
burnt her. To intercept Rupert, De Ruyter had de- 
tached a squadron of over 20, but Rupert, knowing 
that the Galloper was between them and him, ignored 
them. There were huge rejoicings on the Duke's fleet 
to celebrate the reunion. The English decided to renew 
the action decisively on the following day. 

On the morning of the 4th the wind had veered back 
to S.S.W. again and was blowing hard. The Dutch 
were almost out of sight at daybreak, but by 8 o'clock 
the English came up with them and formed up in line, 
led by Sir Christopher Myngs in the van, " in very good 
order 2 ." Both fleets were now on the starboard tack, 
the English to the leeward. For two hours the fight 
ran thus, the English gradually forcing their way into 
the Dutch line. No less than five ' passes ' to and fro 
were made. Some of the English ships got through to 
the windward, some remained to the leeward, and 
gradually all order was lost. The main bodies under 
De Ruyter and Albemarle retained their positions 
respectively. In the meantime Myngs with a few ships 
had headed the Dutch van which was in full pursuit 
after him. Tromp and the rear had fallen away to 
leeward and, taking the initiative into his hands more 
successfully, and so more justifiably than on the pre- 
vious day, he overhauled the pursuers and brought 
them back with him to the main action. The main 
squadrons had, however, been beating to windward, 

1 Cal. 8. P. Dom. 1666, p. xxi. 

1 Tanner MSS. 296. Allin's Journal. 





JuNE3 r - d 

R. Princejm /j^/nf , Jo meet 
\ \Galloper 


VanNes Tromp 


JUNE 4 b . h 


so Tromp found himself to leeward of the English centre. 
In other words, Albemarle found himself between the 
Dutch centre and the van and rear, between De Ruyter 
and Tromp. For a time the situation was critical ; 
he was surrounded, both his ship and Prince Rupert's 
were shattered, and ammunition was running short, 
when De Ruyter made the move which finally broke up 
the English line. He gave the signal for his squadron 
to keep away before the wind. This manoeuvre took 
the Dutch windward ships directly through the English 
centre in a kind of irregular line abreast. It was a 
shattering blow, but it left the English in the compara- 
tive safety of the weather-gauge, for the wind was blow- 
ing half a gale. The Dutch " bore away to leeward," 
writes Allin with an almost audible sigh of relief, " and, 
glad to part soe, we stood over for the English shoar 1 " : 
or as the Dutch account has it, " God, after he had so 
gloriously favoured the Arms of the Victours, was not 
pleased they should be utterly defeated by the De- 
struction of their whole Navy, which appeared as 
unavoidable : For the shattered Remainder of them 
miraculously escaped by the Favour of a thick Fog 2 ." 
The fight marks an important development in naval 
Tactics of tactics. In it, for the first time, are we 
4 Days- Fight. able ^ trace definite and effective tactical 
manoeuvring of squadrons : in it the fight did not 
commence with manoeuvring and end with a 
melee. Unavoidably did the lines become confused in 
the heat of battle, but they always proved capable 
of reforming. Especially striking is this in the case of 

1 Tanner MSS. 296. 
8 Life of Tromp, p. 163. 


the Dutch, who were confessedly the inferiors of the 
English both in discipline and handiness ; the man- 
oeuvres of their centre and rear squadrons on the first 
day, Tromp's movements on the fourth day and De 
Euyter's breaking through the English so as once more 
to unite his fleet : it is movements like these, during and 
after the melee, which mark the beginning of a new era 
in naval engagement an era in which the tactical 
unit was no longer the ship, but the squadron and the 
line. The criticism of the Comte de Guiche after 
witnessing the fight will give some idea of the extent 
to which the English had developed the new system. 
" Bien n'egale le bel Ordre et la Discipline des Anglois ; 
que jamais Ligne n'a ete tiree plus droite, que celle que 
leurs Vaissaux forme, que, lors qu'on en approche, il 
f aut les tous essuier . . . Ton peut dire, qu'ils vaut bien 
mieux entrer dans une Flotte d'Angleterre, que de 
passer aupres ; et bien mieux passer aupres d'une Flotte 
Hollandoise, que se meler au travers, si elle combat 
comme elle fit pour lors ; ce qui ne vient que de la 
Iachet6 de quelques-uns, qui s'epaulent tant qu'ils 
peuvent de leurs camarades. A la verite," he con- 
cluded, " POrdre Admirable de leur Armee doit toujours 
etre imite; et pour moi, je sais bien que si j'etois dans le 
Service de Mer et que je commandasse des Vaissaux du 
Roi, je songerois a battre les Anglois par leur propre 
Maniere, et non pas avec celle des Hollandois et de 
nous autres, qui est du vouloir aborder 1 ." 

The Dutch had won the battle, but it was a 
Pyrrhic victory; they had lost seven or eight ships, 
many more utterly shattered ; some 2000 men 
1 Memoirea d'Estrades Comte de Quiche, pp. 251-2, 266. 


killed and wounded ; and three flag officers killed, 
including Evertsen, one of their finest leaders. And 
that in spite of the fact that for most of the fight they 
had had the advantage in numbers of nearly two 
to one. Naturally, the English losses were heavier. 
Berkeley and Myngs killed, Ayscue a captive in Hol- 
land ; 12 commanders killed ; eight ships lost to 
the Dutch, including ships of 62, 58, 54 and 40 
guns ; at least 12 ships sunk or burnt, including the 
Royal Prince ; and perhaps 5000 casualties and 3000 
prisoners 1 . 

The fact that the defeat was not a dishonourable 
Popular one > however, did not prevent the out- 
feeiing. burst of a perfect fury of recrimination. 
The unpleasant fact remained that at the end of the 
battle the Dutch had been left in command of the sea. 
The gossip with which Pepys fills his Diary at this time 
is of the universal disgust. " Pierce the surgeon, who 
is lately come from the fleete, tells me that all the com- 
manders, officers and even the common seamen do 
condemn every part of the late conduct of the Duke of 
Albemarle : both in his fighting at all, in his manner of 
fighting, running among them in his retreat, and running 
the ships on ground ; so as nothing can be worse 
spoken of. Sir G. Carter et. . .tells me, as I hear from 
everyone else, that the management in the late fight 

.was bad from top to bottom There is nothing but 

discontent among the officers ; and all the old experi- 
enced men are slighted 2 ." Nor was the recrimination 

1 Carte MSS. 72, f. 70 ; Rawl. MSS. A. 191, f. 108 and Clowes, 
op. cit. n. 277. 

2 Pepys' Diary, June 7th, 10th, 1666. 


at all one-sided : the Duke professed equal disgust with 
his subordinates, and writes " that he never fought 
with worse officers in his life, not above twenty of 
them behaving themselves like men 1 ." The justice of 
all these complaints is best proved by the narrative 
of the battle itself, and the above-quoted criticism by 
the Comte de Guiche offers a suggestive comment on the 
whole question. 

The general discontent had one salutary effect at 
least : there was no exception to the general unanimity 
of the opinion that the fleet must get to sea again at 
the very first opportunity. As early as the 8th and 
9th of June, when as yet only vague accounts of the 
battle were to hand, the Navy Commissioners were 
arranging and discussing concerning " the haste 
requisite to be made in getting the fleete out again, and 
the manner of doing it 2 ." The business of manning 
and victualling was pressed forward with the utmost 
energy. For once after a battle the victualling had not 
been the subject of complaint, had not been made the 
universal scapegoat. There is no doubt that Pepys in 
his position as Surveyor must have contributed largely 
to the attainment of this satisfactory result, and, as his 
Diary shows, he now had a busy time in arranging for 
the renewal of supplies. The provision of men was, 
however, a more difficult matter, and with increased 
urgency came increased licence. Desertion was rife, 
every day men came " flocking from the Fleete 3 ," and 
the provision of substitutes was a difficult problem. 
More than ever did the press-gang become no respecter 

i Pepys' Diary, June 7th, 10th, 1666. 

1 Ibid. June 9th. 3 Ibid. June llth. 


of persons : " Even our owne men that are at the 
Office, and the boats that carry us," writes Pepys, " so 
that it is now become impossible to have so much as a 
letter carried from place to place, or any message done 
for us : nay, out of the Victualling ships full loaden 
to go down to the fleete, and out of the vessels of 

the Officers of the Ordnance, they press men 

It is a pretty thing to observe that both there (Broad 
Street) and everywhere else, a man shall see many 
women nowadays of mean sort in the streets, but no 
men ; men being so afeard of the press 1 ." 

An additional incentive to a speedy setting forth of 
the fleet was the fear of a French invasion. The Dutch 
had come to sea again by the 28th of June, and many 
rumours of co-operation between them and the French 
were current, of French soldiers waiting on the coast 
to be transported, of stores of shovels, pickaxes, wheel- 
barrows ready to work against English forts, of schemes 
of invasion so wonderful as to draw even from Pepys 
the epithet " ridiculous conceit." 

By July 13th the English fleet was ready to sail, 
The new " but ^ or ^ ne carrying of the two or three 
new ships, which will keepe them a day or 
two or three more 2 ." Six days later they sailed from 
the Thames for the Gunfleet, leaving Penn behind to 
see to the manning of the few ships remaining. Albe- 
marle and Rupert were once again in command, but 
some changes had been necessary in the subordinate 
commands. The van, the White squadron, was under 
Sir Thomas Allin, with Tyddeman as vice and Utber 

1 Pepys' Diary, June 31st, July 6th, ei passim. 

2 Ibid. July 13th. 


as rear admirals ; the centre, Red, was under Albe- 
marle and Rupert, who were both on the Royal Charles 
flagship, Jordan vice and Holmes rear admirals ; the 
rear, Blue, under Sir Jeremy Smith, with Spragge as 
vice and Kempthorne as rear admirals. The fleet 
seems to have numbered 90 ships of the line and about 
17 fireships 1 . The Dutch numbered 98 warships and 
20 fireships. It was divided into three squadrons ; 
the van under Jan Evertsen and Tjercke Hiddes de 
Vries, the centre under De Ruyter, the rear under Tromp 
and Van Meppel. 

Even at the present time the way out of the Thames 
estuary, along the complicated channels past countless 
shoals and sand-banks, is a severe test not only of 
seamanship but also of local knowledge of sands and 
currents ; but in the 17th century the problem of getting 
a large fleet of sailing ships safely out to sea was one 
fraught with danger, and at no time more so than on 
this occasion. The point of the problem was that it 
was necessary that either the whole fleet or none of it 
should come out of the river. De Ruyter was known 
to be cruising off the Naze, and if one part of the fleet 
got clear of the sands alone, it would be in danger 
of piecemeal destruction by the Dutch, while at the 
same time a return into the Channel would be a very 
dangerous proceeding. The chart 2 will explain the situ- 
ation. Rather than risk the dangers of the numerous 
little shoals lying at the head of Black Deep the English 

1 Contemporary accounts vary largely, as also modern deduc- 
tions : cf. Clowes, op. cit. n. 279, " 81 ships," and Hannay, op. cit. 
I. 372, " 92 ships." 

2 At end of volume. 


Admirals had decided to take the fleet out by the Swin 
channel. But to get safely through the channel to the 
open sea, both an ebb tide and a favourable wind were 
necessary : moreover, the great length of the column 
perhaps as much as ten miles added to the difficulty 
of the move. On the 19th the fleet reached as far as 
the Middle Ground, where, the wind being too much in 
the north for further progress, they anchored. For 
two days they "couldn't get out for the sands 1 ," or 
rather, for the wind. At length on the 22nd the wind 
shifted a little to the west, and the fleet got under weigh. 
The same evening they anchored in the Gunfleet. 

Early on the morning of the 25th the English fleet 
weighed and bore down on the Dutch in 
line abreast to the S.E. The wind was 
N.E. but very light and the fleets drew 
near but slowly. Probably owing largely to the lightness 
of the wind, which would make the heavier ships some- 
what unhandy 2 , the English line was nothing like so 
well kept as it had been in the previous battle when it 
had drawn forth so much admiration. " Our peopl 
were very slow to gett into a lyne, and some never did," 
wrote Allin, " but shot thorow severall of our ships 
contrary to a strict order 3 ." The Dutch line was still 
worse formed, and was more of a crescent than a 

1 Carte MS8. 72, f. 41. 

2 Hannay, op. cit. I. 373, tells an amusing story of a small yacht 
of Prince Rupert's, which on the following day, the wind having 
dropped still further, was sent out to mock De Ruyter, stationed 
herself opposite the stern of the Dutch flagship and for two hours 
pelted away with two little ornamental pop-guns, the huge Dutch 
man-of-war being helpless for lack of wind. 

3 Tanner MSS. 296, Allin's Journal. 


straight line. Consequently, when the English bore 
up on approaching the Dutch, some ships and some 
parts of the line came into action before others. The 
van was the first engaged. "We fell to fighting betweene 
9 and 10," writes Allin, Admiral of the White. " Sir 
Tho. Tyddeman fought bravely upon his party although 
the St. George and Ann did him noe service and the 
Old James did us as little. The Richard and Martha 
went away from us, the Reare Admiral's divisions did us 
little helpe. We fell in close and in 4 houres time put 
them to beare from us 1 ." This virtual desertion on the 
part of ships in action had been not one of the least 
complaints after the previous battle, and the Duke of 
York had ordered that there should in future be an 
enquiry into all cases of ships returning to port during 
an action, " that soe hereafter it may be looked on as a 
certaine thing that every man who returns from y e 
fleet in an engagement must give an account in publique 
of the reasons induceing him to it 2 ." This order would 
seem to have had some effect, for, besides these cases 
mentioned by Allin, there appears to have been very 
little complaint of desertions after this fight. 

In the meantime the two centres had engaged and 
there was some savage fighting. The Admirals on both 
sides had to move their flags, the Royal Charles being 
forced to fall out of the line to refit, and the Zeven 
Provinien, De Ruyter's flagship, being completely dis- 
masted in a close tussle with Sir Robert Holmes on the 
Henry which itself fell permanently out of the line. 
Between 2 and 3 p.m. the Dutch began to give 

1 Tanner MSS. 296, Allin's Journal 

2 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, July 9th, 1666. 


way, and the van and centre made towards the Dutch 
coast, followed by the English. 

In the rear the fight had been more even and pro- 
longed. Accounts vary considerably as to the course 
of the action there. Tromp appears to have fought 
with his usual persistence and individualism. In the 
first encounter he and Meppel gained somewhat the 
advantage over the Blue squadron including the 
destruction of a 64-gun ship, the Resolution and so far 
from giving way as their van and centre were doing, 
they forced Smith to give back. As a result, this part 
of the action became separated from the main battle : 
and gradually as De Ruyter gave way further to the 
leeward the struggle between Tromp and Smith became 
further and further separated until they were lost sight 
of by the rest of the combatants. As night came on 
the main fleets drifted slowly towards the Dutch coast, 
fighting desultorily, leaving Tromp and Smith hammering 
at each other well into the night up towards the English 
coast. The following day opened with an almost 
complete calm, and only in the afternoon did a wind 
arise which enabled the Dutch to continue their retreat 
covered by 20 ships under Admiral Bancker. The same 
evening they came to anchor off Flushing, protected 
from the English by shoals 1 . In the meantime Tromp 
was also in retreat from Smith. In the evening of the 
26th the fleet off Flushing heard distant firing and stood 
out to intercept the Dutch squadron ; but in the night 
Smith, through fear of the shallow water, lost touch 
with Tromp, and on the following day the latter slipped 

1 Cf chart at end of volume. 


in between the shore and the main body of the English. 
The latter pursued until they found themselves in 
shallow water, when they were forced to desist. Thus 
was lost another opportunity of dealing a shattering 
blow at the Dutch navy. In the late battle, though 
the Dutch had lost four flag officers Jan Evertsen, 
Tjercke Hiddes de Vries, Rudolf Coenders and Govert 
'T Hoen and perhaps 20 ships, the English had only 
taken four prizes, and lost one ship ; here was an 
opportunity of gaining some more solid glory; the 
chance of cutting off, of capturing perhaps, the 30 
battered ships under Tromp's command. The failure 
brought a torrent of abuse on Sir Jeremy Smith's head, 
He being accused of cowardice and incompetence at 
the very least. The official enquiry into the matter 
acquitted him, however, of all but a slight excess of 
caution : "he yielded too easily to the opinion of his 
pilot, without consulting those of the other ships, 
muzzled his ship, and thus obliged the squadron 
to do the same, and so the enemy, which might 
have been driven into the body of the King's fleet, 
then returning from the pursuit, was allowed to 
escape 1 ." 

The wildest rumours were current in England con- 
cerning the victory, and it was long before the accurate 
facts became public. The following paper belonging 
to Pepys is a fair example of the more sober of the 
' authentic ' accounts that were current after every 
naval battle. It is endorsed by Pepys, " a copy of 
what was reade in y e pulpitt at Bow." 

1 Cal. 8. P. Dom. November 3rd, 1666. 


"July 29th, 1666. 
" The Dutch totally routed. 
14 ships taken. 
26 burnt and sunk. 

2 flagg shipps taken and out of them 1200 men 
and what else they would, then sunk them. 
Taken in all 6000 men. 

Our Shipps have blocked up the Zealanders in 
Flushing and ride before them. 

The Dutch fleete have got into the Texell, we ride 
before the same. 

The Lord Mayor ordereth thanks to be given this 
forenoone throughout the city 1 ." 

The Dutch were, for the time being, demoralised. 
De Ruyter came in raging against the disgrace of the 
retreat ; " severall of my captains and particularly 
Tromp shall answer for it 2 ," he is reported to have 
said. On his own ship he had lost 200 men, and " the 
rest tellement intimide y* if hee had received another 
charge hee should not have had a man to fyre a gun, all 
being resolved to leap overboard and shift for them- 
selves 2 ." The whole of Holland was in a panic ; the 
appearance of the English fleet off Scheveling caused 
tremendous fright at the Hague, and the most amazing 
rumours concerning invasion became rife. 

This was a state of mind that the English did their 
best to foster. The fleet made a triumphal progress 
up the entire coast of Holland, capturing ships, scaring 
the coast towns ; on the 6th they were in sight of the 
Texel. On the 7th, having heard from a Dutch renegade 

1 Rawl M8S. A. 195, f. 202. 

2 Carte MSS. 72, ff. 56-7. 


of a large fleet of Indiamen lying between Vlieland and 
the mainland, a plan for destroying it was evolved at a 
council of war. Sir Robert Holmes was to take charge 
of a squadron of nine low-rate ships, besides a dozen 
fireships and small craft, and to be given 900 men 
picked proportionately, 100 from each division of the 
fleet : the party to land on Vlie Island and burn and 
destroy all that they could, both stores on the island 
and ships in the harbour. On the 8th the remainder of 
the fleet was drawn up in a line N.E. and S.W. from the 
N. of Vlie towards the Texel and at 8 a.m. the expedi- 
tion stood away towards the shore. After some delay 
owing to contrary winds Holmes took his squadron 
into Ter Schelling roads on the 9th and there attacked 
over 160 merchant ships and two men-of-war lying at 
anchor. That afternoon, writes Allin, " we saw divers 
smoaks arise upon the land which made us judge that 
Sir Robt. Holmes was prosperous 1 ." Strict orders had 
been given to the men to destroy and not to plunder : 
to such effect were the orders obeyed that at least 150 
Dutch ships were burnt and utterly destroyed, only some 
10 or 11 escaping up a creek. On the following day 
the English landed on the island, burnt and sacked the 
town Brandaris and numerous storehouses. Early 
on the llth, after an attempt on Vlie Island had 
been rendered fruitless by bad weather, Holmes came 
back to the fleet, he and his men loaded with booty 
(despite orders concerning plunder), flaunting captured 
Dutch flags. The affair came to be known and referred 
to as " Holmes' Bonfire." The loss to the Dutch, both 
in money and prestige, was enormous ; the former, 
1 Tanner MSS. 296, Allin's Journal, 


amounting to nearly a million pounds 1 , was irrecover- 
able, the latter they did their utmost to restore by getting 
their fleet promptly to sea again : nor were they un- 

With this further success to their credit, however, 
Albemarle and Rupert were forced back to England by 
shortage of victuals though they made the most of 
their time on their way back by capturing some more 
Dutch ships laden with stores. As early as August 
2nd the men had been put on short allowance, and by 
the time the fleet reached the English coast on the 17th 
the shortage of victuals was serious. As a matter of 
fact victualling ships had already been despatched but, 
owing to lack of communications and connection, had 
missed the returning fleet 2 . 

Meanwhile the Dutch preparations were hastening 
towards completion, and on the 26th De Ruyter was at 
sea again and making for the Channel in order to effect 
the long-promised junction with De Beaufort and his 
fleet. Two days later the English fleet, under sole 
command of Prince Rupert, set out to find De Ruyter 
and to prevent the junction. On the 31st they sighted 
him off the Long Sand and made all sail for him ; in so 
doing, however, they became entangled in the Galloper 
shoals, a number of the ships touching, and had to tack 
southwards until they were clear, when they stood S.E. 
by S. At daybreak on the following morning the Dutch 
were seen off the French coast, and Rupert gave chase 
down past Calais. Then followed an incident which 
does not speak very highly for either the daring or 

1 Cal. 8. P. Dom. August 10th, 1666. 

2 For question of victuals see above, pp. 112-14. 

T. 12 


generalship of the English commander in letting slip 
an opportunity of attacking the Dutch under favour- 
able circumstances and at a critical time. De Ruyter 
had driven in close under the French shore, the wind 
being N.N.E., when part of his fleet tacked to the north 
towards the English. " Our general," writes Sir Tho. 
Allin, " tacked also to N. and after then Sir Rob. Holms 
and severall others and soe did we nott having eyther 
syne to draw into a lyne nor to fall on. The Guinea 
reed, severall shotts from these ships soe did the 
Assurance from De Ruiter. they tacked soe till 6 aclock 
and then tacked towards their owne fleett agayne and 
then Sir Rob. Holms tacked also and stood into shoare 
after them." The rest of the fleet followed suit, and 
then, and then only, did Rupert " put out flag of defi- 
ance and all stood in to shoare till it was darke and all 
bore up and tacked and stopt chase 1 ." Why Rupert 
should have deliberately refused to engage at the first 
opportunity is scarcely comprehensible, for not only 
are there no dangerous shoals at any distance off the 
French coast at that point, but also had he engaged then 
it would have been some way off the coast; the remainder 
of the Dutch fleet was still nearer the coast, and, lee- 
shore as it was, there was but a very short stretch 
before Cape Gris-nez and the practical safety of the 
wider channel. Such an opportunity did not occur 
again ; stormy weather drove both fleets into harbour, 
the English to St Helens, De Ruyter to Dunkirk. 

For three weeks Rupert held the Straits, Allin being 
kept at sea with his squadron, and effectually pre- 
vented any junction between French and Dutch 

1 Tanner MSS. 296, Allin's Journal 


though it is very doubtful if the union was ever any- 
thing more practical than a diplomatic bogey dressed 
up for his own use by Louis XIV. Towards the end of 
September, however, the Prince was at sea again, and 
on the 25th sighted 40 Dutch ships off Dover ; he 
drew into line and was " in a handsome posture to wind- 
ward of them to gayne there van 1 ," when the wind began 
to rise, and the sea with it. " The Prince tacked to 
W. and about 5ancoredintheir sight, soe might they have 
done to attend fayre weather had they a mind to fight 
us but they stood off to the S.E. and S.S.E. 1 " 

So ended the naval operations of 1666, and indeed 
of the Second Dutch War, for the final act in 1667 
which turned a triumph into a tragedy and disgrace 
had but little to do with naval action so far as the 
English Navy was concerned wherein lay the tragedy. 

In the autumn of the previous year there had 
been some talk of withdrawing the main 
fleet from service, and in the following 
spring sending out only light squadrons and licensed 
privateers in order to attack merely the trade of 
the Dutch : in 1666 the proposition again came up, 
but more forcibly. " It was said that the Dutch 
might best be beaten by sending small squadrons 
abroad to interrupt and ruine their Trade without 
which it would be impossible for them to continue the 
Warr or support themselves in Peace 2 ." The financial 
difficulties under which Charles' government lay lent 
additional point to the argument. Charles had taken 

1 Tanner MSS. 296, Allin's Journal. 

2 Rawl. MSS. D. 924, Continuation of the Dutch War. 



to appropriating for his own purposes especially the 
payment of soldiers the money voted for the upkeep 
of the Navy, and the double prospect of an enquiry 
into the past and of increased needs for the future was 
specially unpleasant to the son of Charles I. " Parlia- 
ment," says Pepys, " begins to be mighty severe in 
examining our accounts and the expence of the Navy 
this war," and strict enquiries began which put not 
only Pepys but all the officials and many of the courtiers 
" into a mighty fear and trouble 1 ." 

To lessen the difficulties attending this juncture 
Charles adopted a two-fold policy, of peace with Hol- 
land and, in the meantime, a reduction of naval ex- 
penses to a minimum. The chivalrous conduct of the 
Dutch in honouring and returning to England the body 
of Sir William Berkeley, who had fallen in the four 
days' battle, offered an opening for peace negotiations 
between England and Holland. Charles, however, 
relying on a breach between Holland and France 2 , put 
his terms too high, and the negotiations dragged on. 
" To justify and maintain this line of conduct he should 
have kept up his fleet, the prestige of which had been 
so advanced by its victories 3 ." 

1 Pepys' Diary, September 30th, October 2nd, 1666. On October 
10th he makes a note of these complaints : 

" They say the king hath towards this war 

expressly thus much 5,590,000 

" The whole charge of the Navy, as we state 
it for two years and a month, hath been 

but 3,200,000 

" So what is become of all this sum ? 2,390,000." 

2 Louis XIV had opened a campaign of aggression in the Spanish 

3 Mahan op. cit. p. 131. 


At the end of September, when rough weather made 
naval action impossible, Rupert was recalled to har- 
bour, and the process of discharging the fleet, beginning 
with the first and second line ships on October 2nd, was 
begun and carried through. Months later, when this 
policy had borne its inevitable fruit, much complaint 
was made from English sources of the ' perfidy ' of the 
Dutch, who, under cover of the peace negotiations, 
had made so base and dishonourable an attack on 
England. But really it is difficult to see much deeper 
grounds for these assertions than those of injured pride 
and dignity. It is obvious that the continuance of the 
war in the meantime was a fact perfectly understood 
and accepted by the English authorities, and measures 
were taken all along the coast for the fortification of 
important posts against possible Dutch attacks. In 
the light of later occurrences, the measures taken 
regarding the Medway have a special interest. As 
early as December 27th, 1666, the Duke of York had 
given order : " upon considerations concerning y e 
security of his maj ts shipps at Sheernesse, and y e River 
of Medway, it hath been thought necessary that a 
platforme should be made upon y e point at Sheernesse 
for 12 guns to be planted upon 1 ." A boom was also 
to be set across the river to protect the ships lying 
further up stream. Three months later further orders 
were given regarding "the Safety of H.M.'s shipps in 
the River of Medway " : the complement of the guard- 
ships was to be increased, and the ships provided with 
grapnels : the Dolphin and two other fireships were to 
lie inside the chain, while in the upper part of the river 
1 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-7. 


the ships, especially the first and second rate, were to 
be moored in the safest place : and " besides com- 
pleating y e chaine for their further security y e ships 
Charles V and Matthias may be moored w th in y e chaine 
. . . that they may bring their broadsides to bear upon 
y e chaine, and that a competent number of seamen be 
allowed to be borne on them 1 ." Yet, in reality little 
was done. The fort at Sheerness was never completed 
on June llth, when news of the Dutch fleet in the 
Thames had scared people into a panic-stricken energy, 
Sir Edward Spragge was sent down to raise the long- 
planned fortifications there : but the Dutch arrived 
before he did. The chain was scarcely better done : by 
May 10th Pett had written to the Navy Commissioners, 
" the chain is promised to be dispatched tomorrow, 
and all things are ready for fixing it 2 " it had been 
ordered four months previously and when done it 
was only completed in a perfunctory manner and the 
Dutch had no difficulty in breaking through it. 

While the peace negotiations still hung fire, the 
Dutch were steadfastly resolved on the full maintenance 
of their fleet, and, if possible, on a revenge for Holmes' 
" Bonfire." On June 7th De Kuyter's fleet of 80 ships, 
including 15 fireships, was sighted off the North 
Foreland : he anchored in the King's Channel that 
night. Scouts were sent up the Thames on the follow- 
ing day, and on the 9th a light squadron of 17 men-of- 
war and 24 fireships and galleons under Van Ghent set 
sail up the Thames with orders to attack the small 
English squadron lying in the Hope and also to make 

1 Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-7. 

2 Cal S. P. Dom. May 10th, 1667. 


a descent on the stores and ships lying up the Med- 

London was seized with a panic only equalled by 
that caused by the Fire. " The dismay that is upon us 
all, in the business of the kingdom and Navy at this 
day, is not to be expressed otherwise than by the con- 
dition the citizens were in when the city was on fire, 
nobody knowing which way to turn themselves, while 
everything concurred to greaten the fire ; as here the 
easterly galle and spring- tides for coming up both rivers, 
and enabling them to break the chaine 1 ." Those 
who could began to bundle out of the city with their 
most precious belongings. On the other hand there is 
a picturesque story reminiscent of, perhaps founded on, 
Nero's fiddle, "that the night the Dutch burned our 
ships the King did sup with my Lady Castlemayne, . . . 
and there were all mad in hunting of a poor moth 2 ." 

Prince Rupert went off to Woolwich, the Duke of 
Albemarle to Chatham, to attempt to make some pro- 
visions to meet the emergency. Sir William Coventry 
made frantic appeals for more fireships, and hands were 
laid on any and every suitable ship. The fireships 
proved of great service ultimately, but the Prince and 
Albemarle were too late to be more than onlookers of a 
pitiable disgrace. In the Medway the fireships were 
unmanned, the guardships half manned, the forts 
without guns, and according to some accounts even 
the chain was not yet in place. Not merely was the 
work not done, but there were no men to do it when Albe- 
marle arrived. Men who had not been paid for months 
refused to work in this emergency. Out of 1100 men 
1 Pepys' Diary, June 14th, 1667. f Ibid. June 21st. 


in pay at Chatham Dockyard not more than three 
attended to help the Duke in any way. 

"Our Seamen, whom no danger's shape could fight, 
Unpaid refuse to mount their ships, for spite : 
Or to their fellows swim, on board the Dutch, 
Who show the tempting metal in their clutch 1 ." 

Pepys tells of many Englishmen heard talking on board 
the Dutch ships, and crying to their less fortunate 
countrymen, " We did heretofore fight for tickets ; now 
we fight for dollars 2 ! " ; and there is "no doubt that 
there was no small number of deserters on board the 
Dutch fleet. De Ruyter gained considerable help in 
his attack on Chatham from one Captain Thomas Hol- 
land 3 , an old Commonwealth captain : and there is 
also a dramatic story of a cousin of this man going to 
De Ruyter after the Medway attack and offering to 
lead him up the Thames, and De Ruyter's reply, " If 
you are so brave a man as you have represented your- 
self to be, I will send you back again to your Master the 
King, he has now occasion for such valiant men as you 
are 4 ." 

In the meantime Van Ghent had been delayed by 
unfavourable wind. On the 10th he had gone up the 
Thames nearly as far as Gravesend the ships at the 
Hope having escaped him but the turn of the tide 
and the S.W. wind decided him to drop down again to 
Sheerness. Despite a stout resistance by Sir Edward 
Spragge, the unfinished fort there caused but little 

1 Marvell, Instructions to a Painter. 

2 Pepys' Diary, June 14th, 1667. 

3 Clowes, op. cit. ii. 289, says " Dolmar", for which I have been 
unable to find any authority. 

4 Rawl. MSS. T>. 924. 


hindrance to the Dutch, into whose hands fell the large 
magazines of naval stores. The Dutch followed the 
retiring English up the river without venturing further 
inland from the water, " because the most part of our 
Land-Troops were separated from us by the foul 
Weather, the Generall officers thought not fit to engage 
themselves too far up the country with so few 
People 1 ." At 6 a.m. on the morning of the 12th, being now 
accompanied by De Ruyter himself, the Dutch moved up 
the Medway before a brisk N.E. breeze. About noon 
their van, led by Van Brakel, reached the chain below 
Gillingham. Albemarle had had two ships sunk out- 
side the boom, the Unity stationed outside also, and two 
very slight batteries on land at each end of the chain. 
The sunken ships were not in the channel, the Unity 
was promptly fired by fireships, and the chain snapped 
as a second Dutch ship crashed against it. A short 
tussle and the Dutch were swarming up the river in all 
kinds of craft, from man-of-war to ship's boat. The 
Amity, Charles V, Monmouth and Matthias were soon 
blazing. Just above these ships lay the Royal Charles, 
the flagship during the last campaign ; she had only 
30 guns mounted, so Albemarle had made every effort 
to get her towed into safety up the river, but mutinous 
men would not move a finger to help, and Commissioner 
Pett of Chatham Dockyard had fled nursing his models 
which he thought more important to the King than 
aught else. The Royal Charles thus fell an easy prey, 
was converted into a Dutch flagship, and at the pre- 
sent day her stern-piece is displayed in an Amsterdam 

1 Life of Tromp, p. 425. 





"A Scheme of the Posture of the Dutch Fleete and Action at 
Sheeraesse and Chatham 10 th . 11 th . and 12 th . of June 1667, taken 
upon the place by J. E." (Drawn and sent to Pepys by J. Evelyn, 
June 20 th . The above is a tracing of part of the original in Bawl. 
MSS. A. 195, f. 77-8.) 

"1. The 3 Dutch ships w 611 . 11. 

brake y e chayne. 12. 

2. 2 sunk ships without y e 13. 

chayne. 14. 

3. The Unity. 15. 

4. The Chayne. 16. 

5. 6. Two very slight batteries 17. 

at each end of the 18. 

chayne. 19. 

7. Chas. y 5 th . 20. 

8. The Matthias. 21. 

9. The Monmouth as she lay 22. 

during the Assault. 23. 

10. The Royall Charles. 24. 
A fort with 8 guns. 


James ' 

The Catherine sunke. 
The Princesse. 
The Old James. 
The Guilden Ruiter. 
The Triumph. 
The Rainbow. 
The Unicorne. 
The Henry. 
The Helverson. 
Vanguard sunke. 

Two other batteries with 21 and 16 Guns. 

A Battery of 60 guns in y e old Dock (not mounted). 

Note y l . these batteries were not finished til after the fight." 


That night the Dutch lay in the Medway between 
Upnor and Gillingham, they and their handiwork 
covered by a heavy pall of smoke illumined only by the 
flickering glow from the burning ships. On the follow- 
ing morning De Ruyter moved further up the river. 
For a time the garrison at Upnor put up a stout fight, 
but shortage of ammunition checked them before the 
enemy would have done so, and the Dutch passed on up 
to three ships which had been half sunk at the side of 
the channel ; these the Royal Oak, Loyal London, and 
James they fired. Above the latter lay the Katherine, 
sunk in the channel, and, beyond, nine other large ships. 
However, all but two of the Dutch fireships had been 
expended and the return passage promised to be dan- 
gerous, so no attempt was made against the remaining 
English ships. The Dutch got away down the river 
without mishap, taking with them the Royal Charles 
" at a time both for tides and wind when the best pilot 
in Chatham would not have undertaken it, they heeling 
her on one side to make her draw little water : and so 
carried her away safe 1 ." 

On his return to the Thames, De Ruyter satisfied 
himself with keeping a blockade, and it would seem that 
a slight excess of caution on his part lost him a good 
opportunity of improving on his Chatham exploit. 
" De Ruyter might have done much more mischief," 
writes an English contemporary, "if he had imme- 
diately after the exployt at Chatham seconded it with 
another in the Thames : for Gravesend was slenderly 
provided, Tilbury Fort not erected, and the Dutch 
having a Spring tyde and an Easterly wind, might soon 

1 Pepys' Diary, June 22nd, 1667. 


have been pass'd Gravesend, and nothing could have 
hindered but that y e Frigatts and Fireshipps might have 
come up as high as Woolwich at least, and have fired 
all the ships that were afloat and have endangered the 
King's Yard and Storehouses 1 ." On July 1st he made 
a fruitless attack on Landguard fort, and a week later, 
being again at the mouth of the Thames, he divided his 
fleet into two squadrons ; taking one himself, with 
which he cruised down the south coast of England, 
and leaving the other in the Thames under Van Nes. 

Meanwhile somewhat hysterical preparations had 
been in progress in London and Chatham. Fortifica- 
tions had been hurried on, new forts sprang up, new 
guns were mounted. So eager had people been to 
block up the fairway in two or three places that in some 
cases valuable merchant ships, fully stored victual ships, 
effective fireships, had been indiscriminately sunk. 
However, the object aimed at was achieved : the stores 
and dockyards were safe. 

For nearly a fortnight Van Nes cruised off the 
mouth of the Thames, mostly in the neighbourhood of 
the Gunfleet and so keeping a small squadron, com- 
posed mostly of fireships, securely shut up in the Stour. 
On the 22nd, however, he weighed from the Gunfleet 
with about 38 sail, including 13 fireships. On the 
following day he heard of the presence in the Hope of 
five English men-of-war and 20 fireships, and thereupon 
pushed up the river. At noon he reached the Hope 
and attacked the little squadron there : his success 
was very partial, he forced them under the guns of Til- 
bury and five of their fireships were burnt the wind 

1 Bawl MSS. D. 924. 


being easterly, the English could not make any real 
use of them but to achieve so much he expended a 
dozen of his own. The following day he retired down 
stream followed by the English, who were now led by 
Sir Edward Spragge. On the 25th both squadrons 
anchored at the Nore almost within gunshot of each 

In the meantime Sir Joseph Jordan had decided to 
come out from his retreat. For some reason he seems to 
have come to this decision very suddenly. On the 
evening of the 23rd he suddenly called in all the sea- 
men, whereupon "y e 4th part of our best men tooke 
y e opportunity of theire heeles and deserted 1 ." That 
same evening in a very unprepared condition he set 
sail. Six vessels had to be left behind ; four of them 
caught up on the following day. On the 26th he came 
in sight of the Dutch fleet. He arranged his little fleet 
seven small men-of-war and 16 fireships into two 
squadrons, each led by some of the warships. Spragge's 
squadron were eyewitnesses of the ensuing fiasco. 
" Wee were in hopes to see some Bonfires made of the 
Dutch ships in return to those they had made of ours 
too lately, but our Expectations were wholly frustrate, 
for the Dutch manning out all their small craft and 
Boats, put the Fireships by or cut off their Boats, so 
that we lost the greatest part of 15 Fireships and not 
one of them did execution 2 ." The fireship crews 
utterly disgraced themselves ; they practically refused 
to attack ; two of them, by dint of being pushed on 
between three of the frigates, attempted to grapple 

1 Eawl. MSS. A. 195, f. 264. 

2 Ibid. D. 924. 


one of the Dutchmen but failed to do so ; some of the 
crews fled from their ships in small boats only to be cut 
off ; two other crews set fire to their ships when com- 
pletely isolated, thereby affording a striking display of 
the badness of the materials, for the ships smouldered 
for over half an hour before they began to burn properly. 
One of these fireship captains was afterwards shot, and 
three others drummed out of the service, for their 
share in this final incident in the war. Jordan, with 
his frigates untouched, joined Spragge without any 
further action. Van Nes, being without fireships, made 
no more attempts in the Thames, and before another 
opportunity for an engagement arose the signature of 
the Treaty of Breda on July 31st put an end to the 

Such was the last melancholy incident in a melan- 
choly war : melancholy not so much in the practical 
results though indeed they form a sorry enough case 
of lives and money squandered, of good work wasted 
as in the pitiful spectacle it affords of good material 
wasted, ruined; of sturdy, willing seamen become 
paupers, diseased and mutinous ; of volunteers become 
deserters; of fine old seamen captains displaced by 
foppish courtier ignoramuses, who, as often as not, 
owed their preferment to some disreputable intrigue 
in a disreputable court ; of lack of food and bad food ; 
of lack of pay and pensions ; of state money, stores and 
prizes embezzled by men of every rank, from the King 
who ' appropriated ' naval money to help pay for his 
mistresses and his soldiers, to the miserable dock- 
yard workman, unpaid and half-starved, who ' stole ' 
'chips ' to help keep his pitiable body and soul together : 


in short, it is the spectacle of a great service, of a nation, 
being rotted to the core by the foul spirit that came into 
England with Charles II and his court. 

Explanations other than these, however, other 
reasons, had to be given. The people and the Parlia- 
ment demanded a victim, and in their demands were 
coming unpleasantly near the true root of all the 
trouble, when the scapegoat was found and exposed 
the unfortunate commissioner of Chatham Dockyard, 
Peter Pett. 

" After this loss, to relish discontent, 
Someone must be accused by Parliament ; 
All our miscarriages on Pett must fall, 
His name alone seems fit to answer all. 
Whose counsel first did this mad war beget ? 
Whose all commands sold through the Navy ? Pett. 
Who would not follow when the Dutch were beat ? 
Who treated out the time at Bergen ? Pett. 
Who the Dutch fleet with storms disabled met, 
And, rifling prizes, them neglected ? Pett. 
Who with false news prevented the Gazette, 
The fleet divided, writ for Rupert ? Pett. 
Who all our seamen cheated of their debt ? 
And all our prizes who did swallow ? Pett. 
Who did advise no navy out to set ? 
And who the forts left unprepared ? Pett 
Who to supply with powder did forget 
Landguard, Sheerness, Gravesend and Upnor ? Pett. 
Who all our ships exposed in Chatham net ? 
Who should it be but the fanatick Pett ? 
Pett, the sea-architect, in making ships, 
Was the first cause of all these naval slips. 
Had he not built, none of these faults had been ; 
If no creation there had been no sin." 

MARVELL, Instructions to a Painter. 


Sept. 1658 July 1667. 

II. STATUTES, etc., p. 195. 

III. NAVY LISTS. (1) Contemporary. (2) Later compila- 

tions, (a) Officers, (b) Ships, pp. 196, 197. 


(a) Library and Private Collections. 

1. Admiralty, p. 198. 

2. Bodleian, p. 198. 

3. British Museum, p. 200. 

4. Historical Manuscripts Commission, p. 201. 

5. Pepysian MSS. at Magdalene College, Cam- 

bridge, p. 203. 

6. Printed Calendars, p. 204. 

(b) State Papers. 

1. Calendars of State Papers (a, b, and c), 

pp. 204, 205. 

2. Admiralty Papers, p. 205. 


(a) General, p. 206. 

(b) Memoirs, Letters, etc., p. 207. 

(c) Technical, p. 209. 

(d) Tracts and Pamphlets. 

1. Thomason Tracts, p. 210. 

2. Miscellaneous Tracts, Eng. p. 211. 

3. Dutch Tracts, p. 213. 

(e) Miscellaneous, p. 216. 
(/) Newspapers, p. 217. 



(a) General, and English and Dutch Navies, p. 218. 
(6) Special Subjects. 

1. English and Dutch, p. 220. 

2. Other Nations, p. 221. 

(c) Technical 

1. Strategy, p. 222. 

2. Tactics, p. 222. 

3. Hydrography, p. 223. 

(d) Administration. 

1. General, p. 223. 

2. Shipbuilding, p. 224. 

3. Personnel, p. 224. 

( e ) Miscellaneous. 

1. Articles in Reviews, etc., p. 224. 

2. Mercantile Navy and Commerce, p. 226. 

3. Other Miscellaneous Works, p. 226. 

(a) Contemporary. 

1. Collective, p. 226. 

2. Individual, p. 227. 

(b) Later. 

1. Collective, p. 228. 

2. Individual, p. 228. 

(N.B. I have marked * works of which I have made special 
use ; and f, works I have been unable to see, but without which 
nevertheless the bibliography would be incomplete.) 

T. 13 



* Admiralty Library. Subject Catalogue of Printed Books. 

Pt. I.* Historical Section (by W. G. Perrin). London, 

1912. 4. 

(The most comprehensive collection of Naval Works. 

Sub-headings Administration, Biography, etc.) 
Bibliotheque universelle et historique. 26 vols. s. 8. 

Amsterdam, 1686-1718. 
British Museum. Subject-Index of modern works added 

to the Library. 1881-1910. Ed. by G. K. Fortescue. 

5 vols. la. 8. 

List of Books of Reference in Reading Room. Vol. n. 

(Under Bibliography, Navy, England.) la. 8. 1910. 

*Class Catalogue of MSS. 

*Cambridge Hist, of Eng. Literature. Vol. iv. (Bibl. to 
Chaps, iv and v, " The Literature of the Sea " and 
" Seafaring and Travel.") la. 8. Camb., 1909. 
*Cambridge Modern History. Vol. iv. (Bibliography to 
Chap, xvi.) Vol. v. (Bibliography to Chap, ix.) la. 8. 
Camb., 1906-8. 

(With the exception of Dewar's Sources, these last 
three are the only recent attempts at an adequate 
naval bibliography of the period.) 

Courtney, W. P. Register of National Bibliography, with 

selection of the chief bibliographical works and articles 

publ. in other countries. 3 vols. 8. London, 1905-12. 

*Dewar, A. C., Lieut. Sources of Naval History in the 

seventeenth century. 

(Publ. as pamphlet for the International Historical 
Congress, London, 1913. The only comprehensive 
naval bibliography of the period; but somewhat 
loosely arranged, and not without errors.) 
Dictionary of National Biography. la. 8. London, 
1885 etc. (See short bibliographies at end of bio- 
graphical notices.) (See also VII, Biography.) 
Langlois, C. V. Manuel de Bibliographic Historique. 
2 Fasc. Paris, 1901-4. 8. 

(l e Fasc. Elements de bibl. gener., et Instruments 
de bibl. histor.) 
Lasteyrie, Robert de. Biblio. gener, des travaux hist. 


et archeolog. publ. par les societes savantes de la 
France. (In progress.) 4. 1888 etc. 

(There is no corresponding publication in England.) 
Le Long, Jacques. Biblio. hist, de la France, conten. le 
catalogue des ouvrages impr. et MSS., qui traitent de 
1'hist. de ce royauine. 5 vols. Fol. Paris, 1768-78. 
*London Library, Subject-Index of. s. 4. 1909. 
(Under Navy, England, Netherlands, etc.) 
*Lowndes, Will. The Bibliographer's Manual of Eng. Lit. 

(New ed. by Bohn.) 6 vols. s. 8. London, 1864. 
Monod, Gabriel. Biblio. de 1'hist. de France. Catalogue 

jusq. 1789. 8. 1888. 

Pepys, Samuel. A descriptive catalogue of the naval 
MSS. in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene Coll., 
Camb. (Navy Records Soc. Publ.) (In progress. 
Vols. i-in published.) 8. [London], 1903 etc. 

Bibliotheca Pepysiana : a descriptive catalogue. 

In progress. Published: Part I, "Sea" MSS. 
art n, Early printed books.) s. 4. London, 1914. 
*Revue Maritime et Coloniale. Table des matieres, 1861- 
88. Paris, 1870^80-89. 

(Reference to numerous articles bearing on this 
period. Unfortunately does not appear to have been 
carried up to date.) 

Sonnenschein, W. S. Biblio. of History and Historic 

(Sections from "The Best Books" and "The 
Reader's Guide," Class F. 23, 24, 30.) London, 
1891-5. (Rather popular.) 

Stolk, Abraham van. Atlas van Stolk : Katalogus der His- 
torie-Spot-en Zinneprenten betrekkelijk de geschiedenis 
van Nederland. (In progress.) 8. Amster., 1895 etc. 


*Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum. Ed. C. H, 
Firth and R. S. Rait. 3 vols. 8. London, 1911. 

^Statutes of the Realm. 1660-7. 

Raithby, John. Statutes relating to the Admiralty, Navy, 
Shipping and Navigation of the U.K. from 9 Hen. III. 
to 3 Geo. IV. inclusive. 4. London, 1823. 



Also, for Treaties, Dumont, Jean, Baron de Carlscroon. 
Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens; 
contenant un recueil des traitez d' alliance, de paix, 
etc., faits en Europe depuis le regne de Charlemagne. 
8 vols. ; Supplement, 5 vols. La Haye, Amsterdam, 

Parliamentary Journals, etc. 

Parliamentary History. Vol. iv. 1660-88. 

Journals of the House of Lords. Vols. ix, x. 1660-6, 

*Journals of the House of Commons. Vol. vm. 1660-7. 


Apart from mere lists of fleets or squadrons, the first 
' Navy List ' is probably : 

Gloria Britannica, or the Boast of the British Seas, con- 
taining a True and Full Account of the Royal Navy 
of England, shewing where each Ship was Built, by 
whom, and when, its Length, Breadth, Depth, Draught 
of Water, Tons, the number of Men and Guns, both 
in Peace and War, at Home and Abroad, together with 
every Man's Pay, from a Captain to a Cabin-Boy, truly 
calculated and Cast up, for a Day, a Week, a Month, 
and a Kalendar Year, or 13 months and 1 Day. Care- 
fully Collected and Digested by a True Lover of the 
Seamen. 1689. 

1 . Contemporary. 

*Pepys, Samuel. Sea Commission Officers. My Naval 
Register relating to the three following Particulars, 
viz. 1. The Execution of the Office of High Admiral. 

2. The Flag Officers charged with the Fleets ; and 

3. The Commanders and Lieutenants of all single 
ships. . .between May 1660, and. . .Dec. 1688. Begun 


and closed with particular lists of the Officers actually 
in Commission at each of the said periods. 

(Pepysian Library, 2941. See also " Catalogue 
of Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library," Vol. I. 
Nav. Rec. Soc.) 

*Pepys, Samuel. A Register of the Ships of the Royal Navy 
of England from... May 1660, to... Dec. 18th, 1688. 
(Pepysian Library, 2940. See also " Catalogue of 
Naval MSS. etc.") " 

2. Later compilations. 

(a) Officers. 
Admirals and Captains, A List of, who have lost their lives 

in the Service, from 1665 to 1801. (See Schomberg's 

" Naval Chronology," Appendix, Vol. v.) 
Captains, A List of, who have served in the Royal Navy 

of Great Britain, from the year 1653 to 1802. (See 

Schomberg's "Naval Chronology," App., Vol. v.) 
Chaplains of the Royal Navy, 1626-1903. (Comp. by 

A. G. Kealy, Chapl. R.N.) 12. Portsmouth, 1903. 
Jackson, Sir Geo. Naval Commissioners, 1660-1760. 

Compiled from the Original Warrants and Returns ; 

by the late Sir G. Jackson, Bart. With Historical 

Notices by Sir G. F. Duckett, Bt. 8. London, 1889. 
Noblemen and Gentlemen, A List of, who have been 

raised to the dignity of Admirals in the R. Navy of 

England and Great Britain ... from 1660 to 1801. 

(See Schomberg's " Naval Chronology," App., Vol. v.) 
Secretaries of the Admiralty, Clerks of the Acts, etc. 

Comp. by Col. Pasley. (See H. B. Wheatley's " Sam. 

Pepys and the World he lived in," 5th ed., London, 

1907, p. 266 etc.) 

(6) Ships. 

See *Clowes' " Royal Navy," Vol. n, for Navy at Restora- 

See Oppenheim's " Administration of the R.N." for 
Commonwealth and Protectorate Navy. 

Charnock's " Marine Architecture " and Derrick's " Mem- 
oirs " also contain useful lists 



1. * Admiralty Library. 

*6. Orders and Instructions. 1658-60. 

8. Orders and Warrants. 1658-60. 

19. Duke of York's Instructions. 1660-2. 

20. Duke of York's Instructions. 1662-6. 
*23. Orders of the Duke of York. 1660-5. 
*24. Duke of York's letters. 1660-8. 

150. Index of Orders. 1660-1741. 
These are all in MS., and with the exception of the last- 
named are copies, apparently made piecemeal contempo- 
raneously. Many of the originals of Vols. 20, 23 and 24, 
are among the Admiralty Papers at the Record Office. 

2. * Bodleian Library, Oxford. 

The most important collections in the Library dealing 
with this subject are four volumes of Sandwich Papers and 
Letters among the Carte Papers, and twenty-six volumes 
of Pepys Papers (besides many other volumes that were 
originally his property in the Rawlinson collection) ; seven 
volumes of Sir Thomas Allin's papers and journals in the 
Tanner collection are also of interest and have not previously 
been thoroughly examined. There are numerous naval 
papers scattered throughout these three collections. 

Catalogues. Catalogi Codicum MSS. P. 4. Cod. 
Th. Tanneri. P. 5. Codd. Rawlinsoniani. 4. Oxf. 
Calendar of Carte Papers (in MS.). 
There are occasional naval papers of the period in all 
the volumes undermentioned, details being given in cases 
of special interest or value. 
Tanner MSS. 

45. Administrative reform, 1665-6 etc. 

47. Tangier and Mediterranean. 

48, 49, 51, 93, 114, 

294, *296. Sir Thomas Allin's papers. Journal 

1660-7 in 296. 


Rawlinson MSS. 

A. 58, 59. 

63, 64. Numerous letters from Opdam, etc. to 

U. States. 
66, 67. General, concerning Sound negotiations, 


*170-195 incl. Pepys Papers, of which the follow- 
ing contain matter dealing with this 
period : 

*174, 175, 176, 177, 181, 183, 184, 185. 
187. Victualling and arrears of pay. 
191, 192, 193. 

*195. " in and about the time of the 1st Dutch 
War 1665-68, designed for the most part 
for a collection, as I remember, towards 
the history thereof." Especially 1666-7. 
197. Register of Ships. 

209, 212, 216. 

*256J Ber S en ' 
448. Report on Striking the Flag. 1661. 

B. 451, 455. 

*457. Answer from Pepys for Commiss. of Navy 
to observations upon Dutch War and the 
management thereof. 
463, 465, 466. 

*468. Sandwich's narrative of Bergen. 

C. 381. Mediterranean. 

423. Tangier (see also Pepys' shorthand notes 
and journal 1667-83, C. 859). 

D. 916. Tangier. 

Carte Papers. (Sandwich Papers.) 72, *73, *74, *223 

Also occasional papers in other volumes, see MS. 
Calendar (arranged chronologically). 

Clarendon Papers, The, contain occasional papers of 
naval interest, but are not yet calendared beyond 
1663; they are, however, arranged chronologically. 


3. * British Museum. 

A. General Treatises. 

Add. MSS. 9335. Hollond's Discourses on R.N. 

Slingsby's Discourse. 
11,602. Rich. Gibson Collection. Incl. 

papers on Gentlemen in Navy. 
11,684. Rich. Gibson Collection. Incl. Eng. 

Safety at Sea and Exam, of Dutch action 

at Chatham. 
30,221 . Sir Ph. Meadowes, etc., on Dominion 

of Sea (f. 13). 

B. Lists of Ships, etc. 

*Harl. 1247. Numerous lists, 1658-66 (ff. 46, 51, 52, 55). 

Stowe 428. 1658-9. 

Harl. 7464. 1660-91. 

Add. 36,781. 1661 (f. 101). 

Stowe 432, 433. Ships, complement, building. 1656 
and 1662. 

Sloane4459. 1665. 

Egerton 2543. 1666 (ff. 144-56, 179-81). 
*Add. 32,094. 1666 (ff. 101-2, 116, 118, etc.). 

C. Orders and Instructions. 

*Add. 36,782. Register of Orders in Council, Warrants, 
etc., of Adm. and N. Board. 1660-6. 

Stowe 430. Register of Instructions, etc. 1661-92. 

Harl. 7464. Establishment of R.N. Jan. 1662. (Also 
Add. 9311.) 

Harl. 6287. Ditto, with reflections thereon (1668). 

Stowe 142. Instruct, from Jas. D. of York regarding 
Impressment. 1665. 

D. Miscellaneous collections of Naval Papers. 
Harl. 1509, 1510 \ 

Lansdowne 194 } on Prizes ' 
Add. *9311. 1660-5, miscell. 

9315. Warrants. 

9317. Chatham Chest. 

9328. Miscell. 1663-. 

Harl. 6287. Incl. Pepys on Victualling and Pursers 
(" New year's gift ") [also Lansd. 253, ff. 280-94]. 


Sloane 1709. Inch case of Surgeons in R.N. (f. 279). 
Lansd. 1215. Incl. paper concerning half pay 

(f. 19). 

Add. 34,353. Striking flag. 
18,986. Misc. 1659-. 
*22,546. Misc. 1659-. 
Stowe 325. Proposals for Maritime Insurance, 1661 

(f. 184). 
Harl. 6277. Charge of Netherlands war, Sept. 1664 

Sept. 1666. 
Egert. 2543. Minutes by Nicholas of Adm. Commiss. 

meetings. Oct. 1664 Jan. 1665. 
Egert. 2618. Sandwich to Albemarle regarding Texel 

fight. Sept. 1665. 
Add. 27,999. Bergen (Talbot). 
Add. 37,425. Report on June 3, 1665. 
Stowe 744. Dutch War, 1666. 
*Add. 32,094. Dutch War, etc. 

Harl. 7010. Accts. of June . ^ d Mb 

1 d. 1 f\f\C -EvUpeit ami Aiue- 

' , ' , , T marie. For narratives 

1666 f concemin 8 diviBion o 

4107.' Accts. of June ?fl"i u ^l'^ Ad<L 

1-4 1666 32 ' 094 ' * 1% - 204 ' 

*Harl. 4888. ' Acct. of Division of fleet in 1666. 
Add. 29,597. Articles against Sir Jas. Smith for action. 

Aug. 1666. 

Egert. 928. Minutes of council of war under Allin. 1667. 
Harl. 7018. Complaints against Pet. Pett. 1667. 

4. Historical Manuscripts Commission. 

3rd Report, Appendix. Northumberland, D. of, MSS. 
of, 1872. (A few papers belonging to, and dealing 
with, Prince Rupert and his naval command.) 
*4th Report, Appendix. Bath, Marquis of, MSS. of, 
pp. 229-37, 1874 (very slightly calendared but con- 
taining much valuable material : Sir W. Coventry's 
papers, including letters on naval administration, 
letters from Pepys, Holmes, Talbot, Tyddeman, 
Clifford, dealing with Bergen, Holmes' expedition 


(1664), etc. Also Coventry's Discourse on the manage- 
ment of the Navy. Notes by C. of Councils of War). 
Some more naval papers in this collection are still 
more scantily indexed in the 3rd Rep, pp. 180-200. 

5th Report, App. I. Sutherland, Duke of, .MSS. of, 
pp. 150-78, 1876. (Many letters concerning Restora- 
tion, only introducing Navy indirectly.) 

Malet, Sir A., MSS. of, pp. 314-5. (Coventry 
papers : outbreak of war in 1664-5, letters from and 
to Albemarle before the four days' fight, 1666.) 

llth Report, App. V. Dartmouth, Earl of, MSS. of, 
1887. (Much naval matter for 3rd Dutch War and 
after, but little before. Duke of York's Orders: 
see " Fighting instructions." Details of four days' 
fight, 1666.) 

12th Report, App. VII. Le Fleming, S. H., MSS. of (at 
Rydal Hall), 1890. (Large collection of news- 
letters covering the period.) 

13th Report, App. II. Portland, Earl of, MSS. of (at 
Welbeck), pp. 100-7 ; 1893. (Orders to Sir Wm. 
Penn, 1666-7 ; many of these have been published 
in the " Professional Life of Penn.") 

14th Report, App. IV. Kenyon, Lord, MSS. of, pp. 67- 
79, 1897. (A few papers dealing with the "warr 
with the Duchy," 1664-7. List of ships, officers, 

15th Report, App. II. *Hodgkin, J. E., MSS. of, 
pp. 153-68, 1897. (Valuable collection of Pepys 
papers, including letters from the Mediterranean from 
Lord Sandwich and others.) 

15th Report, App. VII. Somerset, Duke of, MSS. of, 
1898. (Sailing orders on various occasions to Capt. 
Seymour of the " Pearl," 1664-8.) 

^Heathcote, J. M., MSS. of (at Conington Gas.), 1889. 
(Fanshaw papers : dealing with negotiations with 
Portugal, state of Tangier from the time of the 
English occupation, movements of English fleet in 
the Mediterranean, letters from Allin and Lawson.) 

1 It is difficult to know in what order to tabulate the publica- 
tions of the Commission, as the official order appears to vary. 


5. *Pepysian MSS. at Magdalene College, Cambridge. 

The bulk of the Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library 
belong to the period of his secretaryship, but there are ten 
volumes of "Miscellanies," comprising copies of mis- 
cellaneous papers dealing with naval matters, which Pepys 
intended to use as material for his projected naval history. 
A volume entitled " Naval Minutes " also contains many 
interesting opinions and facts noted by Pepys. See the 
printed Catalogues of the Pepysian MSS. (page 195). 

488. King James II' s Pocket-book of Rates and 


1490. Papers concerning the enquiry of 1686, including 
Pepys' " Memoirs relating to the State of the 
Royal Navy." [The "Memoirs" have been 
printed (see page 208).] 

2242. Papers concerning the enquiry into Naval 
Administration in 1668, including Pepys' 
report thereon. 

2554. Mr Pepys' Defence of the Navy. 1669. 
2589. Expense of the Navy from 1660 to 1666. 
2611. Penn's Collection (including Instructions, 1653- 


2801. Instructions for Fighting. 

*2866. Naval Minutes. (These are odd notes of facts, 
opinions or arguments to be noted, questions 
to raise or answer, all with a view to the 
projected history ; but their very informality 
and personal character give them additional 
value in showing the contemporary view of 
many and various matters.) 
2867. Naval Precedents. 
*2870-79, inclus. Miscellanies, especially 

2871. Many details of distribution of ships. 

2874. Report on Striking of Flags. 

2879. Collection of papers concerning Rights of 

Search and Trinity House, etc. 
*2940. Register of Royal Navy Ships, 1660-86. 
*2941. Register of Sea Officers, 1660-88. 

(" MS. Naval Register relating to the three 
following particulars, viz. : 1. The Execution of the 


Office of High Admiral ; 2. The Flag Officers charged 
with the Fleets ; and 3. The Commanders and 
Lieutenants of all single ships employed in the 
service of the Crown between May 1660... and 
December 1688, etc.") 

6. Printed Calendars. 

"Clarke Papers (Camden Society Publ.). 4 vols. s. 4. 

London, 1891-1901. 
*Hyde, Edward, Earl of Clarendon, Calendar of State 

Papers of, preserved in the Bodleian. 3 vols. 

8. Oxford, 1869-76. (Papers dealing with pre- 

Restoration Royalist intrigues.) 
*Thurloe, John, State Papers of. Ed. by J. Birch. 

7 vols. F. London, 1842. 

(Originals in Bodleian. Many of naval interest : 
especially Baltic expedition in 1659.) 


1. Calendars of State Papers preserved at the Public 
Record Office. 

(a) "Domestic Series. Ed. by M. A. E. Green. 

Commonwealth. 1658-9, 1659-60. la. 8. London, 


Charles II. 1660-1, 1661-2, 1662-3, 1663-4, 1664-5, 
1665-6, 1666-7, 1667. Also Addenda 
1660-70 in volume 1670. la. 8. Lon- 
don, 1860 etc. 

These contain the great mass of the existing information 
about the Navy of the Restoration ; official and private 
letters from officers on service, official correspondence from 
and to the Navy Office, News-letters, etc. Many are not 
fully calendared notably papers dealing with Allin and 
Holmes but sufficient information is given to be an 
adequate guide to the original papers. 

(6) Colonial Series. 

America and W. Indies. Ed. by W. Sainsbury. 
1574-1660, 1661-8. la. 8. London, 1860, 1880. 
(Including many papers dealing with the expedi- 
tions of Holmes and Harman, especially the latter.) 


(c) Treasury Books. Ed. by W. A. Shaw. 1660-7. 
la. 8. London, 1904. 

2. *Admiralty Papers (see List of Admiralty Kecords, 
Vol. i, Pub. Rec. Of. Lists and Indexes, No. xvm, F. 
London, 1904). 

Secretary's Dept. 

Adm. Sec. In-Letters. 
Ad. I. 5246. Copies of Orders in Council. 1660-88. 

Ad. II. Orders and Instructions. 1665-79. 

Index and Compilation. 

Ad. X. 10. Abstracts of Captains' Services. 1660-1741. 
Ad. VII. 549. List of Captains and Ships (1660- 


Accountant General. 
Accounts. Various. 

112. Victualling Accounts. 1657-8. 
B. Books 24-44. 1655-68. 
Treasurer's Ledgers 1-11. 1660-8. 
Miscellanea. Various. 
119. Prices of Stores, 1660-1720. 
132. 1658-1730. Register of Orders to Yards. 
136. 1658-1765. 

139. 1662-1731. Orders from Navy Board (Ab- 

Navy Board. 
*1-14. 1660-7. 

2066. 1660-1700. Abstracts of letters from Ad- 

2507, 2533, 2538-9. 1658-1768-9. Standing 
orders to Yards. 


3117. 1660-7. List and Descriptions of Ships. 
3537-8. Miscellaneous. 

Victualling Dept. 

Accounts 47, 48. Sea and Harbour Victualling. 


Chatham Chest. 

2. 1656-7. Accounts. 

128. Miscell. Orders, etc. 



Aitzema, Lieuwe van, Saken van Staaten Oorlogh, in ende 
omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden. 6 vols. 4. 
The Hague, 1669-72/ 
(To 1669.) 

Baker, Sir Richard. A Chronicle of the Kings of England 
(up to 1661. Detailed account of Restoration). F. 
London, 1670. 

Basnage de Beauval, Jacques. Annales des Provinces- 
Unies, depuis les negociations pour la paix de Munster. 
2 parts. Hague, 1719. F<>. 

Burnet, Gilbert. History of my own Time. 2 vols. 8. 
London, 1723-34. Ed. by M. J. Routh. 6 vols. 8. 
Oxford, 1833. Pt. i. (Chas. II), ed. by A. Airy. 
2 vols. 8. Oxford, 1897-1900. 

(Hostilely criticised by many, especially Ranke and 
Swift : memoirs rather than a history. Nevertheless a 
cardinal authority, " conspicuously and honourably fair 
in tone though frequently inaccurate in detail " (Airy).) 

Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of, Life of, by himself : 
in which is included a continuation of his History of 
the Rebellion. 3 vols. 8. Oxford, 1759. 

Heath, James. A Chronicle of the late Intestine war . . . 
to which is added a brief account of the most memor- 
able transactions in Eng.,-Scot. and Ireland and Foreign 
Parts from 1662-1675, by J.Philips. F. London, 1676. 
*Kennett, White, Bp of Peterborough. A Register and 
Chronicle, ecclesiastical and civil, . . . with proper notes 
and references towards discovering and connecting the 
true history of England from the Restoration of Chas. II. 
F. London, 1728. 

(Only one volume Jan. 1660 to Dec. 1662 
compiled with extracts from newspapers, tracts, etc., 
also from Sandwich MS. Journal.) 


Whitelocke, Bulstrode. Memorials of the English Affairs ; 
or an historical account of what passed from the 
beginning of the reign of King Chas. I. to King Chas. II. 
his happy restauration. F. London, 1682. 

(Very little naval matter. Parliamentary debates on 
the Baltic.) 


Blencowe, R. W., Sydney Papers, ed. by, consisting of 
a journal of the Earl of Leicester and original letters 
of Algernon Sidney. 8. London, 1825. 

(Letters from A. Sidney while ambassador in Baltic 
in 1659 ; see also Sydney Papers below.) 
Burton, Thomas, Diary of, 1656 to April 1659. 8. 
London, 1828. 

(Parliamentary debate on Baltic question.) 
*Estrades, Godefroi Comte d'. Lettres, Memoires et 
negociations de M. le Comte d'E., 1663-8. 5 vols. 
12o. Brux., 1709. 

Ambassades et negotiation de M le Comte d'E., 

1637H62. 2 vols. 12. Amsterdam, 1718. 

Sale of Dunkirk. . .in the year 1662, taken from the 

letters, etc., of the C. d'E. by E. Combe. 12. London, 

(Estrades was largely responsible for the conduct 
of the French side of the negotiations for the purchase 
of Dunkirk.) 

Evelyn, John, Diary of. To which are added a selection 
from his familiar letters. . .Ed. by W. Bray. New 
editions with life and preface by H. B. Wheatley 
(4 vols.), and Austin Dobson (3 vols.). London, 1906. 

(Very little of naval interest in the Diary. A great 
contrast in interest and value to Pepys' Diary. Evelyn 
also proposed to write a naval history but never got 
beyond the introduction. See below, page 217.) 
*Fanshaw, Sir Richard, Bart. Original Letters of his 
Excell. Sir R. F. during his Embassies in Spain and 
Portugal. . .etc. (1664-5). 8. London, 1701. (F. was 
ambassador to Portugal 1662-3, and Spain 1664-5, 
when he was superseded by Sandwich.) 


*Gramont, Armand de, Comte de Guiche. Memoires... 
concernant les Provinces-Unies. 12. London, 1671. 
(Eye-witness's account from Dutch side of the four 
days' battle.) 

*James, Duke of York, [James II]. Memoirs of English 
Affairs, 1660-73. 8; London, 1729. 

(Largely naval, including many of D. of York's 

Ludlow, Edward. Memoirs, 1625-75. Ed. by C. H Firth. 
2 vols. 8. Oxford, 1894. 

(Ludlow was in exile from 1662 till his death. Some 
account of Eepublican intrigues with Dutch by an 
" honest dull man.") 

*Pepys, Samuel. Diary of, 1660-71. Ed. by H. B. Wheatley. 
9 vols., and Suppl. vol. (Pepysiana). 8. London, 

(Absolutely invaluable as giving public and official 
contemporary opinion. His professional position in 
the Navy Office enabled him to give an unofficial view 
of the inside of naval administration, the more valuable 
because unconsidered.) 

Memoirs of the Royal Navy, 1679-88. Ed. by 
J. R. Tanner, s. 8. [Oxf ., 1906.] 

[Sydney Papers.] Letters and Memorials of State. Ed. 
by A. Collins. 2 vols. F. London, 1746. 

(Collections of Letters, etc., of the Sidney family 
from Elizabethan times ; Ewald's life of Alg. Sidney, 
and Blencowe's collection largely drawn from this. 
Baltic negotiations, 1659.) 

Temple. Sir Wm., Bart., The works of. 2 vols. 4. 
London, 1750. 

(Including : Vol. i. Life of Sir W. T., by a particular 

Observations upon the United Provinces, in- 
cluding " Of their Government," " Of their People 
and dispositions," "Of their Trade," "Of their 
Forces and Revenue," etc. 

Vol. n. Letters from Sir Wm. T. concerning the 
1st Dutch War begun May 1661. 
Letters to Sir Wm. T., etc. 


Temple was envoy and ambassador at the Hague 
1665-8. He arranged the secret Treaty between the 
Bp of Miinster and Charles II. The letters include 
some from Arlington, Sandwich and Coventry.) 


Binning, Thomas. A Light to the Art of Gunnery wherein 
is laid down the true Weight of Powder both for Proof 
and Action, of all Sorts of Great Ordnance. Also the 
True Ball, and allowance for Wind, with the most 
necessary Conclusions for the Practice of Gunnery. . .etc. 
London, 1676. 

Bond, Henry. The Boatswain's Art : or the Complete 
Boatswain. Wherein is shown a true Proportion for 
the Masting, Yarding, and Rigging of any Ship. . .etc. 
(21 pages.) 8. London, 1670. 

Bourne, William. The Safeguard of Sailors : or, a Sure 
Guide for Coasters. Describing the Sea Coasts of 
England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Flanders, Holland, 
Jutland, and Norway. With directions for bringing a 
ship into the principal Harbours. 1677. 

Bushnell, Edmund. The Complete Ship-Wright. Plainly 
teaching the Proportion used by Experienced Ship- 
Wrights, according to their Custom of Building. 
Also, a way of Rowing of Ships, by heaving at the 
Capstane, useful in any ship becalmed. . .1st ed. 8. 
London, 1664. 

(48 pages, with diagrams and one plan.) 

Childe, L. A Short Compendium of the new and much 
enlarged Sea-Book, or Pilot's sea Mirror: containing 
the distances and thwart courses of the Eastern, 
Northern, and Western Navigation. 1663. 

(Copy in the Brit. Mus. contains an advertisement 
list of works on Navigation.) 

fDassie, F. L' Architecture Navale, contenant la Maniere de 
construire des navires etc. 4. Paris, 1677. 

(Plans, pictures, and explanations of technical 

Elton, Richard. The Complete Body of the Art Military, 
in three books by R. Elton. F. London, 1668. 

T. 14 


*Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. Ed. by J. S. Corbett. 
(Navy Records Soc. Publ. 29.) 8. London, 1905. 

(Traces evolution of naval tactics ; development of 
fighting in line. " Sailing Tactics was a purely English 

Hay ward, E. The size and Length of Rigging for all His 
Majestie's Ships and Frigates,. . .proportions of Boat- 
swains' and Carpenters stores . . . for 8 months sea ser- 
vice. F. London, 1660. 

*Hoste, Paul ; L' Art des Armees Navales ; avec la Theorie 
de la Construction des Vaisseaux. 2 vols. F. Lyon, 

(An English translation and Adaptation by 
Lieut. Chr. O'Bryen. 4. London, 1762.) 

(The standard authority on naval tactics for nearly 
a century. Valuable accounts of actions in the war 
of 1665-7 used as illustrations arid examples. With 
over 130 engravings illustrating tactical evolutions.) 
*0economy of H.M. Navy Office, The, containing the 
several duties of the Commissioner and Principal 
Officers thereof. Being the first Rules established for 
them by the Duke of York. 12. J. Browne, London, 

(These are little more than a re-issue of the regula- 
tions of the Earl of Northumberland in 1638, with a few 
minor alterations and a letter of the Duke of York 

Vervolgh op het bootsmans praetje van het schip Hollandia. 
s. 4. 1672. 

In British Museum. 

*(1) Thomason Tracts (see special Catalogue, Lond., 1908, 
2 vols. ; none later than 1661) including : 

1659. Feb. 8. English Fleet designed for the 

Sound. (669, f. 21.) 

Nov. 29. Monk to the Navy (Thro' V. Adm. 
Goodson). (669, f. 22.) 


1659. Dec. 28. Lawson's letters to Mayor of 
London and Commissioners of the Navy. 
(669, f. 22.) 

1661. Jan. 17. Orders and Instructions for paying 
off the Navy. (E. 1075, f. 29.) 

(2) Miscellaneous Tracts, English. 

1659. Nov. 4. Letters from Commanders and 

Officers of the Fleet to Gen. Monk. Pub. 
by S. Griffin. London. (1093, c. 37.) 

1660. A List of all the Ships and Frigots of England. 

(Baltic fleet, 1659.) M. Simmons. (103, 

1664. A Brief Relation of the Present state of 

Tangier. (583, c. 8.) 

An History of the Transactions betwixt the 
Crown of England and the States of the 
Netherlands, since they first began to be 
a Republique, to this day. Tho. Mabb. 
London 56 pp., s. 4. (8122, d. 93.) 
(A rabid justification of England. Another 
copy with different title-page : " The 
English and Dutch Affairs displayed to 
the life." 1103, f. 12.) 

1665. A List of H.M. Fleet as divided into Squad- 

rons. (190, g. 13.) (227.) 
Copy of a Paper presented to the King . . . 

by the Spanish Ambassador. 
(Portuguese marriage and Span, claims on 

Tangier. 190, g. 13.) (379.) 
* Instructions to a Painter for the drawing of 

a picture of the State and Posture of the 

English Forces at sea ... in the conclusion 

of the year 1664. London. (1871, e. 9.) 
Relation de ce que Ton a appris jusques a 

present du Combat Naval sonne le 12, 13 

et 14 de juin, 1665. 
(An ingenious tale of English fireshipa 

disguised as flagships, etc.) Quil. Scheybels. 

Bruxelles. (807, c. 28.) 



1665. A Royal Victory obtained against the Dutch 
Fleet, June the 2nd and 3rd, 1665. (A song.) 
F. Coles. London. (Rox. in. 240.) 
Gratulatory Verse upon our late glorious 
victory over the Dutch. By the Author of 
Iter Boreale (R. Wild), London. (1871, 
e.9.) (17.) 

Joyful News for England, or, a Congratulatory 
verse upon our late happy success in firing 
150 Dutch ships in their own harbours. 
F. R. Head, London. (Lett. in. 95.) 
*1666. A True Narrative of the Engagement Between 
H.M. Fleet and that of Holland, begun 
Jun. 1st, 1666 at Two aclock in the after- 
noon. Publ. by command. Th. Newcomb. 
London. (816, m. 26.) (13.) 
The Victory over the Fleet of the States 
General obtained by H.M. Navy Royal in 
the late engagement begun the 25th of 
July inst., as it came from his H. Prince 
Rupert and H. Grace the Duke of Albe- 
marle. Publ. by Command. Tho. New- 
comb. London. (816, m. 23.) (14.) 
1689. Observations concerning the Dominion and 
Sovereignty of the Sea. Sir Philip Meadows. 
47 pp. London. 

Also a volume of " Tracts relating to the Navy " (533, 
d. 2) consisting of a number of tracts of 1693-1702 ; in- 
cluding " Piracy Destroyed ; or, a short Discourse shewing 
the Rise, growth and causes of Piracy of late " (London, 
1701), and " An historical and Political Treatise of the Navy : 
with some Thoughts how to Retrieve the Antient Glory of 
the Navy." 

The Harleian Miscellany of pamphlets and tracts 
selected from the library of Ed. Harley, 2nd Earl 
of Oxford. 10 vols. 4. London, 1808-13. (Index 
in Vol. x.) 

The Somers collection of Tracts ; arranged by W. Scott. 
13 vols. 4o. London, 1809-15. (Vols. vi, vn and 


vin contain numerous tracts dealing with civil and 
ecclesiastical questions of the period, but none are 
of direct naval interest.) 

3) Dutch Tracts. (8122, ee. 7 and 8.) 

" Traktaken betreffende Engelsche Staatszaken," of 
which Vol. vii, 1661-5, and Vol. vin, 1666-73, contain many 
tracts of interest, of which the following are the more im- 
portant : 

Vol. vii. 1661-5. 

2. t'Samen-Spraeck tusschen een Portuguees ende 

een Spanjaert, ober het befloten Houwelijck 
van den Herst. Koninck van Engelant met 
de Tochter van den Hertogh van Bragance. 
Brugge. 1661. 

3. Raets-vraginge van den K. van G. Brittainen 

van sijnen Broeder den Hertogh van Jorck, 
of het Houweljek met de Princes van Portu- 
gael. (From English.) 1661. 

12. Twee Memorien van de Herre Downing. . .over- 

gegeven aen de Herrn Staten Generael. 
Den 3 end 8 Aug. 1661. 

13. Vervolgh Schryvensnyt Engelandt aenzen 

Nederlants Coop Man . . . ontrent den torstand 
van de Engelish en Hollandtsche Tractaten. 
Enckhuyschen. 1661. 

17. Historisch-Verhael van de vrye Nederlandsche 
extraordinare Ambassade by den Koninck van 
Brittangien vervolght ; t zedert den 27 Jan. 
1662. 2 parts. Rotterd. 1662. 

24. Naer der Klagh-Vertoogh aen de H.M. Heeren 
Staten Gener. wegens de Bewinthebberen 
vande Gener. geoctro. W. Indische Comp., 
ter sake vande on wettelljcke. . . procedure n 
der Engelsche in Nieu-Nederland. (Nae de 
Copye.) 1664. 


25. Den Toestant der Swevende Verschillen, tuss- 

chen de Oost, ende West-Indische Compag- 
nien, van Engelant, ender van de Neder- 
landen. (Nae de Copye.) 1664. 
(Negotiations from Oct. 18, 1663, to Feb. 3, 1664.) 

26. Advys ende Antwort van haer H.M. Heeren 

St. Gener. op het sentiment ende verklaring van 
de H. Downing . . . ontrent de twee Schepen 
Bon' Avontura, en Bon' Esperance. Gehon- 
den in 's Gravenhage, den 10 Junij, 1664. 
Leyden, 1664. 

27-29. (Correspondence between Eng. and Nether- 
lands July 13 Dec. 20, 1664.) 

30. Klachte der W. Indesche Compagnie, tegende 
0. Indische Comp. . . .voor-gevallen in een 
Dialogue... Middelburgh, 1664. 

32. Memorie van de Bewint-Hebberen der W. 
Indische Comp. ter Earner van Amsterdam... 
Nessens een be-eedigde verklarung van And. C. 
Vertholen Schipper op het Schip de Eendracht. 
Amsterdam, 1664. 

34. (Dutch Trans, of Coventry's account of June 3, 

1665.) Antwerp, 1665. 

35. Lyste. (Large sheet-list giving fleet that left 

Texel 22nd and 23rd May (n.s.), and those 
that returned after the battle of June 3-11. 
" Lost or missing 16 and one yacht.") 

36. Hertoge van Jorck . . . Generale Instructie voor 

. . . gevonden in 't Schip de Charity of Liefde, 
genomen by Cap. de Haen. Haarlem, 1665. 

38. Neerlander en Engelsman. t'Samen spraek 

overden Zee-Strijt den 13 Junij, 1665, lest 
voorgevallen, 1665. 

39. Autenticq Verhael, van al 't geene, guepasseert 

is, in, ende ontrent 's Landts Vloote, 't sedert 
...den 13 Jun. tot. den 13 Aug. 1665. 

(Including details of Dutch inquiry into the 
conduct of the fleet on Jun. 3-13, 1665.) 


40. Zee- Journal, ofte Autentijcq Verhael, Uyt 

d'annotatien vande Heeren haer Hoo. 
Volm. inde Vloot. . . aen-gaende al het. . . 
geschiet is van den 13 Juny to den 6 Octob. 
1665. (68 pp.) Amsterdam, 1665. 
(Including Dutch version of Bergen affair.) 

41. Den Engelsen Blixem, Welck is de Zee... 

mitsgaders nader openbaringe van der Engel- 
sen Handel ende wandel. (Dutch side of the 
English Dominion question: cf. "An History 
of the Transactions," above, page 211.) 

42. Brief van Johan Valkenburg. . . (Large sheet.) 


(Published by order of the States and distributed 
throughout the Fleet.) 

Vol. vm. 1666-73. 

3. Oprecht ... Verhael, van 't gene is geremarc- 

queert onder het bloedigh gevecht, . . . voor- 
gevallen op den 11, 12, 13 en 14 Junius, 1666. 
Middleburgh, 1666. 

4. Een vonpartij dig. . .Verhael. . .(identical with 

above). Eotterdam, 1666. 

5. 6, 7. Een trouw 't Neder. Duyts 

vertaelt; op dat de Nederlanders en alle 
andere mogen sien, de versiede Logenen, 
daer de Engelse haer behelpen, oomme haer 
gepretendeere Victorie staende te honden. 
(Trans, by different printers of the English 
"True Narrative of the Engagement" (see 
above, page 212) ; publ. by command of 
the States Gen.) Kotterdam and 's Graven- 
hage, 1666. 

8, 9, 10, 11. Verhael van 't gepasseerde inde Zee- 
slach Tusschen de Vlooten van Engelandt 
ende van de Ver. Neder ... opgestelt ... in 
date den 24 Junij, 1666... Naer een curiens 
examen vande Hooft-Officieren, Commandeurs 


en Capiteynen der voorsz. vloot. 's Graven- 
hage, 1666. 

(French trans, of this in "Description exacte," 
see below.) 

13, 15. Het Engelsche Verkeet-bert, gespeelt op 
de Vlaemse Kust. (2 parts.) Velissingen, 
(A discussion between numerous persons about 

the four days' fight.) 

16. Brieven aende H.M. Staten Gener. van De 

Ruyter, Tromp, en Meppel. Schiedam, 1666. 
(Aug. 5-7, 1666. Account of sea-fight, Aug. 5.) 

17. Journal van den lesten Uyttoch, Zee Slagh,. . . 

geschiet den 4 Aug. 1666. 1666. 
(42 pp. 12, includes above letters.) 

18-20. Den Oprechten Hollandsen Bootsgezel . . . 
geveest zijnde in de Laatste Zeeslag. (2 parts.) 
Eotterdam, 1666. 


Burchett, Josiah. A Complete History of Transactions 
at Sea to conclusion of the last War with France. 
F. London, 1720. 

(Not in detail before 1688. Not reliable ; e.g., Allin 
and Smyrna fleet.) 

Churchill, Awnsham and John. A Collection of Voyages 
and Travels by A. and John Churchill. 6 vols. F. 
London, 1744-6. 

Colliber, Sam. Columna Rostrata, a critical History of 

English Sea-Affairs. 8. London, 1727. 
*Description exacte de tout ce qui s'est passe dans les 
guerres entre le Roy d'Angleterre, le Roy de France, les 
Estats des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas, et 1'Evesque 
de Munster. Comm. de Tan 1664 et finissant avec la 
conclusion de Paix faite a Breda en 1'an 1667. (241 pp.) 
s. 4. Amsterdam, 1668. 

(A moderate account from the Dutch point of 
view. Full and valuable accounts of various actions.) 


Evelyn, John. Navigation and Commerce, their origin 
and progress. 8. London, 1674. 

(Intended as an introduction to a history of the 
Dutch War. Suppressed by order of the King on 
first publication.) 

*Hollond, John. Second Discourse of the Navy, 1659. 
Ed. by J. R. Tanner. (Navy Records Soc. Publ., No. 7.) 
8. London, 1896. 

(Victualling, pay, etc.) 

*Manley, Sir Roger. The late Warres in Denmark. F. 
London, 1670. 

(Contains report made by Meadowes on his return 
to England from his embassy in Denmark during the 
Baltic expedition of 1659.) 

Molloy, Chas. De Jure Maritime et Navali: or a treatise 
of Affairs Maritime and of Commerce. First ed. 
8. London, 1676. 

(Chapters on "The Right of the Flag, as to the 
acknowledging the Dominion of the British Seas," 
"Dominion established by Treaties of Alliance," 
"Salutations of Ships of War, and Merchantmen," 
etc., in Book i.) 


The principal newspapers, under various changing 
names, during the period were: 

Up to April 1660: 

Mercurius Politicus, 
Publick Intelligencer. 

Later : 

Mercurius Publicus, 
Parliamentary Intelligencer, 
The Monthly Intelligencer, 
London Gazette, 
Current Intelligence. 

(For history of the Press during the period see Kitchin, 
George. Life of Sir Roger Lestrange. 8. London, 1913.) 




Allen, J. Battles of the British Navy. 8. 2 vols. 
(Bohn's Illustrated Library.) London, 1852. 

(This, in company with Du Sein, Yonge, etc., has 
been largely superseded by the works of Clowes and 
Hannay and Rittmeyer, q.v.) 

Campbell, John, LL.D. Lives of the Admirals : containing 
an accurate naval history. New edition, revised. 
8 vols. 8. London, 1817. 

("Naval History of Chas. II," and "Memoirs" of 
Monk, Mountagu, Rupert, Ayscue, Lawson and Spragge.) 
*Clowes, Sir W. Laird. The Royal Navy. A history from 
the earliest times to the present day, by W. L. Clowes, 
assisted by Sir C. Markham, Capt. A. T. Mahan, Mr T. 
Roosevelt, etc. 7 vols. la. 8. London, 1897-1903. 
(The standard English Naval history. Vol. n. 
Ponderous and rather unequal: uses strange and 
arbitrary distinction between "major" and "minor" 
operations. The operations in the Mediterranean are 
"minor." Illustrations of prints and medals, but no 
maps beyond diagrams. No bibliography. Note Navy 
List of 1660 Some of the omissions, e.g. Restoration, 
Administration, are supplied by Hannay, q.v.) 

Derrick, C. Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of the 
Royal Navy. 4. London, 1806. 

(Useful lists and notes about Shipbuilding.) 

Du Sein, A. Histoire de la Marine de tous les peuples. 
2 vols. 8. 1863-79. 

Eardley-Wilmot, Rear-Adm. Sir S. Our Navy for a 
Thousand Years. Fourth ed. 8. London, 1911. 

Entick, John. A New Naval History. F. London, 1757. 

Firth, C. H. The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656-8. 
2 vols. 8. London, 1909. 

(A general history, including, however, the financial 
decay of the Navy before the death of Cromwell.) 


Gardiner, S. K. History of the Commonwealth and Pro- 
tectorate, 1649-60. 3 vols., and Suppl. chapter. 8. 

(The standard general history of the period. 
Unfortunately, owing to author's death, never com- 
pleted beyond 1656.) 

*Hannay, David. Short History of the Royal Navy. 
Vol. i. 1217-1688. 8. London [1898]. 

(On main points not so "short" as Clowes. Note 
specially administration and development of naval 
strategy after the Restoration.) 

*Jonge, J. C. de. Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche 
Zeewezen. 6 parts. 8. The Hague, 1833-48. 
(Second ed. 1858-62.) 

(The standard Dutch Naval history. From 1665. 
Good bibliography and valuable lists.) 
Lediard, T. Naval History of England, 1066-1734. 
2 vols. F. London, 1735. 

(One of the better early histories; quotes largely 
from original sources; spends most pf his footnotes 
in controverting Rapin which, at times, is en- 
Moreau, Cesar. Chronological Records of the British 

Royal and Commercial Navy. F. 1827. 
*Rittmeyer, Kontre-Adm. Rudolph. Seekriege und See- 
kriegswesen in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung. 
2 Bde. 8. Berlin, 1907-11. 

(Combines De Jonge and Clowes; discussions on 
Strategy and Tactics; good critical bibliography of 
general works: maps and illustrations.) 
Robinson, Comm. C. N. The British Fleet, the growth, 
achievement and duties of the Navy of the Empire. 
8. London, 1894. 

(Note Customs, personnel and social side of Navy, 
150 illustrations, prints, etc.) 

Stenzel, Alfred. Seekriegsgeschichte . . .mit Beriicksichti- 
gung der Seetaktik. 5 vols. 8. Hanover, 1911. 

(Much space devoted to discussion of the tactics of 
the Dutch Wars. Very few references. Rather fond 
of comparing seventeenth century politics with those of 


present day substituting England for Holland, and 
Germany for England.) 

Wheatley, H. B. Samuel Pepys and the World he lived 
in. Fifth ed. 8. London, 1907. 

(Chapter on Navy, p. 128, and following.) 
Yonge, C. D. History of the British Navy from the earliest 
period. 2 vols. 8. London, 1863. 
(Of. Allen, above, page 218.) 

(1) English and Dutch 

Anderson, R. C. Naval Wars in the Baltic, 1522-1850. 
8. London, 1910. 

(Little about the Baltic expedition of 1659.) 
Beaujon, A. Overzicht der gesch. van de Nederlandsche 

zeevisscherijen. 8. Leyden, 1885. 

*Corbett, Julian. England in the Mediterranean : a Study 
of the Rise and Influence of British Power within the 
Straits, 1603-1713. 2 vols. 8. London, 1904. 

(Only complete work on subject; fairly detailed 
account 1662-7. Not many references and no biblio- 

Davis, Lt.-Col. J. Hist, records of the Second Queen's 
Royal Regiment. 6 vols. la 8. London, 1887-1906. 
(Full account of Tangier, 1663-. Good biblio- 

Edmundson, Rev. George. Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during 
the first half of the Seventeenth Century. 8. Oxford, 

(Origin of the Dutch Wars.) 
fJapikse, N. De Verwikkelingen Tusschen de Republiek 

en England van 1660-5. 

Jurien de la Graviere, J. P. E. Les Anglais et les 
Hollandais dans les mers polaires et dans la mer des 
Indes. 2 vols. s.8. Paris, 1890. 
Lopez de Ayala, Ignacio. Historia de Gibraltar; docu- 
mentos ineditos perteniendos a la ciudad de Gibraltar. 
4. Madrid, 1782. 

(Eng. trans. London, 1845.) 


Lord, W. F. England and France in the Mediterranean, 
1660-1830. 8. London, 1901. 

(Very scanty before 1800, mostly Napoleonic. No 
references, and arrangement, peculiar.) 
Low, Charles K. History of the Indian Navy, 1613-1863. 

2 vols. London, 1877. 

*Routh, E. M. G. Tangier; England's lost Atlantic 
outpost, 1661-81. 8. London, 1912. 

(Full references and bibliography; numerous illus- 
trations from old prints.) 

*Tanner, J. R. Navy of Commonwealth and First Dutch 
War. (See Chap, xvi in Cambridge Modern Hist., 
Vol. iv. Cambridge, 1906.) 

"Tanner, J. R., and C. T. Atkinson. Anglo-Dutch Wars. 
(See Chap, ix in Camb. Modern Hist., Vol. v. Cambridge, 

(The best summary of the period. Bibliographies 
at end of respective volumes.) 

(2) Other Nations 

Chevalier, E. Histoire de la Marine fran9aise jusqu'au 

traite de paix de 1763. 8. Paris, 1902. 
Fernandez Duro, C. Armada Espanola desde la Union de 

los Reinos de Castilla y de Leon. 9 vols. la. 8. 

Madrid, 1895-1903. 
Guerin, Leon. Histoire Maritime de France. 6 vols. 

Nouv. ed. la. 8. Paris, 1851-2. 
La Ronciere, Charles de. Histoire de la Marine frangaise. 

4 vols. 80. Paris, 1899-1910. 

(Vol. iv, pub. 1910, only goes to 1642. A standard 

Mitchell, J. History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks. 

(Trans, from Turkish of Haji Khalifeh. Oriental 

Trans. Fund.) 4. London, 1831. 
Sue, M. J. Eugene. Histoire de la Marine fra^aise, 

17 e siecle (1653-1712). 5 vols. 8. Paris, 1835-7. 
tTuxen, J. G. Den Danske og Norske Somagt fra de 

aeldete Tider ind til voge Dage. laere Skildringer. 

Kjobenhavn, 1875. 



(1) Strategy. 

*Colomb, V. Adm. Philip Howard. Naval Warfare, its 
ruling principles and practice historically treated. 
Second ed. la. 8. London, 1895. 

(Standard work. Dutch wars treated from strategic 
standpoint; accounts of actions: chapters 2, 3, 4, and 
references passim.) 

*Corbett, Julian. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 
la. 8. London, 1911. 

(Treated historically: references to Dutch Wars 

*Mahan, Capt. A. T. The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History, 1660 to 1783. 8. London, 1889. 

(The classic of naval strategy: cf. later works on 
subject by other writers. Detailed accounts of actions. 

Maltzahn, V. Adm. Baron Curt von. Naval Warfare: 
its historical development from the age of the great 
geographical discoveries to the present time. (Trans, 
from German by J. C. Miller.) 8. London, 1908. 

(Short (152 pp.) but clear general view of develop- 
ment of naval strategy.) 

*Rittmeyer, Kontre-Adm. R. Seekriege und Seekriegswesen. 
Bd. i. 8. Berlin, 1907. (Discusses strategy of 
Dutch Wars.) 
Rodenberg, Carl. Seemacht in der Geschichte. la. 8. 

Stuttgart, 1900. (33 pages.) 
Stenzel, A. Seekriegsgeschichte. Vol. n. 8. Hanover, 

1911. (Strategy of each campaign.) 
Thursfield, James R. Nelson and other Naval Studies. 
8. London, 1909. 

(Including "The Dogger Bank and its Lessons," 
"The Attack and Defence of Commerce.") 

(2) Tactics. 

Castex, Lieut. R. Les Idees Militaires de la Marine du 
xviii 6 siecle. De Ruyter a Suflren. 8. Paris, 1911. 

(Chap. I on seventeenth century, including critical 
paragraph on Hoste, "Le Theoricien du xvii e siecle.") 


*Rittmeyer, Kontre-Adm. R. Seekriege und Seekriegswesen. 

Bd. I passim. 8. Berlin, 1907. 

Stenzel, A. Seekriegsgeschichte. Vol. n passim. 8. 
Hanover, 1911. (Discussions of tactics of each 

(3) Hydrography. 

The charts in use in the English Navy appear to have 
been small sheets of Dutch publication or English copies 
of Dutch originals. Pepys notes "that Ashley's Books of 
Maps were never printed but once. And never looked after : 
whereas y e Dutch Waggener has been continually kept in 
print and sold under many names over all y e world in 
diverse languages, and continually prefered and used by us, 
notwithstanding Ashley's pretence to have corrected him." 

Wagenaar, Luke. The Mariner's Mirror. 41 charts, la. f. 


(1) General. 

*Charnock, John. An History of Marine Architecture. 
Including an enlarged and progressive view of the 
Nautical Regulations and Naval History, . . . especially 
of Great Britain, etc. 3 vols. 4. London, 1800-2. 
Marsden, R. G. The High Court of Admiralty in relation 
to National history, etc., 1550-1660. (Transactions of 
Roy. Hist. Soc., 1902-3.) 

*0ppenheim, M. A History of the Administration of the 
Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in relation to 
the Navy, from 1509-1660. 8. London, 1896. 

(Note especially victualling, pay, morale. Plentiful 
figures, lists and references.) 

Raithby, John. The Statutes relating to the Admiralty, 
Navy, Shipping, and Navigation of the United Kingdom 
from 9 Hen. III. to 3 Geo. IV. inclusive. With notes, 
referring to the subsequent Statutes, and to the de- 
cisions in the Courts of Admiralty. 1164 pp. 4 
London, 1823. 


*Tanner, J. R. Administration of the Navy from Restora- 
tion to Revolution. (Intro, to A Descriptive Catalogue 
of the Naval MSS, in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene 
College, Cambridge, Vol. i. Navy Records Soc. Publ. 
1903.) Also in Eng. Hist. Review, xn, xm, xiv. 

(Forms a continuation to 1688 of Oppenheim's 

(2) Shipbuilding. 

Arenhold, Kapt. L. Die historische Entwicklung der 
Schiffstypen vom romischen KriegsschifF bis zum 
Gegenwart. la. 4. Kiel and Leipzig, 1891. 

(Includes 30 engravings showing development of 
ships and armament.) 

Charnock, John. An History of Marine Architecture. 
3 vols. Illus. 4. London, 1800-2. 

Derrick, Charles. Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of 
the Royal Navy. 4. London, 1806. 

(Useful notes about shipbuilding, and lists: refer- 

Steinitz, F. The Ship, its origin and progress: with 
plates and flags. 4. London, 1849. 

(Numerous plates illustrating development of ship 
building; also a slight naval history scanty on Dutch 

(3) Personnel. 

Hannay, D. Ships and Men. 8. London, 1910. 
Robinson, Comm. C. N. The British Tar in Fact and 

Fiction . . . with introductory chapters on the place of 

the sea officer and seaman in Naval history and historical 

literature. Illus. 8. London, 1909. 

(Studies of the sailors of the Commonwealth and 

Restoration; uniforms, customs; songs, etc., many 

reproductions of old prints.) 


(1) Articles in Reviews, etc. (The following does not 
pretend to be in the slightest degree even a representative 


American Historical Review, July, 1909. "The English 
Conspiracy and Dissent," by Wilbur C. Abbott. (Navy 
and Restoration.) 

English Historical Review. *Vols. xn, xm, xrv. "Ad- 
ministration of the Navy from Restoration to Revolu- 
tion"; by J. R. Tanner. (Publ. in Vol. I of Catal. of 
Pepys MSS.) 

Marine Rundschau. 1901, p. 117; 1902, p. 265; 1903, 
p. 463; "De Ruiter," Kapt. Gudewill. Jan. 1911. 
" The North Sea : Its History, Politics, and Geography." 
(Trans, and reprinted in Roy. United Serv. Instit. Jour. 
1911.) Cf. Inhaltsverzeichnis zu den Beiheften zum 
Marine Verordnungsblatt und der Marine Rundschau, 
1872 bis 1902. 
Mariner's Mirror, The: Journal of Soc. for Nautical 

Research. 3 vols. 8. [London?], 1911-13. 
Nauticus. Jahrbuch fur Deutschlands Seeinteressen. 
Berlin. 1900. Number contains articles on "Ent- 
wicklung der englischen Seemacht," and "Bliite und 
Verfall der hollandischen Seemacht." 
Revue Historique, xxv, 28. "Etudes Algeriennes; la 
course, 1'esclavage et la redemption a Alger," H. D. de 
Revue Maritime et Coloniale. 

1864, Vol. xii, 565. "Le personnel de la Marine 
Militaire et les classes maritimes sous Colbert et 
Seignelay." (de Crisenoy.) 
1875, Vol. XLIV, 165. "Les ecoles d'hydrographie 

au xvii e siecle." 

1879, Vol. LXIII, 448, 666. "Les Ingenieurs de la 
marine sous Colbert et Seignelay" (1664-90). 

1884, Vol. LXXXII, 137. "Combat naval entre les 
Hollandais et les Anglais, le 11, 12, 13 et 14 juin, 
1666. Relation inedite." 

1885, Vol. LXXXV, 497. "Batailles Navales au milieu 
de xvii e siecle." 

Vol. LXXXVI, 74. 

1888, Vol. xcix, 577. "Tourville et la Marine de sou 

T. 15 


(2) Mercantile Navy and Commerce. 

fBaasch, E. Hamburgs Konvoyschiffahrt und Kon- 
voywesen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Schiffahrt im 
xvn. und xviii. Jahrhundert. la. 8. Hamburg, 1896. 

Blackmore, Ed. The British Mercantile Marine: a short 
historical review, including the rise and progress of 
British shipping and commerce. 8. London,. 1897. 

Cornewall-Jones, E,. J. The British Merchant Service, 
being a History of the British Merchant-Marine from the 
earliest times to the present day. 8. London, 1898. 

East India Company. An Historical Account of the inter- 
course between the inhabitants of Great Britain and 
the people in the West Indies, containing likewise a 
compleat history of the East India Company from its 
erection under Queen Elizabeth. (In Harris, Voyages, 
1764. PO. Vol. i, pp. 873-934.) 

Dutch, History of the Rise, Progress, and Estab- 
lishment of the. (In Harris, Vol. i, pp. 914-48.) 

Oppenheim, M. Administration of the Royal Navy and 
of Merchant Shipping, 1509-1660. 8. London, 1896. 

(3) Other Miscellaneous Works. 

*Firth, C. H., ed. Naval Songs and Ballads. (Navy 

Records Soc., Vol. xxxm.) 8. [London], 1908. 
Hawkins, Edward. Medallic Illustrations of Great Britain 

and Ireland, to death of George II. Ed. by A. W. 

Franks and H. R. Grueber. 2 vols. 8. London, 1885. 
Mayo, J. H. Medals and Decorations of the British Army 

and Navy. 2 vols. 8. 1897. 

(1) Collective. 

*Bos, Lambert van den. Leben und Thaten der durch- 
lauchtigsten See-Helden, und Erfinder der Lande 
dieser Zeiten, anfangdend mit Christopher Columbus 
und sich endend mit dem hochst beriihmten Admiral 
M. A. de Ruyks. 2 parts. Sultzbach, 1681. 
(Includes Opdam, Tramp and De Ruyter.) 


(2) Individual. 

De Euyter 

*Brandt, Gerrit. La Vie de Michel de Ruiter; oh est 
comprise 1'Histoire Maritime des Provinces Unies, 
depuis Fan 1652 jusques a 1676. F. Amsterdam, 

(Original in Dutch, 1687. French trans, by son of 

(Exhaustive and calm account from the Dutch side. 
One of the chief contemporary authorities.) 

De Witt 

Hoeven, Emanuel van der. Leeven en dood de door- 
lustige heeren gebroeders C. de Witt en J. de Witt. 
4. Amsterdam, 1705. 

Monk . 

Gumble, T. Life of Gen. Monck. s.8. London, 1671. 
Skinner, T. Life of Gen. Monck, from an original MS. of 

T. Skinner; ed. by W. Webster. 8. London, 1723. 
(MS. of circa 1680 ? Detailed accounts of actions 

of 1665.) 

Miinster, Bp of 

Life and actions of C. Bernard von Galen, Bishop of 
Miinster. London, 1680. 


Historical Memoirs of the Life and death of Prince Rupert. 
Pub. by Th. Malthus. s. 8. London, 1683. 


*La vie de Corneille Tromp. (Author unknown.) 8. 
Hague, 1694. 

(Though anonymous, this is in company with 
Brandt's De Ruyter, q.v. the chief contemporary 
authority dealing with the war from the Dutch side. 
Detailed eye- witness's accounts of actions.) 


(6) LATER 

(1) Collective. 

*Campbell, John, LL.D. Lives of the Admirals. New 
edition, revised. 8 vols. 8. London, 1817. 

(Includes Monk, Mountagu, Eupert, Ayscue, Lawson 
and Spragge.) 

*Charnock, J. Biographia Navalis, or Impartial memoirs 
of the lives and characters of Officers of the Navy of 
Great Britain from 1660 to the present time. 6 vols. 
8. London, 1794-8. 
(Vol. i. 1660-7.) 

Oust, Gen. the Hon. Sir Edward. Lives of the Warriors 

who have commanded Fleets and Armies before 

the Enemy, 1648-1704. 2 vols. Illustrations. 8. 

London, 1874. 

De Liefde, Jan. Great Dutch Admirals, s. 8. London, 

*Dictionary of National Biography. 

(See under Sir Tho. Allin, Sir Wm. Berkeley, Sir 
Wm. Coventry, Cromwell, Sir Rich. Fanshawe, Sir Rich. 
Goodson, Sir John Harman, Sir Rob. Holmes, Sir Phil. 
Meadows, Gen. Monk, Edw. Mountagu, Sir Wm. Penn, 
Sam. Pepys, Peter Pett, Prince Rupert, Sir Alg. Sidney, 
Sir Rich. Stayner, Sir Tho. Tyddeman.) 
Laughton, J. K. Studies in Naval History. Biographies. 
8. London, 1887. 

(Du Quesne and Colbert.) 

See biographical notes on Penn, Coventry, etc., in Wheat- 
ley's "Sam. Pepys and the world he lived in." 8. 
London, 1907. 

(2) Individual. 

Cromwell, Rich. 

Guizot, F. P. G. Richard Cromwell and the Restoration 
of the Stuarts. Trans, by J. Scoble. 2 vols. 8. 
London, 1856. 

De Ruyter 

Grinnell-Milne, G. Life of Adm. de Ruyter. 8. London, 

(A popular life.) 


fKlopp, Dr 0. Leben und Taten des Admirals de Ruiter. 
8. Hanover, 1852. 

De Witt 

*Lefevre-Pontalis, A. Jean de Witt, Grand pensionnaire 
de Hollande. 2 vols. 8. Paris, 1884. 

(Eng. trans, by S. E. and A. Stevenson. 2 vols. 
8. London, 1885.) 

(One of the chief modern authorities.) 
Simons, P. Johann de Witt und seine Zeit. XJbersetzt 
von F. Neumann. 2 parts. Erfurt, 1835-6. 

(Trans, from Dutch edit., pub. Amsterdam, 1832- 

Du Quesne 

Jal, Auguste. A. du Quesne et la Marine de son Temps. 
2 vols. 8. Paris, 1873. 


Jonge, J. C. de. Levens-beschrijving van Johan en 
Cornelis Evertsen. The Hague, 1820. 

(See also his " Geschiedenis van het Nederl. Zee- 
wezen" above, page 219.) 

James II 

Clarke, J. S. Life of James II, collected out of memoirs 
writ of his own hand. 2 vols. 4. London, 1816. 

Corbett, Julian. Life of Gen. Monk. (Eng. Men of Action 

Series.) 8. London, 1889. 

Guizot, F. P. G. Memoirs of George Monk, D. of Albe- 
marle. Trans, and edit, by J. S. Wortley. 8. 
London, 1838. 


*Harris, F. R. Life of Ed. Mountagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich. 
2 vols. 8. London, 1912. 

(Containing the most recent results of research into 
naval history of this period. Much new material from 
the Sandwich MS. Journal, etc., at Hinchingbrooke: 
full of references, but no complete bibliography and 
no maps.) 



Miinster, Bp of 

Brinkmann, C. Charles II and the Bp of Miinster, 1665-6. 
(Eng. Hist. Review, Vol. xxi, 1906.) 


*Penn, Granville. Memorials of the Professional Life and 
Times of Sir Wm. Penn. 2 vols. 8. London, 1833. 
(A standard authority on the period: impartial: 
prints many valuable papers, orders, etc.) 


Smith, J. The Life, Journal, and Correspondence of 
Samuel Pepys, . . . deciphered by Rev. J. Smith. 2 vols. 
8. London, 1841. 

(Sandwich correspondence starting June 1661 in 
Vol. i.) 

Wheatley, H. B. Samuel Pepys and the World he lived 
in. 5th ed. 8. London, 1907. 

(Slight sketch of development of Navy under Pepys.) 

* Pepysiana. (Supplementary vol. to Diary.) 8. 

London, 1899. 
(Chap, on Navy Office, etc.) 


Warburton, Eliot. Memoirs of Pr. Rupert and the 
Cavaliers, including their private correspondence. 
3 vols. 8. London, 1849. 

(Note Rupert's declaration as to division of the 
Fleet in 1666, Vol. in.) 

Sidney, Algernon 

Ewald, A. C. Life and Times of Algernon Sidney, 1622- 
83. 2 vols. 8. London, 1873. 

(Cf. Sydney Papers, above, page 208.) 


Administration : Chatham Chest, 

enquiry into 62 
Clothing, fixed rates for 69 
Debts 1, 2, 3, 4, 40, 41, 45, 

46 48 54 

Duke of York's " Instruc- 
tions," 1662 49-53, 56, 58 
Funds, shortage of 1,2, 54, 55, 

56, 57, 64, 146, 149, 150; 

appropriated by Charles II 

"Instructions to Captains," 

1663 67, 68 

Navy Board, creation of 42 
Pay, overdue 2, 3, 4, 5, 55, 

63, 64, 150, 151, 153, 183 
Prize money 70, 107 
"Ticket" system, reforms in 

64, 65, 66 
Victualling, see Victuals 

Algiers, expeditions against 81, 
87, 88, 92, 93, 94 

Allin, Captain Thomas 87, 89, 
91 and 91 w., 92, 93, 94, 95, 
96, 98, 119, 121, 124, 130, 
165, 167, 171, 172, 177 

Ayscue, Sir George 6, 110, 120, 

Batten, Sir Wm 42, 43 
Battles, Naval, see Engagements 
Beaufort, Due de 100, 101, 151, 

152, 177 
Bergen, intrigue and fiasco, July, 

1665 126-139 
Berkeley, Sir Wm 110, 112, 

120, 141, 158, 167, 180 
Brakel, Comm. 96, 97, 185 
Breda, Treaty of 190 

Carteret, Sir Geo. 42, 43, 46, 

Charles II 16, 18, 28; declara- 
tion to fleet 33, 34; resto- 
ration 36, 40, 45; marriage 
negotiations with Portugal 
79, 87; and Dutch war 
103, 153; appropriation of 
Navy funds 179 

Chatham Chest, enquiry into 62 

Clifford, Sir Thomas, narrative 
of Bergen fight 135-138 

Colliery ships, high wages on 
118, 120 

Coventry, Sir Wm 43, 45, 53, 
58, 59, 103, 107, 119, 155, 

Cromwell, Oliver 1, 2, 6, 16, 
39, 40, 41; Mediterranean 

policy 72, 74, 76 
ichard 2, 3, 19, 22, 



Denmark 6, 8, 9, 20, 21, 127, 
129, 134, 137 

De Ruyter 9 ; in Mediterranean 
83, 84, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 
93, 116, 126, 128, 130, 131, 
132, 143, 145, 152; in Four 
Days' Fight 153, 155, 156, 
158, 159, 161, 163; St 
James' Fight 171, 172, 175, 
177, 178, 182, 184, 185, 187 

Desertions from fleet 108, 118, 

De Witt 90 

Dutch War, see Netherlands 

East India Company, loan of 
50,000 151 



Engagements : Capture of pirate 

Papachino 10, 11 
Tangier 79, 80 
Smyrna fleet off Trafalgar 94- 


Merlin off Cadiz 98 
Off Lowestoft, June 3rd. 1665 


Bergen 133-139 
June lst^4th, 1666 153-167 
July 25th, 1666 171-175 
"Holmes' Bonfire" 176 
Medway, 1667 182-188 
Thames estuary 188, 189 
Evertsen, John 120, 155, 156, 

159, 167 

Fanshaw, Sir Rob. 80 

France 74, 79, 89; Mediter- 
ranean rivalry 99 ; declara- 
tion of war 100, 151 

Gauden, Denis, victuals con- 
tractor 113, 114, 147 

"General Instructions to Cap- 
tains," 1663 67, 68 

"Gentlemen Captains" 57, 58, 59 

Gibraltar "defile" 72, 73, 78, 
80, 99, 100; see Tangier 

Goodson, Vice-Adm. 5, 7, 8, 
22, 57 

"Guinea Fleet," abortive 105, 
106, 107, 109, 110 

Hamburg convoy, loss of 118 
Harman, Sir John 125, 141, 142, 

Holland, Capt. Thomas, renegade 

Holmes, Sir Rob. 78, 91, 170, 

172, 176, 178 

Invasion, rumours of threatened 

James, Duke of York, command 
of fleet 35, 39, 40; naval 
reform 41,45,48; "Instruc- 
tions," 1662 49.50; reform 
51, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 

65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 78, 83, 
87, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 
battle of June 3rd, 1665 
121, 122, 123, 124, 125; 
reform 147, 148, 172, 181 
Jordan, Sir Joseph 141, 170, 189 

King's letter boys 59, 60 

Lawson, Sir John 16, 19, 24, 25, 
26, 28 ; conversion to royal- 
ism 29, 30, 37, 38, 59; on 
Mediterranean policy 80 ; 
in Mediterranean 80, 81, 82, 

83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 
92, 93, 110, 120, 124, 126 

List, Navy, of ships, 1659 12 

Mediterranean, see Algiers, Gib- 
raltar "defile," Pirates, 
Tangier, Tripoli 

Medway, defences of 181, 182; 
Dutch attack on 182-188 

Mennes, Sir John 44, 64, 110 

Midshipmen, see King's letter 

Monk, George, Duke of Albe- 
marle, conversion to royal- 
ism 27, 28, 29, 31, 34, 42, 
102, 129; joint command 
of fleet with Rupert, 1666 
151, 152, 153; battle of 
June IstH^th, 1666 153, 
155, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 
165, 167, 168, 170; battle 
of July 25th, 1666 171-177, 
183, 185 

Mountagu, Edward, Earl of 
Sandwich 3; in the Sound 
8, 9 ; conversion to royalism 
16, 18; in the Sound 20, 
21,22; and Restoration 23, 
in Mediterranean 81, 82, 

84, 85. 86, 87 ; command of 
"Guinea Fleet" 109, 110, 
116, 120; battle of June 
3rd, 1665 121, 123; com- 
mand of Bergen fleet 129, 



130, 131, 132, 139, 140; off 
Texel, Sept. 1665 141, 142. 

Myngs, Sir Christopher 120, 122, 
163, 167 

Navigation Acts 102 

Netherlands, in the Sound 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 20, 21, 22; claim 
to Bombay 79, 83 ; tension 
in Mediterranean 83, 84, 85, 
86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95; 
Smyrna fleet attacked 96, 
97; declaration of war 97; 
Merlin action 98, 99 ; trade 
rivalry 102, 103; war 
preparations 104, 105, 106; 
trade attacked 111; pro- 
hibition of commerce 115; 
second Dutch war 115-191; 
fleet compared with English 
fleet 119, 120, 121; fleet, 
plague in 144, 145; Dutch 
trade, scheme to attack 
179, 180; peace negotia- 
tions 180, 181, 182; Eng- 
lishmen on Dutch ships 
184; treaty of peace 190. 
See also Engagements 

Opdam 8, 9, 105, 110, 120, 122, 
123, 124 

Perm, Sir William, naval re- 
form 42,43,45,49; captain 
of the fleet 120; as a 
tactician 122; divided com- 
mand of Bergen fleet 129, 
130, 131, 133 n., 169 

Pepys, Samuel, and the Restora- 
tion 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 
35, 36, 37; Clerk of the 
Acts 42, 43, 44; reform 
45, 46, 47 n., 51, 52, 53, 54 n., 
55, 56, 58; enquiry into 
Chatham Chest 62, 64; on 
abuse of pay 65 w., 103; 
war preparations 105; vic- 
tuals 112, 119, 145; reform 
of victualling 146, 147, 148, 

149 ; shortage of funds 150, 

153, 167, 168, 169, 174 
Peterborough, Lord 86, HOn. 
Pett, Peter, Commissioner for 

Navy 42, 44, 55, 182; 

made scapegoat for Medway 

disaster 191 
Pirates, in Mediterranean 10, 11, 

73, 74, 75, 77, 80, 83, 87, 88, 

89, 91 ; in Irish Sea 10, 1 1 n. 
Plague, the, in Dutch fleet 144 ; 

in England 144, 145, 146,161 
Portugal, marriage negotiations 

with 79, 82, 83, 87 
Press-gang 61 ; abuses of 106, 

108, 169 

Restoration, influence of fleet on 
15, 16, 28-36 

Rupert, Prince 39 ; command of 
"Guinea Fleet" 105, 106, 
109; battle of June 3rd, 

1665 120, 122, 123; joint 
command with Monk 151, 
152 ; battle of June lst-4th, 

1666 153, 162, 163, 165, 169, 
170, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183 

Ruyter, see De Ruyter 

Sansum, Robert, Rear- Adm. 110, 

120, 126 
Seamen, shortage of, in the fleet 

107, 108, 118, 130, 140, 142, 

168, 169 

Ships, see List, Navy 
Sidney, Algernon 19. 21, 23 
Slingsby, Sir Robert 43, 49 
Smith, Sir Jeremy 100; battle 

of July 25th, 1666 170, 173, 

Sound, the, abortive expedition 

to 6; tension with Dutch 

in 8, 9, 10 ; changed policy 

in 20, 21, 22 
Spragge, Sir Edward 153, 182, 

184, 189 
Stoakes, Capt. John 10; in 

Mediterranean 74, 75, 76, 

77, 78 
Sweden, see Sound, the 



Talbot, Sir Gilbert, Bergen 
intrigue 126, 127, 128, 131, 
135 n., 136 n., 137 

Tangier, acquisition of 79, 80, 
84, 85, 87, 88, 95, 98, 99, 

Texel, Sandwich off, Sept. 1665 

140, 141, 142 

"Holmes' Bonfire," Sept. 1666 
175, 176, 177 

"Tickets," payment by, see 

Tripoli, pirates of, 73, 74, 75, 77 

Tromp, Cornelius, Adm. 104, 
105; battle of June 3rd, 
1665 120, 124; battle of 
June lst-4th, 1666 155,159, 
161, 163, 165, 170, 173, 175 

Tyddeman, Thomas, Rear-Adm., 
attacks on Dutch trade 110, 

111; battle of June 3rd, 
1665 *120; Bergen 132, 
133, 134, 136. 137, 138, 139; 
battle of July 25th, 1666 
169, 172 

Vane, Sir Henry 25 s , 
Victuals : Shortage and badness 
of 22, 51, 64, 76, 108, 112,' 
113, 114, 117, 118, 129, 130, 
140.. 142, 146, 147, 148, 177 
Enquiry into and reform by 

Pepys 147, 168 
Satisfactory 167 
Pepys on importance of 112 

Whetstone, Capt., in Mediter- 
ranean 74, 75, 77; im- 
prisoned 78 

Witt, see De Witt 


Gal lope r M 


; HART of the Mouth 
of the 


from recent Admiralty charts} 





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86 The navy of the restoration